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INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this dissertation
i. Main purpose
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to
provide a critical introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion of the Swedish philosopher, Christopher Jacob
Bostrflm, with a translation and a critical commentary.
There will be an attempt to discover BostrOm’s
historical relations, his unique contribution, and the
validity of his ideas.
ii. Incidental purpose
A secondary purpose of this dissertation is to
introduce BostrfJm to those who speak the English lan-
guage. This will be done by including some of the
essential facts of his life, a summary of his own
system, and a statement concerning his influence.
Beyond the Scandinavian countries, BostrSm is
comparatively unknown. It is true that the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica has an article of one hundred words
on him.l The Philosophen-Lexikon
,
edited by Hauer,
1. 14th ed.
,
III, 939-940
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Introduction 2
Ziegenfuss, and Jung, has a somewhat longer article on
his life and work.
2
His absence from Hastings’ Ency -
clopedia of Religion and Ethics is striking. The recent
Diccionario de Filosofia by Josd' Ferrater Mora includes
him, 3 and he is accorded a paragraph in Webster’s Bio-
graphical Dictionary . 4 He is treated at greater length
by tteberweg,5 and is included in Eisler.^ HOffding
includes BostrBm in his story of philosophy. ^ Baldwin’s
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology lists BostriJm’s
works .
8
But aside from such recognitions it is safe to say
that he is scarcely known, unless it be as a name, even
in philosophical circles. HOffding says that Swedish
philosophy has been little known beyond the homeland,
even though Sweden has produced a line of energetic and
independent thinkers, such as Thorild, HiJijer, Geijer, and
2. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1937, 112-113.
3. Mexico City: Editorial Atlante, 1941, 63 .
4. William Allan Neilson (ed.), (Springfield: G.
& C. Merriam Co., Publishers* 1943), 175.
5. Grundrlss der Geschichte der Philosophie (Ftlnfter
Teil, 12. Auflage), (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1928),
240, 248-254.
6. Philo sophen-Lexlkon (Berlin: Siegfried Mittler
und Sohn, 1912), 72-73.
7.
- A History of Modern Philosophy (tr. B. E. Meyer),
London: Macmillan and Company, 1935), II, 284-285.
8., New York: The Macmillan Company,. 1905, III,
Part 1, 130.
<.
>n«T
.
_
*’
.
.
' '
Introduction 3
BostrBm. He complains that the other Scandinavian
countries had not done likewise. 9 Yet Kierkegaard
had lived and died practically unrecognized by his
fellow-countrymen. (There was a good reason why; he
found fault with them all the time.) HOffding him-
self has since the time those words were written won
a place among the great philosophers of modern times.
The solicitude of HJJffding speaks for itself.
Waldemar Dons, of Norway, who is generally critical,
admits that if BostriJm had accomplished nothing else,
he has, nevertheless, indebted Sweden to him for lay-
ing the foundation for a scientific interest, which has
vastly benefited the Swedish people #10
The works of HOffding and Dons indicate that in-
terest in BostrOm had extended to the other Scandinavian
countries. He has also been translated into German. !!
Wikner says that an unnamed German called Bostrtfm "The
Plato of the North."!2 A man whose thought has continued
to be a source of interest and study for more than a cen-
tury deserves attention. Fortunately, new books continue
9TTS, 5.
10. OB, 8.
11. Reinhold Geijer and Hans Gerloff: Grundlinien
elnes Philosophischen Systems (Der Philosophischen
Bibliothek, Band 30)
,
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923).
12. STB, 27.
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Introduction 4
to be published about him, one appearing as late as
1937. Books by or about him make a library of more
than fifty volumes. 1^ Indeed, in 1908 a society was
formed to perpetuate the philosophy of BostrCm.^5 its
roster includes the names of leading men of all walks
of life, including some of the bishops of the Church of
Sweden.
2. Survey of previous work
A survey of the work done in this field reveals
that up to the present time very little has been done
in English about Bostrttm. No translation of any of his
work has been discovered. In 1892 L. H. Beck wrote a
doator’s dissertation at Yale University on the subject,
A Comparison of the Doctrines of Reality in the Philos -
ophies of Lotze and BostrQm
,
which includes a study of
the reality of being, finite and infinite, the phenom-
enal world, and the psychic life. This dissertation,
however, has not been published, and the amount of
actual translation of any of Bostrt5m’s work is very
13. Wedberg, LSBF.
14. The Harvard University library contains this
number. According to correspondence with Professor
A. Karitz of Uppsala University, Sweden, this list
appears to be quite complete.
15. BostrtfmsfBrbundet . In all quotations the 0
modern Swedish spelling is used. The Swedish letter a
is given as a.
..
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Introduction 5
limited. The Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature
discloses one article, written by Axel Lundeberg, on
the subject, "Sweden’s Contribution to Philosophy," in
which the philosophy of Bostrtfm is presented. Beyond
this apparently no research has been attempted in this
field.
3. Plan and method of the dissertation
#
The lectures in the Philosophy of Religion by
C. J. BostrOm, which will herewith be given in trans-
lation, were recorded from class lectures and edited
by Sigurd Ribbing, one of his students. This was true
of many c£ the works of Hegel. Ribbing has also edited
Bostrflm’s lectures in Ethics .
^
He was later professor
at Uppsala University. Because BostriJm himself did not
write his Philosophy of Religion
, it is not always pre-
sented in as clear and concise a form as if it had come
from his own pen. Some sentences are incomplete, and
occasionally it is difficult to get their meaning. In
such instances, parts of the original text are included
in the footnotes.
^
In the commentary which will be appended to the
16. Open Court
. 41 (1927), 410-423*
17. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells boktryckeri-
aktiebolag, 1897.
18. Ribbing was aware of this deficiency, and
speaks of it in his Foreword. See FR, VII.
..
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Introduction 6
translation, some of the special thoughts of BostrfJm
are further discussed and analyzed, and in some cases
compared and contrasted with those of other thinkers.
Owing to the necessity of limitation, and to the fact
that a summary exposition of Bostrflm's central thought
is included in the opening chapters of this dissertation,
the commentary will be focused on the fundamental prob-
lems which, though already noted or expounded, call for
added consideration in their special context.
BostrtJm’s lectures in the Philosophy of Religion
include three sections: Theology, Anthropology, and
Philosophy of Religion. The translation included in
this dissertation is the third section. BostriJm's
general introduction to the entire work will precede
the translation of his Philosophy of Religion . Bostrflm
himself wrote an Outline of the Philosophy of Religion
,
which will also be included in the translation as Ap-
pendix.
The plan is to make known as much of Bostrflm as
possible within the scope of this dissertation. In
doing this, special effort will be made to evaluate
BostrOm, and to see him as his fellow-Scandinavians
saw, and see, him. The sources for this dissertation
will, therefore, be almost entirely from the Scandi-
navian languages. They will always be given in trans-
*'
•
.
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lation, but occasionally the original words will be
reproduced in footnotes.

CHAPTER I
WHO IS CHRISTOPHER JACOB BOSTRQM?
The question,, "Who is Bostriim?" is important in
view of the general lack of information about him.
BostrOm himself did not lay great stress on the biog-
raphies of thinkers. He held that their thoughts, if
they really had any, comprised the real element of
their life, and were all that was worth leaving to
posterity.
BostrOm lived in his thoughts. Wikner says of
him that he walked the Alpine heights of speculation
with perfect calm, apparently unconscious of the a-
bysses that yawned to the right and to the left be-
low him. There was in him a sublime naivete' and, in
the best sense of the word, a childlike confidence in
the omnipotence of truth.
1
1. Bo strJJm the Man
BostriJm wrote a brief autobiography in connection
with a resum£ of his philosophical system. 2 This is
apparently what he wished to have known about himself,
1.
" STB, 15.
2. SB, II, 479-480. These references are to
BostrJJm unless otherwise stated.
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I. Who is BostrSm? 9
and is herewith given in a free translation.
He was born at Pite£, January 1, 1797. At the
age of nine he was adopted as a foster-son by an uncle
on his mother’s side, the naval architect, Erik Nordlund,
by whom he was supported as he attended the grammar
school at Pitea. At the beginning of 1812 he went to
college at HernOsand, where his interest in philosophy
was aroused by the lecturer, N. M. Berlin.
As a consequence of this interest in philosophy,
he enrolled at Uppsala University in the summer of 1815,
and remained there as much as his means permitted. The
professors in whose instruction he was most interested
were Biberg and Grubbe. Both while at college and at
the university, (until 1829), he practically supported
himself by tutoring, spending several years av/ay from
Uppsala for this purpose. For this reason he did not
receive the Master’s degree until the spring of 1824.
At graduation he received the highest honors. During
the next few years he studied theology at Uppsala
University.
In 1827 he discontinued the study of theology,
and went back to philosophy, and at the beginning of
1828 he was appointed lecturer in practical philosophy.
He was undoubtedly the most active lecturer at the
university, and also the one most in demand. This con-
.. ,
’
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I. Who is Bo strflm? 10
tinued until the beginning of 1833 5 when he was appointed
tutor at the royal family, and moved to Stockholm.
In the fall of 1837 he returned to the university
as assistant professor in philosophy, and the following
spring he was appointed professor. In September, 1840,
he succeeded Professor Samuel Grubbe in the chair of
practical philosophy, and at the beginning of 1842 he was
appointed regular professor in this department. In this
position he continued until the time of his retirement.
During his incumbency philosophy rose to a very high
position in the life of the university. In the year
1853 he was created Knight Commander of the Order of the
North Star.
^
Dons says that he became fatherless in childhood,^-
which explains his adoption by an uncle. His mother
lived to a ripe old age. Dons accords BostriJm the tribute
that it was not only in the professor’s chair that he
was a philosopher, but both at home and away from home,
and even on the sick-bed. In everything that came into
his experience he saw new occasions for continued research
or for verification of results already attained.-
3. K. N. 0.
4. OB, 5.
5. Ibid.
,
7.
..
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I. Who is BostrfJm? 11
Bostrflm suffered from physical illness during a good
portion of his life. In his letters to students and as-
sociates he complains frequently of the fact that he had
been prevented from doing as much as he wanted to, because of
sickness. 6 He died March 22, 1866, at the age of 69 .
He had already been pensioned some years previously.
He was apt to be intolerant with those who differed
with him. In many instances he said of them that they
did not have the capacity for the study of philosophy.
His argument with Borelius? caused HOffding to speak of
his "sneering reply”® and to remark laconically, "You
are wrong, Zeus, because you become angry. "9 Dons also,
with subtle irony, says that Bostrtfm’s philosophy is only
for those for whom it is sufficient that the master has
said it. 10 But they who knew him most intimately said
that it was not from any ill will that he sometimes spoke
and wrote in such words, but rather from a sense of duty
to what he considered to be the truth.
H
There could also be tenderness in his words, and there
was a spirit of optimism in his soul. When his mother
6. SB, III, 489-599.
7. Ibid.
,
181-245.
8. FS, 5* "H^nende svar."
9. Ibid., 5. "Du har uret, Zeus, ti du bliver vred."
10.
OB, 78. "Mesteren har sagt det."
11.. Wikner in SB, III, XXIV, note; 541-542.
..
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I. Who is Bostrflm? 12
died, he wrote a letter to his sister that breathes
genuine warmth and devotion. To a niece he wrote
on the occasion of her marriage:
One ought to make as reasonable demands
on life and what it has to offer as possible
...and not expect all or even much of it...
By the use of this rule of life I have never
found myself dissatisfied or unhappy, but have
been the happiest and most fortunate person
in the world, so that not even my infirmity
has been a disturbing influence ... .But it is
certainly not my intention to teach you any
kind of contempt of the world or indifference
to the advantages in life. These, too, are
the gifts of God which we should seek ear-
nestly, receive gratefully, and enjoy wisely.
One does not indeed live chiefly to have a
good time, but in order to fulfill the most
important duties of life. But the one can
easily be united with the other, and it is
a great mistake to think that our Lord be-
grudges us our happiness. He Himself is the
fountain of joy and of every other good thing,
and sorrows and afflictions do not proceed
from Him. . .Remain, therefore, as far as you
can, a healthy and hearty individual, because
thereby you please our Lord as well as your
fellow men. 13
This healthy attitude toward life he maintained
to the end of his days. In 1861 he wrote:
The only thing I regret is that I
shall stop at work half done, and that
I would have the mental ability to do
much more, but lack the physical strength. 14
At another time he wrote:
For my own part, I am remarkably
12. See below, 105.
13. Ljunghoff, BSP, 9-10.
14. SB, III, 521.
* . .
.
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I. Who is BostrOm? 13
calm, because I am satisfied with what
happens. For nearly ten years I have
been ready to pack up; and these latter
years that I have lived I have regarded
as borrowed time. 13, 16
In 1862, only a year before he retired, he wrote
to a friend:
But God be praised for what has been.
I am now 65 years, and can soon retire. I
have the joy of seeing others continue what
I have only been able to begin. Thus I have
not lived in vain. 1 '7
2. BostriJm the Teacher
For BostrOm his work as professor at Uppsala
University was always his chief task. Everything else
was subordinate . 18 His duties there were heavy; but,
though his strength was limited, he carried on his
teaching with the devotion of one who loves his work.
His lectures aroused great enthusiasm in his
listeners. Edfeldt speaks of his genuine personality
and the earnestness and love that characterized his
public and private teaching, as well as his entire
life. Of BostrOm it was true that, "Nemo potest in-
flammare alios, nisi ardet ips.."19
15. "Haft pa kiJpet."
16. Larsson, MOB, 53*
17. SB, III, 523.
18. Leander, LGI, 2.
19. SB, III, XIV.
• -
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I. Who is BostriJm? 14
Nyblaeus has described BostriJm as a teacher in
these words:
At the beginning of his lecture, after
he had adjusted his glasses, he produced a
long and narrow pamphlet from which he now
and then sought guidance for his line of
thought. His. voice was usually somewhat
weak and faint as the lecture began, but
gained in strength and firmness as he con-
tinued, without, however, overstepping the
boundary of harmonious proportion. At
times he would raise to his chin the gold-
headed cane that he used for his promenades.
After the lecture was concluded he would
step down from the chair, with a slight
bow to his listeners, and with the same
courteous and kindly smile as the one with
which he had taken his place. 0
Closely related to his work as a teacher was
his writing. BostriJm was often distressed about the
fact that the demands of his duties as a teacher,
together with physical weakness, prevented him from
writing. Sahlin expresses regret that he made the re-
quest that papers left at his death, for whose publi-
cation he had not made definite provision, should be
destroyed. 21
In his writing BostrOm insisted on brevity. He
said, "If the metal that has been acquired is genuine,
it does not need much volume to be of value. "^2 It was
generally believed when BostriJm died that he had left
extremely little writing. But as his editors began to
20. FFS, IV, Part 1, 6.
21. In [Pira and Keijser, ed.]
,
SS, 2 (1909), X, 10.
22. SB, III, 552.
:* -
.
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I. Who is BostrOm? 15
collect it, it was soon discovered that it was not so
meager as had at first been supposed. His works com-
prise three large volumes, and afford a quite complete
presentation of his philosophical system.
BostrOm's style is plain and transparent. There
is a classical simplicity in his writings, as there
was in his extemporary delivery, that cannot but af-
fect the reader, and convince him of the earnestness
of the thinker. 2^ Wikner, evaluating BostrOm’s style,
makes the observation that he cannot be compared with
Plato in the playfulness of fancy, the flexibility of
his thoughts, and his fine irony. But he adds that
when BostrOm could devote himself to his thoughts in
peace, and give expression to them from his viewpoint,
he could be likened to a son of Hellas in artistically
clear and measured plastic. ^5
Nils Linder in an article that gives special at-
tention to BostrtJm's use of the Swedish language, says
it is by its logical clarity and incisiveness, the
stability of its composition, its correctness, concise-
ness, and unostentatious simplicity, that his style merits
the attribute of artistic. He says that the Swedish
23. Nyblaeus, TUBF, 2.
24. Beck, RLB, 13 .
25. STF, 27-28.
.,
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I, Who is Bo striJm? 16
writers are few in whom the words and what they are to
signify harmonize so well as in BostrOm. °
26." Art. (1897), 380-381.
'.'
CHAPTER II
bostrOm’s HISTORICAL RELATIONS, HIS ORIGINALITY,
AND THE VALIDITY OF HIS IDEAS
An investigation of BostrSm’s historical relations
reveals the fact that he had a thorough knowledge of
philosophy. His Outline of the History of Philosophy1
covers the field of philosophic thought, beginning with
Oriental philosophy, and continuing to his own time.
Hans Edfeldt, one of his intimate students who edited
his works, wrote an introductory chapter which bears
the significant title, "The Relation of BostrQm's
Philosophy to the Historically Given Philosophical
Systems, Which Are its Antecedents."
2
The systems in-
cluded as having had influence on BostrfJm are those of
Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Al-
though in his Outline Bostrtfm devotes eleven pages^ to
Aristotle, he is not included.
From Plato he received his syiem of ideas, rational
idealism, and the truth that being is spiritual and has
the content of consciousness. He also accepted the doc-
trine that there is a non-sensuous
,
timeless, and eternal
ground of becoming as the ultimate source of all develop-
1. SB, II, 7-144.
2. Ibid.
,
I, l-92a.
3. Ibid., II, 29-40.
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II. Historical Relations 18
mentU, and that God is Providence, or the personal guide
of man and his world. In Bostrtfm there is also found
Plato's thought that man's purpose is to come to a clear
consciousness of the Ideas and their unity, as well as
of the idea of the Good; and to order his life so that
he attains the Idea.
But BostrOm holds that Plato falters when he as-
cribes moments to God that are sensuous, thus introducing
a dualism into his system of Ideas. 5 He finds this to
be due to the fact that Plato’s idealism is relative,
since the Idea with him is not originally a subject,
or person, but only something that can be the content
of a person. 6 Thus the soul cannot be explained from
the Idea, because it is not identical with it,, as it
is for BostriJm.
BostrBm persistently maintains the distinction
between the empirical and the rational. Plato thinks
A. This strongly reminds/of Aristotle's unmoved
mover.
5. BostrOm says that we must not transfer moments
to the Divine self-consciousness which belong to the
empirical self-consciousness, or moments that are laws
and forms of the sensuous world. SB, I, 15*
6. By relative BostrOm means a philosophical view-
point which begins, not principally with the subject as
such, but only with its content or determinations. See
Edfeldt, Art. (1897), 223. Relative determinations are
determinations for the senses, and thus temporary and
changeable. Absolute determinations are determinations
directly for consciousness, and therefore something in
themselves, necessary, and unchangeable. SB, I, 7.
m.
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II. Historical Relations 19
of the Ideas as being only the original and true content
of consciousness, but BostrOm thinks of them as also
themselves being self-conscious and rational beings.
?
With Plato the Ideas are regarded as forms of divine
reason, as spiritual objects, while BostrOm thinks of
them as spiritual subjects. Thus there are many simi-
larities and some dissimilarities between Plato and
BostrOm.
Pont us Wikner, one of BostrOm' s favorite pupils,
who for a while was professor in Kristiania (now Oslo),
draws this comparison between Plato and BostrOm:
The one as well as the other has erected,
not simply a city in which to dwell, but a
temple in which to worship. If there is some-
thing that can be called speculative devotion,
it is the feeling that grips us as we enter
this sanctuary of the eternal beings. The
trouble and din of the world is there silenced.
Everything has stopped: the struggle and striv-
ing of life, the activity, yes, time itself.
The world is reduced to a shadow, nothing more.
Both Plato and BostrOm know that this shadow is
but the obscure image of the temple; the only
difference is that BostrOm knows why the shadow
must fall here, that it is an optical phenomenon
bounded by law. And the temple itself is very
much alike in both of them. It is built of ideas,
and has its completion in the idea of the good.
But BostrOm knows that within these radiant walls
there dwells a varied personal life. This life
is a beholding. Every idea is a spiritual eye,
7. Walter Pater says that in their first stage
Plato's Ideas are abstract, but that in the second stage
the abstract Ideas themselves become animated, living
persons, almost corporeal, as if with hands and eyes.
See Plato and Platonism (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1903), 152. BostrOm's answer would be that there is no
"as if” about them. They are living persons.
..
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II* Historical Relations 20
and all behold each other, and are beheld by
each other. But they do nothing else, and
nothing happens in this temple. It is a
service without ritual, without song, without
words, without mobile thoughts. It Is an
existence without activity, a life without
history. At this point the two philosophers
meet anew. Twenty-two hundred years of his-
tory intervenes, but they are united in ban-
ishing history from the world of truth. 8 The
question is whether man will be satisfied
with the shadowy existence which is thus as-
signed to him; but he will, nevertheless,
admit that the prospect of a world of clarity
and harmony, whL ch Plato and Bostrdra have
opened for him, is something beautiful to
think about, when he is to determine the goal,
in the direction of which he is to guide the
devslopment of humanity and of the world.
9
Leibniz, a rational idealist who emphasizes per-
sonality, had a great influence on Bostrflm, whose first
writing was a study of the philosophy of Leibniz.
Both stress the importance of the individual, and in the
explanation of the physical world by Imperfect perceptions
there is also a close relationship. With Leibniz the
monads are centers of force; Bostrflm ascribes the same
qualities to the ideas.
Leibniz and Bostrdm differ, however. In their con-
ception of God’s relationship to the outer world. For
8. Yet in Plato the demigods, at the bidding of
the creator, make history. See Timaeus, 41. In Bostrfim
man is ever striving to bring his idea to perfection.
Passim.
9. STB, 28-29. See also SB, I, 5-25, 109, 311;
Leander, LGI, 120-123; Beck, RLB, 10; Ribbing (ed.),
FR, 29.
10.
SB, I, 93-111. See further SB, I, 27-54; II,
77-86; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 29, 34-38, 54, 77, 92-96; Ld-
feldt
,
Art. (1897), 223, 252-253; Nyblaeus, TUBF, 3-4;
Wikner, STB, 27.
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II. Historical Relations 21
Leibniz God is the source of the best possible world;
BostriJm holds that the ideas are eternal in God, Who
stands in a mediate relationship to the world, in and
through man’s spirit, for which the sensuous world is
immediate.H BostriJm says that the system of Leibniz
brings God into the sensuous world, whereas his own
does not.
Leibniz has a pre-established harmony, which makes
his monadology deterministic, while in Bo strOm the
eternal ideas in God are free and independent beings.
BostrOm criticizes the system of Leibniz as relative,
by which he means that it is not concerned with the
subject alone, but with its content and determinations,
and that it grasps the relationship of the monads under
the analogy of that which is in space, or as a ’’spiritual
mechanism.
”
Kant's view of the sensuous world as phenomenal,
and his doctrine of the ideality of space, are a part
of the system of BostrOm.-^ Both emphasize the forms
of understanding, Bostrttm accepting the a priori prin-
11. See below, 37r38.
12. SB, I, 54-61; Edfeldt, Art. (1897), 224,
245-246; Nyblaeus
,
Art. (1897), 2-6, 11-12; Sahlin,
KSB, 17-18; Ribbing, ( ed. ) , FR, 98-100.
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ciples of Kant, as well as Kant's emphasis on conscious-
ness as self-active intelligence . ^-3 BostrOm agrees with
Kant that man cannot go outside of his own consciousness.
For Kant, however, the world is a phenomenon of an
unknown thing-in-itself
,
whereas for BostrOm it is a
phenomenon of an idea as a spiritual and concrete reality.
Thus Kant becomes concerned with the phenomenal, and God
becomes a postulate; with BostrOm God is central,, and
the phenomenal world is the system of God’s thoughts
imperfectly perceived by man. Thus BostrOm is nearer
to Berkeley and Hegel than to Kant at this point.
BostrOm believes that Kant has performed a great
service to practical philosophy in directing attention
to duty; and with Kant BostrOm holds that man is to
be regarded as an end, and not as a means only. BostrOm
criticizes Kant's thing-in-itself as something lying
outside of consciousness, and thus creating a dualism.
For BostrOm consciousness is reality, and therefore
for him there can be no metaphysical dualism between
consciousness and anything external to it. While free-
dom and immortality are postulates with Kant, they are
fundamental in BostrOm.
13- Kant says: "...Only in so far as I can grasp
the manifold of the representations in one consciousness,
do I call them one and all mine." Critique of Pure
Reason (tr. Norman Kemp Smith ), (London : Macmillan and
Co., Limited, 1933), 154» BostrOm holds that it is by
an independent act of our thinking that we understand
anything. (Railing, OK, 78.)
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For Bostrdm the important element in Fichte is the
thought that there are id objects and no existence that
can he considered as falling outside of consciousness.
Self-consciousness is an independent existence without
any underlying substratum, but is its own substratum.
Self-consciousness plus will, i.e., subject or person,
is the substance, and all substance is self-conscious-
ness and will. Bostrdm emphasizes the identity of life
and self-consciousness as the first and simplest sub-
stance in the universe, and hold3 that everything that
exists is a form of life or self-consciousness. Beyond
this, Bostrdm had nothing essential in common with
Fichte. 14
Schelling had a great influence on Bostrdm. In
this connection mention must b^made about the influence
on Bostrdm of his teachers, Biberg and Grubbe, who were
influenced by Schelling. They held that the sensuous
world had its final ground and purpose in an independ-
ent and perfect immaterial reality, i.e., in a divine
intelligence. Biberg held that the ground of man must
be an idea in God, and Grubbe separated God from space
and time, teaching that God must te a self-conscious
being, a personality. Bostrdm was, therefore, directed
toward giving attention to the world of eternal ideas
IT. RibbLng (ed.), FR, 31, 99; SB, I, 61-66;
Nyblaeus, Art. (1897), 3; Edfeldt, Art. (1897), 224,
256-257; SB, II, 117-130.
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that is found in God f s consciousness, thus moving
further in the development of his philosophy of per-
sonalism.
The fundamental thought of Schelling’s philos-
ophy, which prevailed in Sweden at that time, was,
briefly, that nature and man exist, not only through
God, but in God. They comprised forms in and through
which the Divine Being, which is just consciousness
itself, thought of as an infinite activity beholding
and determining itself, expresses and perceives it-
self. In this view, however, God is brought into time,
and is subjected to its imperfections, and man becomes
a dependent expression of the divine power, is bound
by time, and subject to corruption.
Bostrdm differs and, as he holds, advances, from
this position by his development of the principle of
idealism to the principle of personality. By this
principle the self-consciousness that corresponds to
its idea Is not only a person, but the absolute per-
sonality itself, whose moments are composed of original
or independent personal beings. But the influence of
Schelling on BostrBm cane largely through his teachers,
Biberg and Grubbe. 1 *5
Toward Hegel Bostrdm took a critical attitude;
15. Edfeldt, Art. (1897), 224-225; 256-257;
Nyblaeus
,
TUBF, 4-17; SB, I, 67-80; II, 151-144;
Ribbing (ed.), FR, 100-103; Nyblaeus, FFS, IV, Part 1,
12-13; Beck, RLB, 9.
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but the fact seems, nevertheless, to be that he was
influenced by him to a considerable degree. BostrOm
is said to have received three principles from Hegel,
which are a part of Bostrdm's central system. The
first one is: to be is the same as to be for someone,
or to be perceived .^ The second one is: nothing can
be a determination without being something in conscious-
ness. The third: God could not be omniscient, if He
did not possess the form of system. There does not,
however, appear to be clarity or agreement among Bostrflm’s
students in regard to the inference that BostrOm derived
these principles from Hegel.
There is similarity between Hegel and BostrSm in
the emphasis of both on reason as the highest approach
to God; and there are repeated statements in BostrOm
which strongly remind one of Hegel’s emphasis on the
true as the whole. A survey of their respective philos-
ophies of religion reveals more similarity than dis-
similarity, 1 ? except as regards Hegel's dialectical
movement
.
BostrOm, however, frequently charges Hegel with
pantheism. He says that Hegel brings God into time.
The pantheism, says Bostrflm, is due to his system of
nature as process in one world, where man appears,
16. It is apparent that we here have the words of
Berkeley.
17. See below, 133-136-
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works, thinks, and perishes. With Bostrdm reality does
not inolude nature, whidi is only phenomenal; the
sensuous world is the product of man's imperfect per-
ceptions. God, according to Bostrdm, does not need a
concretion in and through nature, because He is com-
plete in Himself, independent of the senses, and time-
less.l®
Berkeley should be added to adfeldt's catalog of
men whose thought has influenced Bostrdm. Bostrdm's
central thought--to be is to be perceived— is the same
as Berkeley’s esse is perd pi . Bostrdm was familiar
with Berkeley, and directs his readers to Berkeley’s
works. He expresses appreciation of Berkeley’s refuta-
tion of the view that our perceptions are images of the
things.
Bostrdm’s criticism of Berkeley is that he could
only rise to a lower empirical idealism or to a sub-
jective idealism, which could not reveal anything exist-
ing in and for itself in an absolute sense as the content
of our perceptions."1" 9
Bostrdm was fully aware of the fact that in philos-
18. SB, I, 79-90; II, 321; Nyblaeus, Art. (1897),
13-15; Wedberg, LSBP, 176-177; Edfeldt, Art. (1897),
257-258; Dons, OB, 14; Aberg, BV, 44-45, 84; Ribbing
(ed.), FR, 61, 71, 103, 114, 117.
19. SB, I, 279; II, 91, 95, 118; III, 218-219,
note 100; Nyblaeus, Art. (1897), 5; TUBF, 14; Wedberg,
LSBF, 92; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 24-26; Edfeldt, Art. (1897),
223, 244, 254.
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ophy the field for originality is more limited than
in art; he, therefore, did not lay claim to all the
originality that his admirers wished to ascribe to
him. But he was certain that he had made discoveries
that were of the greatest importance. Among these he
counted his doctrine that life and self-consciousness
are not two separate realities, but are one and the
same, that is, that life is self-consciousness, and
self-consciousness is life. lie often said that he was
the first thinker that had given an answer to the
question as to what life is.
BostriJm believed that he was the first one who
had investigated the concept of being in its pure
generality. It seems certain that he was led to his
position by his own reflection on the idea of the con-
crete reality in the determinate self-consciousness.
From the concrete self-conscious being he presented
consciousness as a systematic principle. 20
In a letter to Nyblaeus in 1861 BostrOm wrote:
My philosophy is new, and no one has
measured what it contains. I fear that it
will die out with me and my nearest disciples.
It makes such great demands of the human
faculty of thought and on spiritual develop-
ment in general that only a few will become
familiar with it. For that reason I am re-
garded by the masses as half-crazy. But the
idealistic philosopher Has to be satisfied
20. Nyblaeus, TUBF, 13-16.
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with this. He understands that it cannot
be otherwise .. .If I do not receive any
recognition of my efforts, I can, never-
theless, be satisfied. 21
The years that have passed since then reveal that
ppthere was truth in these words. His system has not
gained an extensive adherence. His influence during
his lifetime was pronounced and general in Sweden, and
to some extent beyond Sweden, but it has never reached
very far. On the other hand, there have always been
followers, and there is interest today.
BostrOm’s relationship to other philosophical
systems is apparent. There are, however, some elements
in his own thought, such as his development of the
doctrine that self-consciousness is life, his driving
his rational idealism to its logical conclusion, and hi
emphasis on personality, that indicate original think-
ing, and that have continuing validity. One hundred
years are a comparatively short time in the history
of thought; but they do give some opportunity for
perspective. Through this perspective he appears as
a man who could think, and who dared to think, inde-
pendently.
21. Nyblaeus ( ed
. ) , FI'S, IV, Part 1, 5-6.
22. For a discussion of BostrOm’s influence, see
below, 42-47.
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CHAPTER III
A BRIEF SURVEY OF BOSTrSm’S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM
BostrSm's high regard for philosophy is evident
in all his writings. He holds that philosophy in its
essence is God’s thoughts, which man strives to think
after Him. ^ With him the problem in all philosophizing
is to secure harmony with one's reason,
2
because God
is rational.
Man's interest in philosophy is a necessary con-
sequence of his eternal essence, and appears when he
has reached a certain degree of development. It is,
in fact, nothing else than his interest in himself as
rational, that is, in his true life. The first and
last question in philosophy is how we are to grasp,
or understand, the absolute being, or God, and how
we are to understand the relationship between the
absolute and the relative. ^ The problem is to rec-
oncile man's independence with his being in God.^
BostriJm's thought is pursued from a religious
point of view. He says that all philosophy which
does not satisfy man's religious and moral conscious-
ness must be false, a conviction which had become
his at the age of twenty.
5
1.
' SB, II, L81-482.
2. Karl Pira, in CPira and Keijser, ed.]
,
SS,
6 (1913), XXXIX, 12.
3. SB, II, 193.
U. Nyblaeus , TUBF, L.
5. Wedberg, LSBF, 9.
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1. BostrOm’s Philosophical Method0
In BostrOm we have a psychological and epis-
temological approach to the problem of reality. L.
H. Beck says:
B'ostrOm aims to be speculative and
and philosophical in all his writings. He
disregards all individual and concrete
facts and dwells exclusively with his reason-
ing among the generals. With a kind of in-
tellectual ’’Anschauung” he intuits his whole
system, and then proceeds to explain its
inner connection and development with great
dialectical skill and astuteness.. What is
thus logically explained and proved is beyond
question the ultimate truth .
'
Wedberg says that BostrfJm's philosophy is a
decided metaphysical thought-structure, and that in
his practical philosophy the axiological principle is
dominant. 9 Bostr&n speaks of philosophy as the science
of ideas. 10 He says that in reality the whole method
consists in this: through analysis and abstraction
a person goes back to the most simple element in his
consciousness, and then, by means of this, he synthe-
sizes the more concrete, in order by synthesis to
illuminate the concrete with the clarity he has gained
6 . In general, this chapter follows the material
in SB, II, 481-508. For presentations of Bostrttm’s
system see also Wedberg, LSBF, 21-24; Dons, OB. 26-27;
Ljunghoff, BSP, 120; Vannerus, BTF, 115-116; Aberg,
BV, 76-80, SB, II, 239-310, I, 216-353.
7. RLB, 12-13.
8. See also Larsson, MOB, 13-15.
9. LSBF, 207. See also Ribbing (ed. ) , FR, 15-16.
10.
SB, II, 149.
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in the more abstract.
Sahlin says that, according to BostriJm, philosoph-
ical method is the constitutionally determined^ form of
the systematic activity of thought. This constitutionally
determined form reveals itself in continuous reflection,
which by abstraction or analysis always leads to a develop-
ment of more complete ideas in a definite sequence. This
sequence has its ground in the systematic form of the
original content of human consciousness, and this sys-
tematic form of self-development by which the thinking
person develops his original content to the highest
possible clarity, and arrives at a relatively systematic
knowledge of this content. The influence of Kant on
BostriJm is here noticeable.
BostrOm declares:
Originally, there is nothing else than
the infinite reason and its content, i.e.,
nothing but God and His eternal determinations
—His ideas, or conceptions, all of which also
are absolutely living or self-conscious, and
consequently perfectly perceiving or rational
beings
.
From rather dogmatic assertions of this type
BostrOm builds his thought-structure on a deductively
logical basis. Such a system will be reject§d by those
who reject a priori principles.
11. See below, £l %
12. "Lagbestfimd
.
M
13. Art. (1897), 378. See also 360-378.
14. SB, II, 270.
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2. Summary of BostrGm’s Philosophical System
BostrOm’s philosophy is idealistic and rationalistic.
It differs from all systems in which there is something
realistic: and empirical. Not only space, extension, and
matter, but also time, motion, and change are excluded from
the true and original being.
i. Philosophy the Essential Science
Philosophy in itself is regarded by BostrOm as the
highest and the essential science; it is the absolutely
perfect perceiving or knowing. In this sense philos-
ophy is God’s own omniscience, i.e., God Himself, re-
garded simply as knowing and perceiving.
Man’s philosophy is the same knowing,, but with the
negations, limitations, and imperfections which are a
consequence of his finiteness in relation to God’s in-
finity.
True philosophy, according to Bostrtfm, cannot have
anything else than rational beings, or persons, as its
objects, and since the truth is the identity of knowing
and being, it can only have beings, or persons, as its
content. It can deal with the sensuous and material
things only as phenomena in and for finite-rational
beings. The non-sensuous
,
or spiritual, is always
present in them, but it is not grasped or perceived as
such when the perception is imperfect; it then appears
,*
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in its relative antithesis—as something more or less
sensuous or material.
ii. Life is Self-consciousness
According to BostrQm, life is self-consciousness,
and self-consciousness is life. Life, or self-con-
sciousness, is not connected with any substratum or
anything substantial, but itself comprises the primary
and substantial element in everything. It is the
material of which everything in the last analysis con-
sists.
iii. The Philosophy of Man
The philosophy of man is divided into theoretical
and practical. ^5 This depends on whether its content
—
the rational beings— is considered from a theoretical
or practical viewpoint. From the theoretical viewpoint
beings are regarded only as perceived, or existing;
from the practical viewpoint they are regarded as also
working and acting in and for man. From man’s viewpoint
the theoretical philosophy is regarded as determining
his theoretical capacity--his intellect and knowledge;
and the practical philosophy is regarded as determining
15. With BostrOm the theoretical philosophy deals
with the true, and the practical philosophy deals with
the good and its attainment. Ribbing ed. ) , FR, 10.
.,
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III. Bostrttm’s Philosophical System 34
his practical capacity—his will ana activity.
The theoretical philosophy is divided into three
main sections: 1) Rational Theology; 2) Rational
Anthropology; 3) Rational Ethnology. The practical
philosophy is also divided into three main divisions:
1) Rational or Philosophical Science of Religion; 2)
Ethics; 3) Rational Jurisprudence.
iv. God
B'ostriJm holds that absolute idealism is the true
and necessary world view. This view requires a per-
fectly perceiving Being, or God. 1^ For BostrOm, In-
finite Reason and God are two expressions for one and
the same being, since he holds that the rational is the
true, and the true is the rational. Man is not the
reason itself, but only a rational being, whose reason
is eternal, unchangeable, and holy. Therefore, it is
not reason, but only the sensuous-rational man himself,
that can be depraved, or imperfect, when he does not
use his reason.
As to His form, God has the general attribute of
infinity, which is more closely determined as absolute-
ness, independence, and perfection, system, unity, and
omnipresence. As to His content, considered onto logically
,
God has the attributes: absolute non-sensuousness
,
which
l6. God comes near to being a postulate here.
,.
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means that He is spiritual or immaterial, eternal or
non-changeable
;
absolute system which includes power,
or unity in plurality of being; and omnipotence, or
unity in multiplex. Considered noologically
,
God has
the attributes, absolute reason, including self-con-
sciousness and absolute self-consciousness; absolute
personality,, including knowledge and omniscience.
In relation to man’s theoretical capacity, God is
apprehended as the true; in relation to man’s practical
capacity, as the good; and in relation to his aesthetic
capacity, as the beautiful.
In God's thoughts or conceptions, the perception
and the perceived, or knowing and being, are identical.
The perceptions, or ideas, in so far as they are thought
by God, are absolute, perfect, and determined. They
are his own self-consciousness in its individual deter-
minations .
In themselves, the ideas are self-conscious, per-
ceiving,. or rational beings. They are not created by
God, but He is regarded as their ultimate ground in
Whom they are all contained.
v. The One and the Many
The rational beings comprise a system, or an
absolutely ideal organism. The moments that comprise
a system must in relationship^ to the whole be more or
-*- f
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less imperfect. In the case of self-conscious beings
they perceive more or less perfectly. They stand in
relation to each other as higher and lower in the sense
that the lower being has fewer other beings (those still
lower) as its positive determinations and more other
beings (all the higher ones) as its negative determina-
tions. It is itpelf taken up as a positive determina-
tion in all the higher beings, whereby it has a fuller
determination than it has in itself alone. For example,
much more can be said about the number 10 when it is
considered in the number 100, or some higher number,
than when it is considered alone. In this series, the
highest number would be God, who has only positive
determinations
.
Against the possible charge that this view could
be considered pantheistic, BostriJm holds it is ab-
solutely idealistic, or spiritual, and, therefore, com-
pletely inconsistent with pantheism .
^
He says that
17. That Bostrflm was much concerned with pantheism
is evident from the fact that some of his early writings
dealt with the subject. See SB, I, 157-182. In a rather
lengthy discussion of the subject, BostrOm presents his
position with regard to pantheism. He says that we have
learned from our Catechism that God is everywhere present,
which means that He is in our spirit. Even to speak
about God, we must have Him in our self-consciousness.
Our religion also teaches us not only that we live, and
move, and have our being in God, but also that He, Who
Himself is a Spirit, has given us of His Spirit, and
that He dwells in us„ i.e., in our spirit. (Acts 17:28;
I Corinthians, 3:16). Bostrflm says that if one wishes
to call this pantheism, it may be done, but that the
Christian religion i-e then also pantheism, which he says
.. 1 .
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the number 10, for instance, is independent, even though
it is a determination in 20, 30, or any other number. 18
All the finite-rational beings, in their development,
strive to realize themselves in the higher beings, even to
the highest and most perfect Being, in whom they find their
complete determination and their true and perfect life.
vi. The Sensuous World
The sensuous world in space and time, according to
BostrSm, is only a phenomenon for man of the non-sensuous
,
or real, due to the fact that as finite we do not per-
ceive it perfectly. There is thus an infinite number
of phenomenal worlds. What we call nature does not
have any existence independent of man. What is sub-
stantial in nature is rational and non-sensuous. For
plants and animals there are no ideas in God, since they
are only phenomena for man of rational beings. Otherwise,
no one is willing to admit. According to BostrfJm’s view,
the sensuous world cannot exist without God, but God
does not need the sensuous world any more than the real
sun needs the visible sun. For Bostrtfm the spiritual
is the true and original existence, and when God is con-
sidered as the absolute Spirit, all true existence must
be thought of as in Him, and He must not be placed in
immediate relationship to anything external. BostrOm
grasps the sensuous world as the phenomenon of the
spiritual and super-sensuous Cworld} and as standing in
the same relationship to it as dusk to daylight, or the
visible sun to the real sun. Bostrflm holds that, if this
must be called pantheism, it is at least not the usual
kind (SB, I, 399-400). Eisler calls BostrOm a pan-entheist,
for whom God is the eternal personality in Whom all is con-
tained ( Philo sophen-Lexikon ) , 72. It is thus apparent
that Bostrflm has difficulty in freeing himself from the
charge of pantheism. See also Bowne
,
MET, 102-103.
18. SB, III, 13, note; II, 273-274.
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says Bostrttm, man could not use them for his purpose. 1 "
God is the ground of the finite beings. With re-
gard to their origin and duration, He is their original
Being. Considered in this relation as a person, God is
their creator and sustainer. They are begotten of God
in eternity. As ground of their development, God is their
religion, their highest law and end. Thought of in this
relationship as a person, God is their highest regent,
their providence, and their savior. As creator and sus-
tainer, God is omnipotent, all-wise
,
all-good, righteous,
and holy. The system of finite-rational beings is the
kingdom of God. BostrOm’s system is thus teleological.
vii. Man
Man is not a union of body and soul, because he is
essentially one spirit, and his body is nothing else
than his sensuous and phenomenal form. Man is rational
in so far as the content of self-consciousness is God,
and sensuous to the extent that the content of his self
consciousness is the phenomenal, which is the result of
19. BostrSm faced the consequences of this doctrine,
and accepted them. He says: "My idea can enter the
phenomenal world of other beings and for them be im-
penetrable; if I become the ingredient of iron, I may
be forged; if I become the ingredient of wood, I may
be used in carpentry; if I become the ingredient of
food, one can eat and digest me. But this does not
concern me, because it does not enter my consciousness,
but only into theirs." Quoted by Wedberg, LSBF, 180.
Original source not available.
.'
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man’s imperfect perceptions. He may have degrees of
development, so that he has feeling, consciousness, or
self-consciousness. By the theoretical activity man
seeks a higher self-consciousness by changing the inner
man; and by the practical activity he seeks a higher
independence by changing the external conditions.
viii. Theory of Knowledge
Man’s rational capacity expresses itself as feel-
ing, imagination, and thought. His sensuous capacity
expresses itself as instinct, desire, and will. Man's
freedom is a capacity to choose between antithetical
grounds of determination, which he can do since the
world is his own possession, and since his life is a
continuous development of what is potential in his
being. In this development his intellect and will have
a part. 20
BostriJm speaks of a lower and a higher cognitive
faculty. The lower faculty expresses itself progres-
sively as spiritual feelihg, fantasy, or allegorizing
imagination, and reason.
A
fundamental thought in
BostrOm's idealism is that everything that exists is
20. For further discussion of BostrOm’s view of
freedom see below, 280-282.
21. SB, III, 15-16.
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self-consciousness and its determinations. 22
xi. Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, the State
Bostrdm’s Philosophy of Religion comprises the
body of this dissertation. Bostrdm says that it
corresponds essentially with the Christian doctrine
of religion, but that it differs from the current
theology at certain points. He does not accept the
doctrine of the Trinity, revelation, or satlsfactio
vlcarla . He accepts immortality, and denies eternal
damnation. 2^
Bostrdm^ ethics is Kantian and Platonic. In his
own summary of his philosophical system he devoted only
one paragraph to his ethics. The world of the individual
must he held in high regard. We are to make our higher
\
nature the principle of our life. Moral activity is
a free self-development for the attainment of life in
\
God. In this activity man’s sensuousness receives a
positive meaning as a means for reaching the self-
development whidi is man* s prerogative, because the
22* Ribbing (ed.), FR, 22. See also Wedberg, LSBP,
33, note, 79-80, 135; Sahlin, Art. (1897), 364; Edfeldt,
Art. (1897), 246 f; Beck, RLB, 18-21; Vann^rus, BTF,
62; Railing, OK, 78; SB, I, 154-156, 229-251; II,
243-246.
23. SB, II, 494-497.
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III. BostriJm’s Philosophical System 41
activity is a purposeful, conscious,, free, and rational
activity which has to do directly with the control of
the sensuous in man. Bostrttm calls his ethics a positive
rational ethical system. 2^
Bostrtfm holds that the state is a rational personal
being as well as man. He defends the monarchial system
and the classes of society as they existed in Sweden
in his day. He also holds that his theory of state is
the most liberal of any that up to that time had been
proposed, because it requires the most complete inde-
pendence not only for the state itself, but for all per-
sons in it. 2 5
24. Aberg, BV, 84
,
88
;
25. SB, II, 501-508.
SB, II, 497; Sahlin, KSB
,
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CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF C. J. BOSTR0M
The third and final volume of BostriSm’s works,
edited by Hans Edfeldt and G. J. Keijser, contains
this dedicatory page:
To the Memory
of
Our Revered and Beloved Teacher
Christopher Jacob Bostrtfm
His Nation’s and His Period’s Greatest
and most Independent Thinker
This Concluding Collection of His Works
Is now Dedicated
fey
The Editors..
Such enthusiastic admiration and devotion indicates
that BostrOm was regarded as a true philosopher by those
who knew him most intimately. While it must be evaluated
no
in this setting, there can be/serious question but that
Bostrflm made a deep impression on his own nation.
1. BostrOm's Influence in Sweden
Johannes Ljunghoff, in 1916, wrote:
.
.
'
,
-
.
•
:
*
£ . . . 5 :• V ;
.
'
, -
.
1
-
.... a
.
•-
:
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In the history of Sweden, Bostrflm is the
only one who has founded a school [of philos-
ophy], and it is certainly no exaggeration to
designate the days of the glory of BostrOmism
as the "classic period" in Swedish philosophy.
Never has the study of philosophy stood higher
in our nation than at that time. Scientists,
teachers, ministers, poets, authors, and states-
men, each in his profession, and according to
his ability, endeavored to make fruitful the
doctrines that their revered teacher in prac-
tical philosophy once had taught them, as he
kindled in their youthful souls a spark of
enthusiasm that never died.
1
The same writer speaks of BostrOm’s idealistic
philosophy of personalism2 as his testament to his
people. 3 From Uppsala University, where he was pro-
fessor for a period of nearly forty years, his in-
fluence extended to the other great center of learn-
ing in Sweden, Lund University, through two of his
students, Axel Nyblaeus and Carl Yngve Sahlin. 1"
Wikner, in a lecture given at Kristiania, Norway,
in 1886, gives something of the background of BostrfJm’
influence
:
...The idealistic tendency has been pre-
ponderant Cln Sweden] , and it corresponds with
the Swedish temperament, which is rather intro-
spective and easily yields to a more or less
deep dream-life that is rich in presentiment...
This idealism has received its most complete
1. BSP, 11-12.
2. Personalism is defined as "A philosophical
system in which persons (or selves) are the sole (or
dominant) metaphysical realities, as well as the only
ultimate intrinsic values.” In Ferrn (ed.) ENC REL,
576. For a discussion of Bostrtfm and personalism see
below, 221-223.
3. BS^, 3.
4. Linder, Art. (1897), 379.
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expression in the philosophy of Bostrttm.
According to my opinion, this philosophy
is a faithful and harmonious reproduction
of the Swedish temperament in the form of
thought. It has exerted an unprecedented
influence, and will long continue to do so
in spite of individual protests that are
raised against it.
5
Nyblaeus says that the wish had been expressed
in Denmark that the works of Bostrflm could be pub-
lished there. 6 HOffding gives the information that
Denmark had sent a student to Uppsala in 1869 to
become familiar with BostrBm’s philosophy.? Though
he maintains that BostrSm’s ihfluence is already
waning (1874), Dons, nevertheless, admits that it is
assured of an extended existence, due to the fact that
the leading men in the various professions are his
followers.
®
Anathon Aall, in a comparatively recent book,
9
dealing with philosophy in the Scandinavian countries,
declares that traces of the influence of Geijer, Grubbe
,
and BostriJm can be found even at the present time in
the concept of religion and justice, not only among the
educated, but in the general rank and file of the people.
He says that their influence has only in part receded.-^-0
5. STB, 11, 13.
6. TUBF
,
1.
7. FS, 5-6.
8 • OB
,
8
.
9. FN, 1919.
10. FN, 3, 6.
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In Aall's book Bostrtfm is accorded vastly the major share
in the section on Swedish philosophers. 11
Axel Lundeberg, while asserting that Bostrtfm’s
philosophical system occupies a high rank in the
history of philosophy, poses the question, neverthe-
less, as to whether BostrBm has succeeded in placing
his system on a vantage-ground that is unassailable for
all time to come, and leaves the answer to the develop-
ment of philosophical research. 12
Anders Wedberg, one of the most recent writers on
Bostrtfm, admits that during the second half of the nine-
teenth century BostrfJm’s influence in Sweden was like
Hegel’s in Germany in his day, so that from i860 to
1890 Swedish philosophical thought was entirely in
BostrJJm’s spirit. But he adds that late in the nine-
teenth century his influence began to wane. Wedberg
makes the assertion that it is not as the founder of
a school of philosophy, but as the object of criticism,
that BostrBm is of the greatest importance in the
history of philosophy
.
1 3 He further claims that much
of Bostrtfm’s philosophy now has only idea- and cultural-
historical value, but makes the concession that from
some points of view BostrOm’s thinking is always worthy
11. Ibid., 12-42.
12. Art. (1927), 418-419.
13. LSBF
,
14-15.
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of study by the student of the history of philosophy . 44
Ljunghoff faces the question of BostrOm’s influence
in these words:
There is, finally, the question of the
abiding value in BostrOm’s thought. It is
not correct to say that all intellectual
interest in it is lacking. For even if the
aspect of the problem is different now from
what it was in BostrOm’s day, it must, never-
theless, be admitted that the fundamental
thoughts of his philosophy are in these very
days beginning to revive. It Is also certain
that the one who, though ignorant of BostrOm,
has only a shrug of the shoulder for him does
not possess much of the ’’genuine philosophical
spirit and temper which seeks the true and
essential in things and strives for its realiza-
tion and improvement in the world.” No doubt
, there is much in BostrOm’s thought that belongs
to the past alone .. .Modern knowledge does not
present a unified picture. It rather reminds us
in many ways of the unrest and agitation which
in history has always been the harbinger of
something new. There is perhaps this difference
that the world events that are shaping up!5 at
the present have more of the character of
world- judgment than at any previous time. It
may, however, not be impossible to discern
certain fundamental tendencies in the general
manner of thinking, and see how from various
directions they seem to point especially toward
a renewed personal idealism. 16
In 1908 the BostrOm Society was formed in Sweden. 17
In the Introduction to the first issue of its publica-
tion, Smgfrre skrifter
,
Karl Pira and G. J. Keijser in
14. Ibid.
,
1.
15. This was written during the first World War.
16. BSP, 117-118.
17. Supra, 3.
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a joint article say that Sweden has passed through a
period that was inimical to idealism, but that there
are signs of a desire to return.
It is thus apparent that BostrfJm had his day of
almost complete philosophical influence in Sweden.
It is also apparent that his influence has waned since
the beginning of the present century. Whether his
followers will be able to effect a new-BostrOmism re-
mains for the future years to disclose.
2. BostriJm’s Influence Beyond Sweden
From the investigations that have been made con-
cerning Bostrflm’s influence it is apparent that beyond
Sweden his influence has been almost negligible.
18. In CPira andiCeijser, ed.J, SS, 1(1908), I, h
..
.
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CHAPTER V
TRANSLATION OF BOSTRIM’S INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION1
Religion is not equivalent in meaning to a certain
dogmatic manner of representation Cdogmatismj
,
or to cer
tain feelings and actions; but it is man’s actual ra-
tionality,
2
his highest form of life, and highest des-
tiny. 3 Hence religion includes the determinations
previously mentioned ^dogmatism, feeling, action], but
as consequences of the essence of religion. When re-
ligion is comprehended in this manner, the philosophy
of religion has as its purpose the highest end of man*
On this fact its importance depends. One could say
that to have religion is more important than to know
it. Religion, however, as a spiritual activity, has
no more important ingredient than clear consciousness,
v/hich is better than obscurity, and contains greater
certainty. 4-
The Greeks,, after they had begun to engage in
practical philosophy, were concerned chiefly with
ethics and politics. _ With Plato and Aristotle philos-
1. This chapter comprises pages 1 to 18 of BostrOm*
Philosophy of Religion
,
as recorded from class lectures
and edited by his student, Sigurd Ribbing. This trans-
lation is in part selected. Omissions are shown by dots.
2. "Aktuela fflrnuftighet .
”
3. "Hcgsta bestSmmelse .
”
4. The Cartesian tradition of clear and distinct
ideas. See Edfeldt, Art. (1897), 251.
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ophy of religion was the first part of ethics, without
the insight that religion is a concept by itself, which
is the foundation of ethics and politics. 5 Neo-Platonism
indeed began with religion, but was so engaged with the
starting-point that it did not arrive at the practical
use of it as applied to humanity and the state.
6
It is true that, within Christianity, man early
engaged in religious problems, but for a long time
rather under the form of positive doctrine than as philos-
ophy. When, at the beginning of modern times, one (a
philosophy] was developed, it was at first directed toward
the outer world; and when it encountered difficulties
with regard to the possibility of knowledge of the outer
[worldj, the chief question centered around the objectivity
of knowledge, and man’s character and nature as a con-
dition for answering this question.
^
In the thought of Kant and Fichte, philosophy of
5. BostrOm here fails to distinguish properly between
Aristotle, who had almost no religion at all, and Plato,
who was a mystic and who made religion autonomous. See
E. S. Brightman in Ferm (ed.), ENC REL, 592-595.
6. This statement may be due to the fact that BostrOm
was deeply interested in political science. Some of his
extensive writings are in this field. SB, I, 355-416;
II, 311-476; III, 85-163, 330-346.
7. For a brief presentation of BostrOm's episte-
mology see supra, 30.
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religion is still an appendage to ethics. It is only-
in more recent times that philosophy has been compelled
to return to the ultimate principles of the spirit and
of nature, even as it has been recognized that religion
is indispensable for practical philosophy in its en-
tirety. Thus we have in our own days [1848] witnessed
a philosophical point of vi ew which has directed
philosophy and religion to each other, although indeed
in an improper way, since it has regarded religion
simply as a lower form of that which, in a higher form,
constitutes philosophy, and comprises its contents.
8
. .
.
[it is, therefore, necessaryj to present some-
thing positive and satisfactory in religion from a
philosophical point of view, because reason must in all
problems be decisive, since it is what lies outside
reason that is questioned; and from what lies out-
side reason no arguments can be produced.
9
...The principle of philosophy must be such that
it can be considered as correct in itself,^ because
otherwise it would not be the highest principle. The
8. This statement, which is directed especially
against Hegel, does not appear to be a true evaluation
of Hegel’s position.. Hegel speaks of the reciprocal
relations of philosophy and religion. He says that the
content of religion and philosophy is the same, except
for details of external nature and finite mind which
falls outside the range of religion. Hegel holds that
religion should not set herself against comprehending
reason and against philosophy in general, especially
against a philosophy of which the doctrine is specula-
tion, and so religion. See Hegel, PIvI, 182-183.
9. Indication of Bostrflm’s rational idealism.
10.
Bostrflm holds that philosophy is the science of
the principles of the other sciences. See below, 54t55*
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psychological education that is required for it may be
diversified, but the means for understanding its prin-
ciple and for perceiving its truth does not lie in it;
this must be accomplished through analysis of the prin-
ciple itself.
What' is the philosophy of religion, and what is
its place in the system of philosophy? This question
raises two others: What is philosophy? and, What is
religion? Each of these can be considered from two
viewpoints: What is philosophy, and what is religion:
1) in itself? 2 ) for us? These two must not be con-
fused, but each question must be answered differently.
If they are confused, the answer for the one will not
be valid for the other.
The question as to what philosophy is in itself
can also be expressed by: What is philosophy in its
purity and perfection, i.e., without any negations ex-
cept those which are essential to it? This expression
is synonymous with: in itself, 11 because nothing can
be more than itself. In like manner the same question
finds another expression: What is it in its essence?
For the truth and perfection of a thing is its essence
in contrast with the phenomena (the manner in which a
thing reveals itself to another). Likewise: What is
11. From the immediate context it appears that
Bostrflm here means ’’intrinsically .
”
BOSTON university
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL
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it as to its concept or its idea? Idea is intensifica-
tion of apprehending or comprehending, 12 just as per-
cipere (or perceiving) is of capere , namely, well and
securely , by which [intensification] the apprehending
power unites the apprehended with itself, and remains
in it as a force. The correctness of what has been said
can be seen through reflection on analogous expressions:
to penetrate into something, to gain insight into it,
etc. Thus idea is clear and distinct, and thereby true
perception; such a perception is identical with its
object. 11 We, therefore, do not seek philosophy out-
side of ourselves, but in the spirit’s own essence or
idea.
Again, the latter question, What is man’s philos-
ophy? does not have the same meaning as the former.
[This] is clear from the fact that our philosophy can
have many shortcomings [for human experience]
,
which
it does not have in itself. Our philosophy is the re-
sult of our effort to understand philosophy in itself,
and this effort can succeed only relatively, because
of our finiteness. Philosophy in itself is related to
our philosophy as, for example, pure gold to impure...
12. ’’Omfatta . ”
13. BostrOm’s metaphysical monism is found in his
repeated statement that nothing originally exists but
God and His ideas. Here he also includes epistemological
monism.
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A preparatory reflection may here be added: Phi-
losophy in itself postulates a similarly perfect subject,
whose knowledge it is, since all knowledge must be some -
one ’
s
. .Philosophy , therefore, requires a subject, and
if it should reveal itself as infinite, then God alone
could be its subject, and then philosophy becomes God
Himself, seen, namely, as simply knowing. Therefore
the human philosophy is not the wisdom of the world,
but the wisdom of God,^5 because it has God more than
the world as object, and the effort is to make the con-
tent of one’s consciousness similar to the content of
God’s consciousness.
It may, further, be observed that we cannot
answer the second quest ion- -what philosophy is for man
—
without first having determined what it is in itself.
This seems to imply a contradiction, since mine is
nearest to me, and it can be questioned whether we
can ever arrive at insight of anything else, or any-
thing different. But here it is to be observed that
man, as finite, has feelings and representations be-
fore he has ideas; consequently he also has faith be-
fore he has knowledge. Through the former he acquires
14. BostrOm employs several different words for
God, as "Gudomlighet , ” "Gud.” In this translation "God"
will be used in each instance, since BostriJm uses them
interchangeably
.
15. "Vgrldsvishet ” and "Gudsvishet
.
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a certain acquaintance with the objects; but to gain
an idea he must get to the ground of it,-*-0 whereas,
when he wishes to understand by faith and opinion, he
does the opposite. Thus [it is] in the present instance.
We must begin with what philosophy is in and for us,
in order that therefrom we may conclude what it is in
itself. On the other hand, we cannot fully know the
former so long as we seek only the latter, just as the
the phenomenon, as the first with which we are ac-
quainted, gives occasion to seek the being, but can
properly be understood only through the latter...
By way of introduction, we may finally be re-
minded of the fact that the question as to what phi-
losophy is for us can itself be taken in a two-fold
sense: What has it been up to the present? The answer
here must come from the history of philosophy. Second-
ly: ’What must it always remain for us? This is what
we here have to clarify.
What is philosophy in itself? To answer this
question, we must proceed from something known, namely,
that philosophy is a science, and the highest science.
Someone could question the latter. To such a question
we should give the answer that, if there is an higher
^science}
,
then that is just the one we here mean and
and define... As the science that deals With the prin-
Io~. "Ga till fOljd fran grund."
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ciples for the other sciences, philosophy is the p ro und
for them, and that on which they rest .. .Therefore phi-
losophy, as the ground of the other sciences, includes
all that they contain plus something more; that is to
say, they are phenomena of philosophy, as the visible
sun is of the real sun. If we possessed all philosophy,
or if our philosophy were philosophy in itself, then
no other knowledge would be possible beside this, be-
cause it would include everything, except its own nega-
tions.
As a science, philosophy is a knowledge , and a
knowledge about something; it has form and content.
Form and content are the same, considered more gen-
erally and more specifically, namely, as that accord-
ing to which we answer the questions how and what the
thing is. As a science, philosophy is formally deter-
mined,, 1) as knowing, which again includes,., a) a self-
consciousness, the unity itself, and b) a certain form
of it, i.e., a perceiving.
To perceive is to be self-conscious in a deter-
minate way, so that one can answer how and of what
consciousness is conscious. That the word has this
meaning can by way of example be illuminated from the
., . .
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ancient scripture, that "the natural man receiveth not
the things of the Spirit of God, "l? i.e., he is not
self-conscious to such an extent that he is conscious
of them. 1 ^ A S to its form, perceiving is: dim, or
noticeable only to others; or clear: noticeable to
the conscious person himself. The former is feeling;
the latter is representation, clearer or more abstract,
and more inner, affording a form in space, either of
something present, or absent, in which case, however,
the perceived is not yet fully clear, because the
spirit is not in it,, but it is for him an object. ^9
If a person grasps a portion of the representation
with complete clearness, then it becomes idea, which
is the highest form of perceiving. Ideas, namely,
are certain, and are known as unchangeable
„
which
again coincides with the form of perfection and com-
pleteness. Thus understood, nothing can be more,
or in any other way, than it is perceived.
Philosophy as knowing is consequently c) an
understanding, but one which is not transition from
one perception to another on the level of perceiving.
Thus philosophy, as knowledge and science, is a
17. I Corinthians 2:14-
18. One of BostrOm’s basic words is "fiJrnimma"
:
"to perceive." In this quotation the Swedish has
”f£5rnimmer" where the English has "receiveth." The
Greek word ifXc^ , which is translated as "fOrnimmer"
and "receiveth , ’"also means "embrace," "make one’s own."
Perhaps here is a relation to his word, "omfatta," supra,
52.
19. "Objectum.”
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a) fixed, b) clear, c) necessary,, and d) systematic,
perceiving, because it aims at everything in its ob-
ject, and thus includes a manifold, whose moments do
not nullify, but postulate each other. Clear per-
ceptions cannot contradict each other. Philosophy . is
,
further, 2) the highest science, a) qualitatively,
i.e., as science
,
fully clear; and b) quantitatively,
pnthe all-embracing, namely, God in His omniscience. w
As to its contents (determined in a general way} 21
philosophy is the science of that which is in itself, or
of the absolutely existing, i.e., of being in a restricted
pp
and true^ sense. It is perfect perceiving. But nothing
can be perceived better than as it is in itself, in con-
trast with the phenomenon, which is the being imperfectly
perceived. Since conception is the highest and the per-
fect form of perceiving; and since the true perception
must be a correspondence between the perceived and the
absolutely true, i.e., since there must be absolute
similarity or identity; or since the peremption and the
perceived 2 3 are divided only as quod and quid : there-
fore, philosophy, as science of the being, becomes the
science of the concepts or ideas, that is to say, of the
20. BostrOm here seems to say that philosophy is
God. Elsewhere he actually does so. See supra, 53»
21. "I allmflnhet bestamt."
22. T, I inskrSnkt och egentlig bemflrkelse .
"
23. "Perceptionen och perceptum."
*
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absolute reason and its content, which is just the true
being.
Conception, or clear perception, and idea are the
same... It may, furthermore, be observed that even in
the sensuous and in the empirical sciences we also seek
the absolute reason and its content, not immediately,
but as referred to us: thus, however, the Divine, pro-
vided we, as far as regards our essence,, are ideas in
the Absolute Reason, and consequently are what con-
stitutes its determination, is apprehended by this
reason in and with the apprehensioh of the idea. 2^
...It is thus apparent that philosophy is a knowl-
edge which is absolutely independent ,... since there is
nothing besides the absolute knowledge. Philosophy is,
furthermore, an organic whole of ideas, and thus is not
sensuous, or divisible, or changeable. It is also a
form of life and self-consciousness, namely, the ab-
solute reason with its content, which includes every-
thing in itself. This means that philosophy in itself
is 1) not a system, but the system; 2) yet it is a
system, namely, the infinite system...; 3) is knowl-
24. Beginning with "thus, however,” the Swedish
is involved. ’’Saledes dock det Gudomliga, savida vi
till vart vSsen ock 9ro ideer hos det absoluta fOrnuftet
och ftfl jaktligen vad som utgflr dess bestflmdhet, fattas av
detta fOrnuft i och med fattandet av iden.”
,
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edge about the being, or beings, and hence about reason
in its concept. Aristotle already saw that the highest
form of thought was s/o yre tocj Plato understood
the ideas in a similar manner . 25
The phenomena, on the other hand, are excluded from
this philosophy. If someone should ask whether the Absolute
Reason, or God, does not have knowledge of them, the
answer must be, Yes, from Him no knowledge is excluded,
but He knows the phenomena, not as the determinations
of His consciousness, but of man's. Finally .. .philos-
ophy in itself is God’s self-consciousness of Himself
in the totality of His determinations or ideas, or His
life as knowing. If, therefore, philosophy is found in
man, it is a participation in God’s consciousness and
life . 26
The concept of motion does not belong to the con-
cept of life; what constitutes life in the finite
living beings is not motion, but their independence,
and this again is found only in self-conscious beings,
25. The text here is so fragmentary that it is im-
possible to determine what BostrOm means. The words
are: "Likasa Plato: om ideerna.” Literally: ”As
Plato: concerning the ideas.” The context seems to in-
dicate that BostrOm means that for Plato the highest
forms of thought were the ideas. With Plato, however,
the ideas are independent and unchangeable. Phaedo 78,
100-105.
26. That BostrOm means this in a metaphysical sense
seems evident from his statement that man’s philosophy
is an effort to make the content of one’s consciousness
similar to the content of God’s consciousness. Supra,
53.
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and the degree of the one is, therefore, equal to that
of the other.
Man’s philosophy ... is his consciousness of himself
in God and in His system of ideas. Again, it is philos-
ophy in itself with the negations under which it appears
in man as a result of his limitations. [Once againj it
is the result of the striving of man’s spirit to realize
himself as absolutely knowing, or in himself to achieve
philosophy in itself; in other words, it is his highest
life as a sentient being. Such a philosophy is possible
for man, provided he is rational, and a participant of
the Divine; namely, when he is considered in his truth
and essence, i.e.
,
that he is an idea in God, or enters
into His knowledge, and that this knowledge— the system
of His ideas— is found in the unity of his consciousness,
even though more or less clearly.
On the other hand, man’s philosophy differs from
philosophy in itself in the same way as man differs
from God: he partakes of His reason—is rationis parti -
ceps— but ijs not the reason. Rational is related to
reason as the golden to gold; man indeed grasps all
of His ideas, but only a few clearly in each instant
of time. 2? Therefore his philosophy also has the same
character as philosophy in itself, but only relatively:
27. "Tidsmoment . ” Compare Royce's ’’Time-span.”
See WI, II, 122-142.
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it is potentially infinite,, or has the infinite in
itself—as ground, --but actually finite;... it is more
or less organic; is indeed (as to its content) infinite,
but only in connection with knowing about something
material; and it is eternal. . .and develops in various
ways. Thus man’s philosophy is generally only relatively
identical with God’s.
...Wherever there is clarity in the apprehension,
there is also philosophical apprehension of or with
respect to the phenomenal world. On this depends the
manner in which man must proceed to attain philosophy.
Much has been said about a method peculiar to philos-
ophy, according to which philosophy should,, as it were
,
follow of itself, or the method coincide with the con-
struction and reality of the object itself. If such a
help 28 could be found, it would be very comfortable
for philosophizing; but it is not to be found, and is
superfluous for the one who can walk by himself. In
reality the whole method consists in this: through
analysis and abstraction a person goes back to the most
simple element in his consciousness, and by means of
this he synthesizes the more concrete, in order by
synthesis to illuminate the cohcrete with the clarity
he has gained in the more abstract .. .This method has
28. "Ledstol.
”
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from the beginning of knowledge been the only one,, and
the correct one...
Philosophy in itself does not have parts, but is
an organic whole. The same kind of knowledge permeates
the whole. But man’s philosophy permits a division,
because man must develop the multiplicity of his deter-
minations in time » or be active, and he can thereby ap-
prehend himself and his world from various points of
view, whereby a division arises between theoretical and
practical activity. There is for man, as finite, an
outer and an inner, and the relation of his activity to
these different poles determines the difference in his
activity. Ke can pose as the goal of his efforts the
bringing of the obscure to clarity. Under these cir-
cumstances he moves from the outer to the inner—which
also per se is his highest goal. Here he reflects
less upon the fact that he is active, although this also
enters into his perceiving .
There is, furthermore, however, more or less of
struggle between the outer and the inner, which calls
forth effort to remove this contradiction by changing
the external to conform to the internal, in which case
he reflects less upon the fact that here also there is
perceiving. In both instances he seeks harmony, but
in the theoretical he seeks it in the things themselves
or their being, and in the practical he seeks it in the
*. ij. or. . bil '
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relation between himself and them... Only free activity
has a purpose. Therefore practical philosophy deals
only with it, and thus determines what the activity
should be in order to attain the goal.
When we thus divide man’s philosophy into theo-
retical and practical, this is not a division of
philosophy itself as such, but only with regard to the
point of view from which it conceives its object and
its relation to the given. Theoretical philosophy
thus deals with the given, which does not depend on
man’s free activity, but only on the absolute as ground.
The practical philosophy does not have anything to do
with what is actual in man’s world, but with what should
become actual in it through man’s free activity .. .The
difference between theoretical and practical philosophy
can also be expressed in this way: The former deals
with the true, the latter with the good...
The theoretical philosophy is divided into: 1)
Theology : concerning the being, or the absolute reason
in itself and in its relation to man and his world as
the ultimate ground in general, and thereby an explana-
tion of these; 2) Anthropology : concerning the essence
of the individual man, i.e. ,. in a rational being exist-
ing in a physical nature; and 3) Ethnology : . . .the doc-
trine of tribes, races, and families, as natural soci-
eties. The philosophical doctrine of nature does not
A \ '
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constitute a special philosophical discipline, but
only implies a completion of what is included in the
doctrine of man, since nature, as such, exists only in
relation to man...
The practical philosophy also includes three parts:
this practical philosophy is the doctrine of reason
as purpose and law, whose unity is religion—whence all
practical philosophy is the science of religion. This
purpose and law can be regarded 1) as such, or for man
in general, when it is the Science of Religion in a re -
stricted sense ; 2) for the individual man: Ethics or
Moral Philosophy ; and 3) for the community or the state,
as such,, Statecraft or Political Science ...
The correctness of what has just been said about
religion and philosophy of religion can easily be seen
by the following general remarks, in and by which we
also gain the concept of religion in itself as man’s
[religion]. No one can be religious without being ra-
tional, and vice versa. If the contrary were true, one
could be more or less rational without being religious,
and thus also absolutely rational without being religious.
Religion would then have no relation to reason, and if
such were the case, it could thus not be made man’s
highest goal, i.e., would not be religion.
The conclusion of this is that a person is re-
ligious in the same degree that he is rational, and vice
-,
•
«
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versa, and that, therefore, religion and reason are
identical. Since no one can be more religious or ra-
tional than reason, religion in itself is consequently
God Himself.
Man’s religion again stands in the same relation
to the absolute religion as his philosophy to philos-
ophy in and for itself. God does not have religion,
but He _is religion, and it is wrong to limit its mean-
ing to that of merely human qualification. As thus
understood
„
we can see the importance of religion for
man...Man cannot place any higher goal for himself than
God. Man’s religion has also been called faith
.
which
is not the mere conviction, but also a life conforming
to it. Here the reason for the name was that from a
certain standpoint we do not distinguish between faith
and knowledge.
When I say, however, that religion and reason in
and for themselves are both God
,
this does not mean that
they are to be regarded as purely identical, but that
in each one we see God from a somewhat different point
i
of view. God is the Highest Being with all its deter-
minations; and this we call reason when we thihk of
it only as absolute self-consciousness or perceiving.
Religion again is this same reason as binding or deter-
mining man’s free activity ... Only man’s innermost being
can bind him, but then his being is God’s.
*.
,
,
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Therefore man’s religion is not something merely
theoretical—a manner of representation--but ratxher
something practical; it is willing and doing, even as
philosophy of religion is a practical discipline
.
Every determination in man, even actual knowledge, or
consciousness, is immediately united with practical
activity, or the results of it. Man’s life is a con-
tinuous activity in time, and, therefore his
original nature is to be active practically, i.e., to
be will . The will determines the end, and directs the
activity toward it.
The correctness of the division of philosophy which
has been presented gains confirmation by giving attention
to the manner in which philosophy has shaped itself
historically, in which no other division has been satis-
factory, except the one now made by me. 36 in the Orient
there is no philosophy ; 31 it is related to Europe as
fancy to reason, but without organization.
The Greeks were the first to develop philosophy
with a certain organization. At the beginning it was
29. In this statement lies an explanation of the
character of BostrOm’s Philosophy of Religion .
30. Bostrflm had implicit confidence that he had
presented a new and unimpeachable philosophical system.
See supra, 27.
31. This statement seems extreme in view of the
fact that BostrOm accepted some of the Oriental thought,
as, for instance, transmigration. See below, 100-101. The
explanation to this statement may be BostrOm’s view
that Oriental thought was not critical enough. See be-
low, 111-112.
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merely theoretical philosophy without divisions,
such as, Cosmology, Anthropology, Theology, because
the external and the internal fused. Toward t.he end
of the first period, however, a two-fold reality was
distinguished, as also a two-fold science: the one
concerning the Being, or Theology, and the other an
empirical science, Physics. Plato accepted this di-
vision, and added a third, Ethics, which was first
developed by the Sophists and Socrates. The ethics
of Socrates was also statecraft, both in one, because
among the Greeks there was no state
,
but only com-
munities.^2 With Socrates, therefore, as with the
Greeks generally, the entire practical philosophy be-
came ethics, whereof the science of religion merely
became a part, and politics a major part.
Aristotle took a forward step in the organiza-
tion, using the same three-fold division. With him,
however, there is another, in accordance with the di-
vision of human activity: the theoretical and the
practical. Thus he also divided philosophy into
theoretical and practical. But in Aristotle’s philos-
ophy the economy 53 f s no t a philosophical consideration,
and ethics and politics fall together. The subsequent
32. The influence of Plato is evident in Bostrtfm’s
interest in statecraft.
33 » "Ekonomiken. M
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Greek philosophers retained the three-fold division,
but the first division with them became only a formal
part—as a residuum of Aristotle’s Logic—which is only
a part of Anthropology. Neo-Platonism was without or-
ganization because of Oriental influence. It contained
only Theology and Philosophy of Religion.
At the beginning of modern times there was only
imperfect organization. Bacon divided [philosophy] ac-
cording to imagination , 34 memory, and reason; but his
philosophy is only empirical. Wolff was the first to
divide philosophy into theoretical and practical, the
former (the theoretical) into Logic and Metaphysics,
and Metaphysics into Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology,
and Theology; and the practical into Ethics and Natural
Law, Politics and International Law...
Kant has made his division in transcendental phi-
losophy, which investigates the cognitive faculties,
divided into the different critiques, and a metaphysics,
the theoretical dealing with nature, and the practical
dealing with morals. This is an unfortunate division,
because according to Kant, nature is itself a phenom-
enon and, therefore, belongs to Anthropology. The
practical philosophy is incomplete, because practical
philosophy also has to do with the law... Fichte also
34. "Fantasi."
-.
.
•
<
.
;
-
-
.
-
o -
.
V. Translation of Bostrtfm’ s Introduction 69
has only a theoretical and a practical part, and the
former only Anthropology, the latter Ethics and Natural
Law.
Hegel has made a new division. Nature and Spirit
are equally real and, therefore, his philosophy has
become a philosophy of nature and Spirit, in which both
have something in common. 35 But while with Schelling
this became empty in content—the abstract identity
between nature and Spirit,, or a negation of both—Hegel,
on the other hand, presented Logic as the common general
form or concept of nature and Spirit, in the sense of
a metaphysical science (just as the dialectic in Plato).
This three-fold division by Hegel is neither like
that of the Greeks, nor an improvement of it, nor can
it be justified in the system. Logic, which is supposed
to contain the general forms of thought, and is related
to the rest as general grammar is to the special lan-
guages, does not in this way have any special content.
Plato’s dialectic did have it, because its object, the
Ideas, did not need the other parts of philosophy, al-
though, on the contrary, with these it was also The-
ology. 36 Hegel’s Physics is not similar to Plato’s
Physics,, because the latter refers only to the sensuous
35* Nature and Spirit, however, are not on an equal
plane in Hegel’s dialectic. His ultimate synthesis is
the Absolute Spirit.
36 . "EhuruvSl tvSrtom med dessa, den var alltsa
teologi .
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existence; this however, completely understood, also
includes man as phenomenon.
Hegel also assigns man’s sensuousness to the phi-
losophy of Spirit, but considers that of the animals under
natural philosophy, though there is no difference in
nature between them. Ethics in Hegel is only a physics,
because it does not consider what ought to be done, but
morality is regarded as that which has become reality.
Moral philosophy thus becomes equivalent to the history
of philosophy and, therefore, not practical, as if only
a plus or a minus of ideality is the difference between
nature and Spirit. Here, then, a difficulty appears in
the system itself, namely, that nature and Spirit com-
prise thesis and antithesis, whence Logic does not be-
come thesis; but the parts of philosophy become, first
,
the philosophy of nature, then of the Spirit, and for
the third, Logic. Finally, the philosophy of Spirit
includes the doctrine of the subjective, the objective,
and the absolute Spirit. But such a philosophy is not
found in the Hegelian system. According to Hegel’s
system, Spirit is the inner37 side of nature, and does
37. "Den inre sidan
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not exist without it .^ 8 The content of the doctrine of
absolute Spirit, therefore, becomes: Art, Religion,,
and Philosophy. But art is always a product of the
human spirit, and, therefore, not absolute. Religion
is regarded only as historical or mythological, whereas
religion has a much wider signification, to which its
imperfect form does not belong, but to man. With us
philosophy is merely knowing alone, without also being
will.
Philosophy of Religion, as a new, separate, and
practical division of philosophy,, is concerned with
religion for man, or man’s religion.. The science of
religion in itself, as is evident from its meaning as
previously mentioned, belongs to Theology .
^
As such,
it must first present the human religion, or the re-
ligious state of mind, in its purity, with conviction,
and with beauty; it must also present the immediate
38. BostrOm’s statement here does not seem to
harmonize with Hegel’s words: ’’From our point of view
Mind (or Spirit) has for presupposition Nature, of
which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute
prlus . In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind
has resulted as the ’Idea’ entered on possession of it-
self. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one
—
either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This iden-
tity is absolute negativity--for whereas in Nature the
intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but ex-
ternalized, this self-externalization has been nullified
and the unity in that way been made one and the same
with itself. Thus at the same time it is. this identity
only so far as it is a return out of nature.” PM, 6 .
39. Supra, 63 .
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products of it, as well as man’s hopes united with it;
and this is the true Philosophy of Religion. Besides
this, it must likewise account for religion in the
limitations and frailties with which it appears in time
in> mankind, such as sin or false and imperfect religion.
It must also account for the way in which man is brought
back to religion, i.e.„ salvation and improvement. It
must also provide the means for it— the Church and
revelation.
Finally, the history of religion may also be sub-
jected to a philosophical observation, namely, how the
idea of religion has successively appeared and the reasons
for the order of development. Before Philosophy of Re-
ligion,, and as a necessary introduction to it, we must,
however, give a presentation of Theology and Anthropology
—
just as theoretic conviction is itself a moment in re-
ligion, and the religious conviction should indeed be
the fully correct theology. The doctrine of freedom
prepares the transition from the theoretical propadeutics
to the true practical science of religion.
One could ask about the importance of, and the in-
terest in,, philosophy of religion. Here it may be re-
marked that, strictly speaking, it is improper to talk
about the importance of that which has worth in and for
itself. And, by way of information, it may also be
mentioned that a thing has interest for a person in so
..
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far as it enters, as a moment, into his innermost being,
or has a necessary relationship to it.
Spinoza says that all that man strives for is good,
but not, on the contrary, that he strives for something
because it is good; and this remark, properly understood,
is true. As to his essence, man is a force, and the
nature of such a force is not to work for something ex-
terior, yet according to its own nature; and in the
measure that something stands in relation to it
,
it be-
comes a good for the active individual. Thus, for ex-
ample, the object of a sensuous desire is a good when
it is sought, although it can be an evil in relation to
man’s total tendency,, according to which all without ex-
ception is measured.
But just that is religion, which, therefore, has
absolute value and int erest . . . In this value and interest
philosophy of religion has a part. It is not religion
itself, but an activity which seeks to bring religion to
clarity, and thereby also man in his religion to freedom,
both in relation to God and to other people. Because
that which is clear to him is also something inner and
his very own, and not merely an external.
The meaning of philosophy of religion for the
practical philosophy tes already been touched. Without
a correct philosophy of religion ethics and politics
40. Supra, 71.
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are impossible. It is important, finally, for life to
be able to retain the purely rational and free in re-
ligion without mingling it with anything sensuous
which, especially in times of religious unrest, so
often happens when expressions of sensuous instincts
and desires are assumed, and people believe that they
can further religion with them, as for example, per-
secutions.
With the possession of philosophy of religion it
is possible calmly to observe, judge, and measure the
worth of the positive religions, without discarding
everything in them, because certain elements in them
have the significance of a covering for the truly re-
ligious. kl
A positive religion arises in the same way as the
individual himself in his various degrees of development,
i.e., his different ways of thinking and acting. Usually
a certain religious consciousness appears in one person,
and since this consciousness is an expression of the age
in which he lives, it is accepted by the rest. In the
founder of the religion, however, all of this religious
consciousness is found, and all subsequent development
41. Bostrtfm believed that he presented Philosophy
of Religion from the Christian standpoint. It is pre-
sumable that he was concerned with the form of Chris-
tianity in which he was brought up. See below, 94.
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of th at religion simply becomes a growth in the com-
prehension or presentation of what already existed in
the founder. When the cult has been established, and
the teachings of the founder collected, the need arises
to build them into a unity, so that the scattered doc-
trines of the founder are apprehended under certain
rubrics and in certain statements, which are supported
by the authority of the founder, and also not found to
be internally inconsistent.^2
These positive religious doctrines thus arise in
the same way as the positive systems of jurisprudence:
through the repetition of similar procedure, according
to the sense of right, in several similar instances,
this procedure is determined to constitute law, and the
laws are then assembled and arranged into an empirical
system.
Later the philosophic sciences of religion arise.
When several churches, or different authorities in the
same church, arise, a reconciliation of those engaged
in the strife can naturally not be from these themselves,
because they all constitute, or base themselves on,
historical-empirical authority. For the settlement of
the struggle we must, rather,, seek a higher principle.
Thus it was in Greece at the time of the Sophists;
thus also at the Reformation. This is the meaning of
U2. "I strid med sitt eget inre.
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the philosophic science of religion: it is an attempt
to determine religion by reason.
The purpose and function of the philosophic science
of religion is, therefore, not necessarily to war against
the positive religious doctrines. On the other hand, a
dispute can arise as to whether the standpoint of the
philosophical science of religion is higher than that of
the positive, or lower. This can be true with regard to
philosophical views at variance with Christianity, which
have been such as have developed out of lower principles
than Christianity. On the other hand, a philosophy which
has attained the highest principle cannot easily come
into conflict with Christianity, except in that which for
religion itself is immaterial.
A philosopher cannot readily get away from the re-
ligion into which he was born, except as to what concerns
the non-essential in it. He may possibly give another
explanation of the content of the positive religious
doctrines, as Copernicus did about the motion of the
heavenly bodies, but thereby the positive still remains
with its worth. So far as religion is concerned, there-
fore, we do not need to be afraid of the development of
philosophy, but we only need to turn polemically against
what from a lower view than that of religion wishes to
establish itself as philosophy.
The question may be asked as to how, since philos-
:...
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ophy has arisen, we can be assured that it will not
annul the positive religion. It can be done only through
insight as to their relationship, as essence and phenom-
enon, in which case no annulment can come into question.
But this must be acknowledged, that in a battle within
the positive religious teaching the rational must be
the norm for the decision. Correspondence with the
empirical religious doctrine may be taken as an indica-
tion of the perfection in principle of the rational, so
that it is suspicious, if the latter discards any of
the leading features in the positive. Should it, how-
ever, become apparent that this must be done, then it
is patently unreasonable that the one who has seen some-
thing clearly should abandon it because of external com-
pulsion.
But,, some one may say, the rational science of re-
ligion can proceed from false principles, and is vari-
able. Indeed, but it is the same way with the positive
religious doctrine as soon as it develops into a system.
In any case it is clear that, if a rational system of-
fends anyone’s feelings, he will not accept it.^
The one who is to study Philosophy of Religion must
4 3. Compare with Brightman’s coherence-theory. See
his PR,. 189-193.
44. This may be what is often done, but such pro-
cedure cannot be defended. Reason ought to conquer
feelings
.
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have interest in religion and the higher life of man*
This implies that this life in some measure already is
real in him, because the one who feels the need of in-
struction already has some knowledge. This study also
posits a need to gain clarity as to one’s position^
with relation to the whole more than to any special
part of it. Such a study, therefore, is not for all,
but nature itself has divided the aptitudes and tal-
ents.^ But this much can be required of each one,
namely, that he may have a view of the whole
,
and thus
see himself,, in his branch, as a part of the whole.
The one who gives himself chiefly to philosophy of re-
ligion has thereby indeed also chosen a branch, but
the chief one. In addition, acumen and depth are
needed, as well as the power of independent research.
Through an apprehension only of what others have
taught, one receives a lower and merely historical
viewpoint.
45. ’’BestSmdhet.”
46 . In a controversy with Borelius, BostrOm says
of him that he was not intended by our Lord to be a
thinker. SB, III,. 181.
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CHAPTER VI
TRANSLATION OF BOSTrBm’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION1
The meaning of religion— in itself and as man’s
religion—we have already clarified in the introduction
to these lectures, and have considered it further in
the teaching concerning God’s metaphysical attributes.
2
In this teaching we have also presented the [doctrine]
of religion in itself, inasmuch as this is God Himself
in a certain relation to man. The true philosophy of
religion, on the other hand, as essentially practical,
^
is, as to its content and object, a doctrine concerning
religion as it exists in and for man; or, in other
words, it is the doctrine concerning the religious man.
Here we only add a few clarifying remarks to what
has been said about religion in general. One can ask:
How can one distinguish between man’s religion in it-
self, and for man? [We can do it] for the reason that,
when we speak of man, we can mean man as he is in his
1. The remainder of this translation comprises
pages 192-260 of C. 1. Bostrtfm’s Philosophy of Religion
,
as recorded from class lectures and edited by Sigurd
Ribbing. These lectures were delivered at Uppsala during
the spring term of 1844, the school year, 1848-1849, and
the falls term of 18AQ.
2. Ribbing
.( ed.,) r FR , 1L5-131.
3 . BostrOm divides his philosophy into the theoret-
ical and the practical. Philosophy of Religion is in-
cluded in the practical philosophy. For explanation
of Bostrdm’s use of the words "theoretical” and "practi-
cal," see supra, 63 ..
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present temporal stated or life; then we think of him from
a religious point of view. When we think of the religious
t
man, we have to consider his human religion. Or [we can
think ofJ man as an idea in God, or man as he is, not actu
in a certain period of time for himself, but for God; and
thus, from a religious point of view, [we carj consider
his Divine religion.
Furthermore: How can God be active in the finite
being? 5 God is the ground of the finite being, since
nothing exists except life, which, therefore, as such,
or as to its general nature,., is included in everything;
an outside and inside does not exist in the spiritual,
but only an existence in each other. 0 That which is in
itself unchangeable can indeed be active in something
else, if this stands in such a relation to it that the
former is a force, -i.e., operates in it. Thus, for ex-
ample, with the power of repulsion of things upon others
without any change in the repelling, God acts upon man
by being the ground of his life and activity, because
the last in time, or that into which the activity de-
velops itself, becomes the ground in an active life;
4. "Tidsmoment .
"
5. In the original this part is a continuation of
the previous paragraph. Since the paragraphs are usually
lengthy, the liberty is taken of breaking them up into
shorter ones.
6. A difficult expression: "blott ett i hvartannat
ttvara
.
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ground
„
therefore, has here the meaning of end and law,
i.e., the end in each moment of the developing series.
To what does God lead man? To Himself, i.e., to
rationality as actual in him [man]; or He gives him the
power of self-determination to the same end, or to be-
come a guiding unity for all the forces subordinated
under his unity; that is to say, He gives man reason’s
form,, content
,
and life—all of this in so far as it
is possible for man because of his limitations; or He
gives him power [to enjoy] the beautiful, the true, and
the good. But [He leads man] to something even still
greater, since religion gives man power to determine
himself for this end, namely: He leads him to holiness
and righteousness; or to wisdom, goodness, and per-
fection; although, due to man’s finiteness, this can
occur in each moment of time only to a certain degree.
Here, then, we have the meaning of man's religion
as human or, what is the same, of the religious man.
It is man himself, provided he is a participant in the
absolute religion, thus with the same end, but in a
lower sphere. In this he is himself the leader, al-
though led by the Divine, that is to say, by freely
accepting? this [guidance] . That man himself thus
guides, 8 though guided, is no contradiction, but means
7~, "Ett fritt upptagande
.
8. "Styra.”
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that he, though guiding, is regarded, and stands, under
a still higher principle, just as the state guides all
its members, but just therein, as itself not absolute,
itself is guided by a higher principle; and likewise
as the citizens of a state, if they absorb the spirit
of the state, thereafter themselves control their en-
vironment.

CHAPTER VII
THE HUMAN
1
RELIGION AND THE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY
CONSIDERED IN ITS UNITY : AS THE WORSHIP OE GOD.
By way of introduction to the presentation of the
Philosophy of Religion, it is necessary that we rid
ourselves of some common elements of one-sidedness^
with regard to the meaning of religion in and for man,
in order that we thereupon may proceed to the con-
sideration of the activity in and with which the re-
/
ligious life as such immediately appears.
Religion in man is man himself as a unity in all
his multiplicity , 3 accordingly, religion also becomes
such a unity in and for all the moments^ in man. It
is this, however, not simply as an abstract unity or
identity in all the moments, but as a unity which de-
velops itself into multiplicity, and then again re-
veals itself as the unity in and by it. Religion does
not have any special relationship to certain human
faculties, but rather stands in antithesis to them all
as a regulating unity and passes over into all of man’
1. "MHnskliga .
"
2. "Ensidigheter .
"
3. "Mangfaid .
"
4. "Moment er .
”
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powers as a unity and all-ness5 present in them* and thus
becomes man himself as present in all his functions.
From this it can be seen that religion is not merely
feeling, as Jacobi and Schleiermacher defined it. The
former said that religion is merely feeling of God,
and faith founded on this feeling, which did not admit
of any evidence. This, however, would make religion mere-
ly subjective and an actus without content, whereby re-
ligion closes itself against all elucidation. But since
the understanding requires clarity, the Jacobian con-
tention is properly to be understood in such a manner
that, though religion also is feeling
,
it is not only
that.
Schleiermacher defined religion as an absolute
feeling ofman’s absolute dependence on God. But, no
matter how absolute the feeling may be, it is never
identical with God Himself, provided one does not wish
to make Him into simply an abstract unity. An absolute
feeling is, furthermore, a contradiction, and: religion
does not go out of itself in order to determine the
multiple as something beside itself, or as something
upon which it exercised no power.
Another—the contrary extreme— is Hegel's insistence
5 . "Allhet." This is apparently a word that BostriJm
coined. It conveys the idea of inclusiveness.
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that religion is only the power of the general*3 in
man, or simply knowing and willing: religion would
then be the objective
„
or with its object identical,
knowing, or ethical conduct according to general maxims.
But religion is found in man even when- he has not risen
to this stage of development; it is in the time-process
first and predominantly feeling, and never ceases also
to be feeling; it is, therefore, just as well a form
of knowing and willing, as also of feeling and struggle.
If religion, therefore, is not merely feeling, but also
not merely a knowing and a willing, but the one as well
as the other, as a unity of them all, then it includes
all the human functions, or comprises them in their har-
monious development for man’s highest end.
The form of activity which is directly religious
is the cult
.
or the worship of God, by which is under-
stood neither the merely theoretical or the merely
practical activity in man, which immediately tends
toward the general realization of religion in him, or
the incorporation of the Divine in his consciousness
and the subordination under it of his aativity. It
must be distinguished from all other functions, which
deal with something special, although it is not without
influence on them. [it is] like the activity of the
citizen, which consists in making himself conscious of
b . "Det generalas makt.”
_V.
—
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the meaning and importance of the community, in order to
stir up his consciousness about them, or to incorporate
them in his consciousness and gain the power of the com-
munity spirit in relation to, or as determining in, all his
other activity.
This religious activity can be partly private, by
the individual, partly public, in connection with [the
activity] of others, as the citizen strengthens the com-
munity spirit, not only in himself, but also in others.
Thus one has to distinguish between an individual and
a public cult; both need to be united, because the in-
dividual reaches completeness principally in the con-
gregation. The combined cult can, moreover, appear in
various circles, as in the family, or the community
—
par preference as a result of the possibility of its
members coming together;—nevertheless, [it can] also
[appear] in the state through common festive days.
The moments in the purpose of the cult are: the
elevation of the human spirit to God
,
and inspiration
by God; also subordination or submission under and
ovation in and of the Divine, or: elevation to God;
devotion and submission, or piety (as one virtue or
expression of the religious manner of thinking, not as
all of this); and peace and joy in God. The elevation
and the devotion differ from each other only as the
beginning and the conclusion of the same ceremony: 7 to
7. "Akt."
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raise man to the immaterial—or a partial victory over the
evil, not triumph, which is the total annihilation of the
enemy,—of which devotion is the result. Devotion can
be called enthusiasm; this word, however, like Begeisterung
,
really only indicates the theoretical in connection with
it; devotion is man’s entire being completely filled by
God. Piety is the state of mind in which one freely
subordinates one’s activity to the demands on it which
lie in religion. It is always a constraint, namely, of
sensuousness, but not as a loss of freedom, but quite the
contrary: man’s power is heightened through piety, and
it is just this state of mind, to feel oneself more per-
fect, which is the other side of piety
—
just as the
case is with the citizen who feels his purpose to be
gained because he realizes or works for that of the
state.
It is these two sides in goodness or piety which
are designated by submission and ovation, just as it
(piety) as a whole is/6he more practical side in the
purpose of the cult, as over against devotion as the
more theoretical.
After indicating the purposes of the cult the
question becomes the one as to the means through which
these shall be attained: the acts which w e call re-
ligious adoration, and which can be several and of
different kinds, according to varying stages of de-
velopment. The lowest form of it (for the feeling)
.'
v
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is the collecting of feeling away from the external,
which is gained through quiet, wherefore the service
begins with it. Of similar significance are such
symbolic acts as, for example, the folding of the hands:
external rest. Here, further, the religious music be-
longs, with another character than that of the aesthetic
not a definite presentation of a certain idea of art,
but of the religious feeling in general; wherefore the
melody in it is lowly in order not to elicit particular
fancies, and more indefinite, whereas the harmony is
preponderant. Likewise [it is with] other aesthetic
meditations: a beautiful day, etc.
Thereupon the collected spirit breaks forth in
prayer and song, expressions partly of the .majesty of
G-od
,
and partly of man’s insignificance, which al-
ready are higher than the mere feeling and achieve re-
sults on man’s higher theoretical capacities. Here the
highest consists of meditations and admonitions which
not only have a theoretical purpose, but also a prac-
tical and an aesthetic one. From the purpose of the
prayer it follows that it is not a petition, but an ado-
ration in general; it does not enter in upon anything
special, but upon that which is general; if it moves to
something special, then it has lost its religious pur-
pose, and one does not then receive that for which one
..
.
_
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prays, because one prays amiss. The prayer may indeed
be concerned with numerous individual interests, espe-
cially the higher ones,, but only for the purpose of
achieving a certain breadth, not to receive something
in particular or everything as such, but only in general
to lift man to God. The same is also true about the
song, which chiefly occurs in the public cult, while on
the other hand the individual engages in quiet medita-
tion. The prayer must therefore not be wordy.
The third form of the adoration is the religious
meditation or, as public, the address. Concerning this
it is true that its purpose shall not be exclusively
theoretical, practical, or aesthetic, but man’s general
elevation to God, from which it can be seen that a re-
ligious address must not be a scientific treatise as
evidence or elucidation of knowledge concerning a cer-
i
tain object; it does indeed strive for the truth, but
not necessarily clearness in detail, and proofs cannot
and should not be presented, because what is said may
be considered as evident, and the purpose is to elicit
fantasy and reason to a spirited occupation with the
subject. It should also be practical, but not exclusive-
ly, and it should close with this aspect, as it began
with the more theoretical consideration. Finally, it
should not be an aesthetic work of art, aimed only at
-\ ' 3 ' i-
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satisfying the aesthetic sense, but only to the extent
that it does not offend it. In a word, its purpose is
to awaken, admonish, and edify in general.
The second purpose of the cult, namely, piety, is
gained through the acts which we call religious sacri-
fice,^ or the voluntary offering to God, and has as
its object giving to man the tendency of mind 9 whereby
he subordinates his purpose under God. These activities
«
can also act preponderantly on feeling, on fantasy, and
on reason and the corresponding faculties. The acts are
symbols, but they serve to strengthen the tendency just
mentioned.
The first acts are those of homage to God (for ex-
ample, bowing the knee), by which 'is understood that
their purpose is simply to give physical expression to
the necessity of subordinating ourselves under God. We
have further, as higher moments, thanksgiving and
praise (which correspond to prayer). Thanksgiving is a
surrendering of egoism to the one from whom one has re-
ceived a good. Such acts do not have in view10 receiv-
ing further blessings. Finally, there is sacrifice,
not necessarily in the old sense of something special,
but acts which imply a restraint on the demands of
8"i "Sakrif ikat ion*”
9. "Riktning.
”
10. "Asyfta."
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sensuousness, and an increase of the spiritual life. The
festivities among the ancients had as their aim costly
outlays,H which were dedicated to God, This, however,
is not necessary, but they do imply the unity of sub-
mission and ovation, or the consciousness of the fact
that the sacrifices signify an absolute gain.
What remains is to indicate how the cult should be
organized appropriately as public, which can be done in
numerous ways. The general rules for it follow from
what has already been said. Certain individuals must
represent the congregation, since the cult is to be
performed by several..^ 2 The reason for this is that it
should have in view both purposes mentioned, in such a
way, however, that the first precedes and is prepohderant
in the former part, and the second in the second part.
The spiritual address Qsermon] cohstitutes the central
part, after which there are prayers, which assume the
character of ovation, with which symbolic offerings are
united. This, however, more properly belongs to the
doctrine of the Church. On the other hand, the indi-
vidual cult cannot be determined according to certain
rules
.
11. "Kostnader. w
12.. It seems evident that BostrOm is here speaking
particularly of the Church of Sweden.
v'
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A remark ought to be made here. In Swedish cult
is called divine worship, 13 for which divine service 1 ^-
is not quite proper. 15 This word is an expression of the
standpoint of the religious consciousness, when man
places God and himself in sharp contrast with each other,
as Lord and servant, and devotes a part of his activity
to Him, and the rest to himself. But God does not gain
anything through his activity. In that case one should
rather call all of life a divine service.
Hitherto we have spoken about religion as unity,
and about the fact that the activity through which it
appears as such is inner, and touches all human power,
but only brings them to a head, 16 or gives them an im-
pulse. For that reason, religion may appear as poor
in content. But the richness of its content will be-
come apparent as we proceed to the next chapter. 17
COMMENTS ON THE HUMAN RELIGION AS THE
WORSHIP OF GOD
1. The quaint and archaic style of BostrtJm’s Phi -
13- "Gudsdyrkan. ’’
14. "Gudst jfinst . "
15. The Swedish word "kult" is given in English as
’’cult.” The New Century Didt ionary gives ’’worship" as
one meaning of "cult,” but says that it is obsolete.
Since BostrtJm gave his lectures in 1844-1849, it may be
assumed that he means "worship." Supra, 79.
16. "G&r blott till deras spets."
17. BostrtJm ends this chapter with the words, "nfir
man tJverg&r till betraktande av,” without a period, thus
leading directly into the caption of the next chapter.
But it seems better in this translation to conclude as
above.
.
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losophy of Religion is immediately apparent. But these
lectures were given one hundred years ago, and the de-
velopment of language and style, as well as the change
in the manner of presentation of the subject, have per-
haps made this inevitable.
There are some excellent passages in BostrOm’s
lectures, as when, for instance, he says that religion
gives man power to determine himself for holiness and
righteousness r for wisdom, goodness, and perfection;
or when he says that God gives man the power to enjoy
the beautiful, the true, and the good .
^
Compare with the words of Hegel:
...Religion is for our consciousness
that region in which all the enigmas of
the world are solved, all the contradictions
of deeper-reaching thought have their meaning
unveiled, and where the voice of the heart’s
pain is silenced--the region of eternal truth,
of eternal rest, of eternal peace. ^9
2. BostrOm’s concept of the philosophy of religion^0
differs considerably from that expressed by E. S. Bright-
man:
Philosophy of religion is an attempt to dis -
cover by rational interpretation of religion
and its relations to other types of experience
,
the truth of religious beliefs and the value
of religious attitudes and practices .
I£. Supra „ 81.
19. LPR, I, 1.
20. Supra, 71-73.
21. PR, 22.
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Brightman says that he has written a philosophy of re-
ligion. 22 In a different sense it can be said of BostrOm
that his was a philosophy of religion. He attempted to
present a philosophical system of the science of religion
based on rational Christian theology. All other systems
were by him excluded as inferior. ^3 There is consequently
a dogmatism in BostrOm which is a bit strange in a person
who claims to be a true philosopher.
3. In his autobiographical article BostrOm makes the
claim that his philosophy of religion corresponds es-
sentially with the Christian doctrines, but that it
differs at certain points with current theology. 2^
This position may be inevitable from the point of
view of BostrOm’ s rational philosophy, but it is making
arbitrary use of the Scriptures for one who makes the
claim that his philosophy is a vindication of Christianity.
When BostrOm enters the field of making distinctions
between Christian doctrines and theology he is in the
realm of human reason and opinion. It is, therefore,
at least conceivable that both BostrOm and the theo-
logians may be wrong. It may be that ’’All philosophy
is an effort to be God,” 2 ^ and it may also be true that
BostrOm made a very special effort in his philosophy.
But even so it must be regarded as only an effort.
22. Ibid.
,
vii.
23. SB, III, IX-XIII, especially X.
24. SB, II, 494-
25. Said by P. A. Bertocci in class lecture,
March 28, 1946.
.
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There is also perhaps something of condescension,
which is not entirely wanting in BostriJm, in the state-
ment :
BostriJm, moreover, believes that the phi-
losophical science of religion can just as little
make the positive religion superfluous as philo-
sophical jurisprudence can make positive justice
superfluous. He, therefore, urges that every un-
warranted disturbance of the development of the
present positive religion be re jected. . .But he
makes a definite distinction between appearing
as a teacher of positive religion for the un-
learned and expressing one’s, self as a pure re-
search man for the learned.
4. BostriJm believed that he was the first one to pre-
sent a true philosophical science of religion. 2 '7
Brightman says that The Euthyphro
,
a dialogue defend-
ing piety, composed shortly after 399 B.C., was the
first book ever written on philosophy of religion. 2 ^
Edfeldt, in his survey of the relation of BostriJm’
s
philosophy to the historic systems, says:
Any philosophical science of religion,
as comprising an independent principal part
of practical philosophy had not yet arisen.
Bostrflm is the founder of the philosophical
science of religion..2 ^
BostriJm does not, of course, deny that there had
been philosophy of religion.-^ 0 His claim is that he
had brought it to a position that it had not attained
26. SB, II, 496-497.
27. Supra, 66. For BostriJm’ s definition, see
supra, 74-76
28. In Ferm (ed.) ENC REL, 593-595.
29. SB, I, 92.
30. Supra, 4&-51.
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before. The validity of his claim will be accepted or
rejected in connection with the acceptance or rejection
of his central system of philosophy..
While he does not directly say it, it is apparent
31that when BostriJm discusses worship-' he is doing it
from the point of view of worship in the Church of
Sweden. This is also implicit in his statement, "A
philosopher cannot readily get away from the religion
into which he was born.”3 2 It may further be said that
BostriJm was a patriotic Swede. 33
5. The first impression that BostriJm’ s philosophy of
religion is merely a religious essay is in part dis-
sipated when we remember his division of philosophy
into the theoretical and the practical, and that his
philosophy of religion is a part of the practical,
dealing with man as a child of God. Thus conceived,
his procedure is understandable in developing the
various phases of the Christian life from a philo-
sophical point of view.
BostriJm’ s philosophy of religion, perhaps, should
be accepted as having a position in the history of re-
ligious philosophy. His idealistic position will, fur-
thermore, be of interest, and possibly of value, to
31. Supra, 86.
32. Supra, 76.
33» Landstrom, OTB, 18.
..
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others who accept the same position. At this point
his work impresses one, not so much as philosophy of
religion in the presently accepted idea, but rather
as a philosophically rational defense of Christianity.
.
CHAPTER VIII
THE HUMAN RELIGION OR
THE RELIGIOUS MAN IN HIS STATES
1.
The Religious Man’s Relation to Deity
We know that man is an idea in God, in which case 1
He is and is considered center and subject; but [we
also know] that man can be considered as subject for
himself, as a rational being, and as such relatively
identical with, and relatively opposed to
2
God, and
that as such a being he can approach relative unity
with his idea. ^ His relation as religious is here that
between a guiding principle and himself as guided by
it; not, however, without independence, but as a con-
dition withal of being guided by himself, or himself
guiding, 1 by means of 5 the guiding being; these two
sides, however, of the religious man’s relation to God
appear somewhat different at different levels of re-
ligious culture. At the beginning of this [culture]
the former side is preponderant, so that a person is
more in the position of being guided; or, religion
has him; but in due time he has religion, and by means
of it he guides himself. This Ls the correct [situation!
,
1. "Varvid .
"
2. ’’Relativt motsatt.”
3. This is a recurring emphasis in BostrOm.
L. Supra, 81-82.
5.. ’’Genom. ”
•
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a condition of being guided and self-guiding, and is con-
ceivable when man’s essence is the divine idea, and when
he becomes more independent, the more he realizes him-
self,^5 so that the religious situation becomes one of
cooperation (not merely interaction) in the sense that,
without God, the religious life would not be possible-
If we consider this condition more closely with
regard to man as self-consciousness and activity, then
religion, with regard to the former, is a revelation of
God to man, but also man’s revelation of God for him-
self—not revelation to him through certain organs for
its communication, but the relationship between God and
man by which all more special revelations become possi-
ble; God permits him to behold His essence, but he be-
holds it, and in that case as his own essence. From a
practical point of view it becomes the relationship of
guiding and being guided, or of absolute dependence and
freedom, which do not contradict each other, since man’s
true essence in fact is the divine. He cannot change
his principle, if he wishes to be religious, but neither
does he have any desire to do so, inasmuch as it is by
free determination. The religious man is ethical by
free choice, and vice versa.
6. ’ITu mer hon blir till ffJr sig sjfilv.”
.,e e IS
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COMMENTS ON THE RELIGIOUS MAN'S RELATION TO DEITY
One of BostrOm’s fundamental doctrines is that
reality consists of God and His ideas. 7 Man as idea
is said to be perfect as perceived by God but, never-
theless, to have a certain imperfection. For God the
idea is perfect. It is only in itself that the idea
is imperfect.
8
This is a distinction that BostriJm
insists should be clearly made. 9
Yet the goal of the finite spirit is perfection
—
the realization of himself in the absolute spirit.
Even though this goal can never be fully attained, be-
cause of failures and imperfections (which BostriJm
characterizes as a remnant of sensuousness), this does
not prevent an approximation to the goal by passing
7. Supra, 39-10. Berkeley says: Ideas are things
inactive, and perceived. And Spirits are a sort of
beings altogether different from them. I do not there-
fore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However,
taking the word idea in a large sense, my soul may be
said to furnish extremely inadequate... ! myself am not
my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active prin-
ciple that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about
ideas." Essay, Principles, Dialogues (Mary Whiton Cal-
kins), (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,. 1929),
301-301.
BostriJm speaks of man as God’s idea. But he also
holds that man is spirit. SB, III, 263. BostriJm also
speaks of man as a person and an immortal being. With
him the ideas are finite-rational beings, or persons,
with feeling, consciousness, and self-consciousness.
Supra, 39-10, and passim.
8. Wedberg, LSBF, 166. See also SB, II, 187-188,
271-272
.
9. SB, III, 225, note 100.
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through an endless variety of forms. 10
As to its true being, the finite [person]
has never begun and never ends, but goes through
endless forms, in which each one is in itself
finite. Even if the transition from one life to
another occurs through dimness, it is, neverthe-
less, development... 1
Everywhere the sensuous reality is a unity
of opposites in a relation of polarity, as the
gray of the morning for the dim-sighted, and
everywhere there is such a unity of daylight
and darkness. 12
It should here be mentioned that BostrOm held a
theory of transmigration. In his own presentation of
his system, he says:
But he [BostrOm] does not regard the end
of the present life as an immediate entering
into the eternal, but he shows the necessity
for man of still other forms of life before
he can attain his highest completion in his
development. Concerning these forms of life
he teaches that they are from eternity poten-
tial in man, just as the present one before
it became reality, and that the individual
phenomenal worlds, which man has for himself
under each one are not found in the space be-
yond, or in the time after the present, since
this is in both instances empirically infinite,
so that it cannot have any other outside or
beside itself. 1 3
Aside from the lack of support of this doctrine by
any of the Christian doctrines, which BostrOm claims to
vindicate, one may ask, What becomes of the doctrine
practically? He does not refer to memory of previous
10. SB, I, 255. See also 305, 345.
11. Ribbing
.( ed. )
,
FR, .79-80.
12. SB, II, 279.
13. SB, II, 496. See also ibid., Ill, 290-291,
Aberg, BV, 57, 61, 121.
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existences, and without memory, where would the abiding
self-consciousness be? On Bostriim’s own system, with
its emphasis on consciousness as reality, where would
consciousness or reality be without memory? There does
not in this doctrine appear to be any suggestion of the
’’trailing clouds of glory.”
But to return to the original subject, man’s ex-
istence is a continuous struggle toward rationality and
religion, properly designated as love to God and God’s
love to us. 11- For man’s religion is not only his love
to God, in whom he beholds the purpose and goal of his
activity, but also God’s love to man who through Him
becomes a partaker in His true perfection and blessed-
ness, which consists in likeness to God and unity with
Him. 1 5
Yet according to Bostrtfm this goal seems never
to be fully attained, for he says:
(.The Kingdom of God] is indeed the final
goal for the development and striving of all
finite beings, and it is also the world in
which they all possess their highest possible
completion and blessedness; but since... they
are finite, they cannot be completely without
some shadow of sensuousness, and consequently
14. BostriJm here appears to make perfect love and
perfect knowledge synonymous. This harmonizes with his
statement that the human philosophy is the wisdom of
God. Supra, 53*
15. SB, I„ 345-347. See also SB, II, 486 .
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not without distinction or difference from
their ideas. The sensuous in them may, it
is true, be far less at the end of their
development than during its progress, but
its complete extinction cannot be possible
in any of their forms of life, and its con-
tinuation is also a condition of their in-
dependent existence for themselves, since
its disappearance woulgl be the same as their
disappearance in God.^0
Thus Egon ZiJller, writing on the subject, ’’Werden
wir einmal ftir uns das sein, was wir fUr Gott sind?”,
presents the question and the answer:
Is not filiation with God^-7 the goal
that we continually approach, without ever
attaining it?... In salvation we have attained
the highest goal, namely, filiation with God.
We are independent, self-conscious members
in the absolute personality of God. Since we
in ourselves are independent in the eternal
salvation, therefore we cannot be as God ap-
prehends us, namely, perfect moments in the
system in which God perceives Himself and all
that is His in an absolutely true manner.
Then we would merge with God, and our in-
dividuality would be destroyed. Since we are
independent, as moments in God, we must also
in our eternal salvation remain distinct from
God and from one another.
Thus Wedberg is led to remark that it is impossible
from what BostrQm himself says to ascertain whether he
believes that man finally in a future life reaches his
goal—identity with his idea--or not. Both thoughts
are to be discerned . ^9
The one view has just been presented. On the other
16. SB, II, 294-295.
17. "Gottes-Kindschaft .
”
18. Art. (1897)
,
112, 115.
19. LSBF, 259.
. L
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,
Bostrtfm writes to Nyblaeus:
You must explain how and with what mean-
ing time can have an end, namely, thereby that
there is in man a potential form of life which
is destined to become actual in him, and which
has the character of eternity and immutability,
because the human spirit, when that form has
been attained, has developed to reality, clarity,
and distinctness, everything that can be thus
developed as a consequence of his eternal being.
This form of life is what we properly call eter-
nal life even in other religions, but especially
in Christianity... 20
On the basis of the former view, Waldemar Dons,
in an ironic manner, writes:
So, then, BostrOm's God sits there and
perceives perfectly in the eternity of the
eternities, while all the other beings per-
ceive, the one more imperfectly than the
other, the farther he gets down the Jacob's
?ladder. See there BostrOm’s Kingdom of God. 1
A comparison of the God of BostriJm with the First
(or One) of Plotinus reveals the fact that,, while
BostriJm’s God perceives, the First of Plotinus is re-
lated to nothing else. Motion is an aspiration, and
the First aspires to nothing. He does not think Him-
self, but only possesses Himself. 22 Plotinus speaks
of Divinities
.
2
^ Nyblaeus charges Edfeldt with poly-
20. SB, III, 490.
21. OB, 54-55. A translation fails to convey the
pungency of the Norwegian: Saa sidder da Bostr^ms Gud
og fornemmer sandt i Evighedernes Evighed, mens alle de
andre Vaesener fremdeles fornemme den Ene mere usandt
end den Anden, jo laengere man kommer nedad Himmelstigen:
Se der Bostr^ms Guds-Rige I
22. See Plotinos
,
Complete Works
, 4 vols. (ed.
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie )” (Alpine: Platonist Press, 1918),
HI, 9, 9.
23. Ibid.
,
V, 8, 9.
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theism in his interpretation of BostrSm’s doctrine of
ideas, because Edfeldt holds that there are many ab-
solute beings in God. Edfeldt defends himself on the
ground that what is finite for man is infinite for God
.
2^
There is apparently a difficulty here in the system
of
of Bostrflm. It is one/the contradictions that his critics
claim to find in his thought, and the difficulty here is
a recurring one. BostrOm claimed rather boldly that he
had removed all dualism from- his system, but it seems
that here we are still finding traces of it. He has be-
fore himself, on the one hand, the problem of the in-
dividual reaching his goal, which is identity with his
idea; and, on the other hand, he is trying to avoid
pantheism, with which he was charged. It appears that
he succeeded only partially in this effort, and so far
as the problem now under consideration is concerned,
he leaves us in some uncertainty as to his real position. 2 ^
When his mother had died BostrOm wrote to his
sister
:
Our beloved Mother has left the earthly
[^habitation] since I last wrote to you; she
has moved to a better world, where she will
reap the reward of all the good that she has
perfected according to God’s will. 2°
Here he appears to be entertaining the thought of
24. Edfeldt, OBI, 17.
25. For BostriJm’s defense against the charge of
pantheism, see supra, 36-37*
26. Larsson, m£5b, U4.
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Deity
perfection. But is he in this instance writing as the
son, rather than as the philosopher?
2. The Religious Man's Relation to Himself
Since we know that religion includes knowing God,
man and the relation of both to each other, the first
thing that man as religious discovers is that God is the
ground of his powers. From this fact comes the conviction
that these are given to him for the purpose that He has
determined, whereby the powers receive a higher meaning
than merely that they are his own or nature's— a point
of view above which he should arise. The conception of
his powers hereby indicated, which is true of them all,
including the sensuous, even though the Divine appears
more in the higher than in the lower, is a moment in
the religious manner of thinking. Thereby they are all
hallowed in the consciousness, and thus become moments
in the service of religion.
But man's knowledge of God must also occasion an
activity in him £man]
,
and stand out as determining this
[activity^
,
so that it shows that his powers have been
given for the highest purpose, and becomes laws for them,
so that a person may hot use them as he pleases, and
that the laws according to which he uses them are divine
and holy. His religion thus becomes an effort to give
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his powers a direction toward God as the highest center,
so that both the science (in all its moments), and
morality, receive the character of something holy, or
of godly life in man; or such a character that through
his knowledge and his activity he partakes in the di-
vine life. 1 This may indeed be done from a certain
position in the whole, but, hevertheless
,
in such a
way that even when a person devotes himself to a certain
science or activity, these become moments in the whole.
Only he who cultivates his science as a link in the
whole, pursues it properly and religiously. Likewise,
if a person correctly understands his life's calling,
no matter what it may be, he will regard it as a moment
of the religious activity. In this manner religion will
theoretically achieve the result that it will strengthen
a person's certainty about, and faith in, the truth, and
will produce the insight that, even though doubt may be
a starting-point as to knowledge, it can, just as little
as criticism, be its highest end, because God is that
which is certain in itself.
In the moral activity religion appears as faith in
the possibility of the good, and gives man power to labor
for it. The religious person can, of course, see that
a certain end is not always attained, and may even admit
that a whole period with regard to religion can be des-
17 For Bostrfim's position with regard to freedom,
see below, 280-282.
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perate enough; but never does he lose the conviction
that man in general and God will attain their purpose.
Finally, as to the aesthetic intuition and production,
religion has the effect of giving it a religious dis-
tinctness* so that it eliminates
2
the coarse in art,
and this is placed in a proper relationship to religion.
After having considered the relation of religion
to the human powers in general, we must, further, make
a survey of its influence on the special human capacities
and their manifestations. Its general effect on the
sensuous [capacities] is that they become means for the
religious [capacities], not in such a way that they are
used arbitrarily, or are destroyed, but so that they
themselves go in as moments in man's purpose. [This is
true] even if alone [the capacities] cannot fill his
life, because the religious person develops them in the
service of religion.
So far as man’s rational powers are concerned, they
are in themselves radically-^ religious. They are theo-
retical, practical, and aesthetic. The lowest expression,
as to its form, of the theoretically rational capacity
is feeling, and of the practical, love. So far as the
aesthetic [capacities] are concerned, we concern ourselves
2. ’’Avstryker.”
3. "Till sin rot.”
..
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less with them, because they are only a certain activity
of the theoretical and the practical. From the rational
standpoint, feeling is never unconscious, be it as
pleasure or discomfort, but, moreover, very soon^ it
appears as consciousness of something objective, be-
cause the rational feeling appears later than the sen-
suous, since man, as sensuous, already has an object be-
fore himself. Religion then arouses a feeling of respect
for a being on whom man knows himself in some way to
depend—though in what way is not clear—and of humility
with regard to himself.
This is its [i.e., religion’s} highest form; at
the first it appears as a feeling of fear and powerless-
ness, in a servile turn of mind, because God is thereby
not grasped as personal being, but as ultimate reality^
and ultimate substance, 6 which man places outside of
himself, either as a part of the whole, or as the earth,
heaven, etc.? This form is a consequence of the fact
that man’s inner being^ is slightly developed; and since
he himself is sensuous, he feels himself to be dependent
\
on the sensuous, and inferior to it in power. It is
only when man has apprehended himself as a person that God
17 "Redan tidigt."
5. "Urrealitet .
"
6. "Ursubstans .
7. Compare Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum in The
Idea of Holy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924)7
20 - 31 .
8. "Det inre fflr mfinniskan."
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also becomes a person for him, at first grasped under
finite anthropomorphisms, both in a lower and a higher
signification.
The feeling also follows to the second standpoint
of religious consciousness, at which fear is modified
into respect and reverence in the human sense, and then
appears in the highest degree of development of this
consciousness as pure and disinterested reverence and
love, as well as humility: the same, whether referred
to God, or man.
From a practical point of view, these forms just
mentioned correspond to, first, involuntary obedience
—
due to the fact that man does not seek to approach God,
and yet cannot escape Him. From this comes the religious
activity, which seeks to appease God, and to gain favor
with Him. 9 This has little influence on his practical
activity in general, except to the extent that he ab-
stains from certain deeds which are displeasing to God,
and gives gifts to Him. On the other hand, from the
highest standpoint of the religious consciousness, the
practical becomes a voluntary love to God, because from
this standpoint man does not consider himself and God
to be in a hostile or external relation to each other
,
and [considers^ himself in his unity with God. In this
form the religious activity appears in connection with
9. "Stella sig in hos honom."
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the voluntary morality.
On the power of imagination, and the practical
activity that results from it, religion works in such
a manner that it sets the power of imagination in motion
in order to form a certain way of representation con-
cerning God and man’s relation to Him, as, for instance,
mythical figures. In a practical way, this impels to
certain acts, which are determined by these representa-
tions. From this standpoint natural religion stands
lowest, in which God is thought of as merely reality,
in many forms, as, certain earthy objects,, fetishism,
the heavenly bodies, or heaven itself. Finally, through
a kind of reflexion on God as the unity
,
by abstraction
from all special determinations, He is thought of simply
as primary substance,, who transforms himself into the
finite beings as a kind of apparition^ 0 of Him (so
in specie ^- in Buddhism)
,
which is pantheistic religion
in the real sense.
All of these forms appear since man has not yet
comprehended himself, and the feeling of the infinite
is preponderant in him. They belong chiefly to Asia.
They indicate a progression in religious consciousness
in which religion gives them their meaning. In all
10. ’’Fantasmata . ”
11. BostrOm uses the expression* in specie , several
times. It appears that he uses it in a figurative sense,
"as to the idea,” or "as to the notion.”
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mythological religion we must, namely, distinguish two
moments: that which is itself religious, which forms
the unity and can continually remain identical; and the
manner of its execution, which can vary, although it also
reacts on the comprehension of the principle.-1- 2 In the
Orient, where the religious consciousness is stronger,
the images reveal a tendency toward infinity, or pan-
theism, and become arbitrary and more allegorical, since
God cannot be seen in nature, but this rather becomes a
make-believe . ^-3
Then religion exists under the form of belief and
feeling, which uncritically supplies material for the
manner of representation, and the certainty that the
religious feeling possesses is transferred to the myth.
Usagel^ is thereby directed more upon the religious in
general, rather than having influence on life; a cer-
tain complex of actions is determined by religion, and
thus becomes religious, but the rest continue without
regard to religion; wherefore it does not determine all
actions, but only a few, for example, those touching
family, cult, etc.
But when man develops himself into a consciousness
of himself as a person, then the mystical religion also
develops into its second form, as anthropomorphic , and
12^ "Verkar tillbaka pa principens uppfattning.
"
13. "Sken.
"
14. "Praxis.”
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thereby actually into a more divine [religionj The tran-
sition itself to this form constitutes the anthropomor-
phizing of pantheism: God is one being who, as it were,
represents the whole world, but as a human being (or man),
who is present in his world; thus it was in Persia (the
personification of light), just as our ancestors [didj
from the beginning.
The second form of anthropomorphic religion is the
Jewish, in which God is at the first regarded as a
national God, later more universally, but always mono -
theistically
,
whereby a new religion could develop from
the Jewish, after Greek views had influenced it suffi-
ciently, so that it could rid itself of Jewish limita-
tions.^
The third form from this standpoint is the Greek
polytheism . The Greek religion was at the beginning
naturalism (Orpheus); later it became more human
(Hesiod) and purely anthropomorphic (Homer), in the
idea of a plurality of personal deities, in which the
divine unity remained only in fate. Since, however,
this division-^ of God did not, on the one hand, suf-
ficiently curb the human liberty,, and, on the other
hand, was unsatisfactory to the human consciousness,
it was in Greece that philosophy arose.
15. A very expressive word: "Inskrflnktheter .
"
16. Also a vigorous word: ’’Splittring.
"
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That which is unsatisfactory in all mythology is
theoretical, namely, that accordihg to it the divine
Being is not qualified to be the principle of every-
thing; that the principle, therefore, does not have its
certainty in itself, but in the religious consciousness,
which gives certainty to the myth; that the myth lacks
inner necessity for the manner of its execution; and
that a complete explanation of the world is not found
in it, but only answers to particular questions.
From a practical point of view the mythological,
just as the anthropomorphic freligionj in general, as
to its principle,, does not become purely practical, but
more or less has the character of something individual,
i.e.„ the authority of a certain person. Furthermore,
it follows that, even though such a religion endeavors
to give sanctity to life in and through certain acts,
these, or the religious usage, are restricted to a few
such, but do not include all of life. These acts can
indeed include more than those which belong to the cult
proper, 1^ but in part it draws it [the usagej into the
cult, and [regards] as moral such acts as do not in
themselves include the character just mentioned; but
17. From here we have an extremely difficult pas-
sage: "Men dels indrager den i kulten och sdsom sedliga
s&dana handlihgar, som icke i sig figa sistnfimnda karaktfir,
dels bestfimmes ej hela livet med sarnma helgd (t. ex. det
offentliga sasom mera helgat eller sedligt, fin det enskilda).
.<
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in part the entire life is not determined by the same
sanctity (for example, the public £ life] as more sacred
or moral than the private). Finally, and in the same
measure that reflexion develops, in theory and in life,
the myths lose their sanctity, and thereby also the
practical religiosity, so that human life is separated
from the religious, and is determined independently of
religion (thus, for example,, among the Greeks in the
Pelponnesian War, when profane usage took predominance
over the religious).
These weaknesses are remedied through philosophy
and voluntary morality. Before this happens a change
takes place with regard to the myth, in that an attempt
is made to develop this itself into something of scien-
tific quality, so that a person, without having relinquished
the sensuous, in which the idea is contained potentially,
seeks to bring his religious representations into unity
under general conceptions, just as general practical com-
mandments develop as divine and externally given. By
this appearance of reflexion in relation to religion
mythology comes forth as a science, or dogmatics, which
forms the transition to philosophy. In dogmatics the
content, or the object, is regarded as given in advance
through a divine revelation, and as such it has an
authority on which dogmatics bases its doctrines. By
this, however, this content, and dogmatics itself, does
..
-
1
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not receive any inner necessity, but only one that is ex-
ternal, or given from without, by which it differs from
philosophy. Dogmatics may indeed wish to prove the myth,
and to resolve the contradictions in it. But since it
does not in this proceed from the idea or an essential
principle, but from the given, which is regarded as fixed
.
and to which one only seeks to give a formal principle,
nothing becomes satisfaatory . Therefore dogmatics leads
to^® skepticism, and this occasions philosophy. At the
beginning the latter does not influence the myth, but it
can later appear critically in relation to it, and then
it may have a disintegrating effect on practical life,
in so far as it is based on authority.
Then a reaction against philosophy usually comes,
J
because it seems to threaten to destroy the given, with-
out offering anything in its place. Even persecution
against philosophy is thereby a consequence of the fact
that religion has the form of myth among the masses, be-
cause' of which content and form fuse, so that person
fears that he will lose the one with the other. Practi-
cally, this standpoint permeates all of life, but never
succeeds completely, but always leaves withal a profane
area, and is restricted to certain acts. The reason for
this may be in part the lower standpoint of the given
religion, the degree of development of the form, in
18. "Upkallar."
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placing something finite instead of the infinite, since
the finite cannot be principle for the whole of life. It
may depend on the dogma itself, if it is restricted,
since both dogma and the religious practice succumb be-
fore science as also before the general morality, as it
dey.elops.
At this concrete development of the understanding ,-1-^
which as to its content is identical with the power of
the imagination, the myth thus becomes theology, and re-
ligious practice becomes theological morality. Then,
it can easily happen that religion divorces itself from
the dogma, and becomes mystic, inasmuch as the first
mentioned,, since it bases its certainty on religion,
makes pretensions at being religion, without in reality
being religion, since it is only a formal systematic. 20
There religion, already toward the end of ancient
times extricated itself from dogmatism2 -1- and cared little
about it, but rather appeared as a striving by the sub-
ject to lose himself in God, as a pantheism, but only
that of feeling and intuition; but this in such a way
that the subject would not relinquish his existence by
it, but would enjoy himself in God without, however,
being at any time entirely free from infection by dog-
19. "FOrstandsutveckling.
”
20. "Systematik.
"
21. "Dogmen
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matism. The other extreme, again, is to leave religion,
and simply give attention to the dogma (as, for example,
t
in scholasticism)
,
which does not give importance to
the religious mind, but in its place substitutes faith
in certain dogmas, and the observance of certain prac-
tices .
Such a dogmatic point of view will properly collapse
before philosophy which, freeing itself from dogmatism
by means of skepticism, is an expression of the pure
understanding, and attempts to develop a consistent view22
from the conception itself. For dogmatism is not religion,
but a way of representation in relation to it, and not the
highest one. And the situation is similar from a prac-
tical point of view. Even a religious custom, which is
the result of external authority, is an imperfect morality.
Therefore it falls in the presence of philosophy, and in
practical life, because neither one is satisfied with it.
To begin with, philosophy is low, and it goes through
the same stages, or forms, as mythology, but not in the
same manner. It supports itself by thought, and seeks
knowledge, and for that reason it is not limited^ to
a certain portion of the universe, but makes all objects
its own, only that it looks upon them in a way different
from that of the other sciences. Likewise it seeks a
22 ~, ”En i sig nOdvandig asikt."
23. "Limited” seems here to be what BostrtJm had in
mind. The Swedish word is "bornerad."
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higher practical principle, which must include all deeds,
and for that reason disintegrates, not religion, but its
dogmatic morality 2 ^- which is based on external authority.
/
Here a number of questions arise with regard to the
foregoing which need to be answered. What is the rela-
tion of philosophy to religion and to mythological dogma,
and of morality to the religious cult and the religious
usage? and, Does religion in a theoretic sense merge
with philosophy, so that this is the perfected religion
viewed from a theoretic point of view? No, because re-
ligion is the consciousness of man’s connection with
God and dependence on Him in all the various forms of
consciousness
.
Philosophy is a special expression of a certain
capacity, namely, of reason, whereas religion reaches
the whole of man and determines all his activity. By
way of analogy, we have the state and the men of
science. The purpose of the former stands above that
of the latter* and its function is to give unity to
all individuals and to the activities in the state.
Religion may indeed interpret 2 ^ itself in philosophy,
but is not exhausted thereby, but gives direction and
determination to science. The same is true with regard
to morality. The cult does not simply have as its pur-
pose the harmony of the sensuous in man with the ra-
24 • ’’Dogmmoralen . ”
25. ’’Explicerar . ”
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tional, but its mission is to support the consciousness
of his relationship to God and subordination under Him;
wherefore it indeed determines morality, but is not
identical with it.
Morality has a special field for itself, because
man does not simply have an idea about God and his re-
lationship to Him, but also about his own idea and its
realization; but this alone would be incomplete and
too limited, in the same way, as, for instance, if a
member of the state, or an order, might indeed devote
himself to his work, 2^ but did not subordinate his
activity under the state, or take up its idea into him-
self. As simply scientific, moral, and artistic, 2 ?
man would not yet be perfected; he rather needs a
unity for these types of activity.
An example of such narrow-mindedness in a political
sense was patria as one only principle among the Romans,
for which they might be willing to sacrifice themselves,
while at the same time they treated other states im-
morally. Likewise in the middle ages the Church and the
heathen. Thus, in general, morality always becomes im-
perfect, if it does not receive its higher awakening
from religion,, and separates from the merely human what
is narrow-minded in it.
Further, how are philosophy, morality, and art,
2 &~. "Leva i sitt yrke."
27. "Vetenskaplig
,
sedlig och konstnflr."
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related to the corresponding lower standpoints in each
instance? In the first place, so far as philosophy and
the myth are concerned, it is to be observed that the
latter includes two moments. The one, as principle and
purpose, is the religious faith; the other, the mystical
form in which this faith has translated itself, is
myth in the narrower sense. That the science 2 ^ does not
have as its purpose to negate, or destroy, the first
moment is clear, because it is exactly the same prin-
ciple that is active in philosophy, only that this ap-
pears in a lower form in the myth, namely, as faith.
Philosophy only gives to it greater clarity, whereby it
still does not lose the character of faith, but by it
faith as well moves from something externally communi-
cated to an inner manner of thinking by man himself.
The moment of religion just mentioned—faith— can
at a certain stage of development become exclusive; it
can become mystical, which is only a certain turning
on the stage of faith, consisting in the fact that faith
desires to separate itself both from its change of gar-
ment which it had as myth 2 ^ and from knowledge, and only
desires to be immediately composed ^ 0 in God, and thereby
absorb everything external, without however comprising
28. BostriJm evidently refers to philosophy.
29. "Fran sin omklfldning sasom myt. M
30. "Omedelbart fatta sig i."
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a scientific pantheism.
If science cannot compel mysticism to interpret it-
self in knowledge, 3^ then it will either descend more or
less to dogma, or it will turn into theosophy, i.e.
,
be
filled with the content of fantasy. But every genuine
thinker is, however, also a mystic, in order that he may
gain and give deeper meaning to his research.
On the second of the two moments mentioned in the
myth, or the mystical form itself, the science works
destructively; and this process is easier, the less
the myth has suppressed the person himself and his own
individuality. Thus, for example, with the Greek myth,
in which man had a place and a certain power together
with God, but where it also thereby was easier to come
to the understanding that the myth did not have corre-
spondence to the idea of God.
As already mentioned, 32 dogmatics constitutes the
form of transition from myth to philosophy, as a generali-
zation of the myth. But about this also it is true that
philosophy only destroys the imperfect form in which the
religious consciousness appears in it.
Such a formal process of development of the religious
consciousness as just mentioned occurred among the Greeks;
and it likewise affected the Jewish supranaturalism, or
31. nExplicera sig till vetande."
32. Supra, 115-116.
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the myth, which was increasingly purified, whereby also
a higher religion developed from it. In its relation to
the Orient the Greek philosophy appears, not only as an-
nulling the myth, by raising the west Asiatic religions to
a peculiar form of speculation, Neo-Platonism; it also
became a condition for the appearance of the highest form
of religion, even though it also immediately appeared in
a mystical form.
This higher religion has the peculiarity, that it
stands not simply under science, but is on an equality
with^3 it; or stands above the one so far given, and
could, therefore, be developed into speculative knowl-
edge. All ancient philosophy was more realistic than
Christianity. Even Plato's idealism did not grasp self-
consciousness as fully as has been possible, through
Christianity, even in philosophy. This was given in
Christianity, since it apprehended God without limitation,
and presented the conception of God as human, by which the
development of the idea of the personality became more
possible
.
But if the myth in its lower form had not preceded,
Christianity could with difficulty have arisen. What
relation does dogma, or dogmatics, have to science,
since such a religion, or Christianity, has arisen? It
33 » "Equivalerar.
"
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has no independence with relation to philosophy, because it
permeates all sciences, so that a theological science by
the side of, or independent of, philosophy could not stand.
Philosophy, nevertheless, recognizes theology as an histo-
rical-religious science of the given and present forms of
religion. It also recognizes that they are few in the com-
munity or the race, who are qualified to acquire philosophy,
or find satisfaction in it.-^
For the others there is always in theology a more
popular form of knowledge, which is accepted in good faith
and in the conviction that it has proceeded from God.
What was last said is correct,, when it has a religious
content, with the provision that it always must likewise
be determined by philosophy, which eliminates the non-
essential in theology, or corrects and purifies theology
and gives it a scientific content, even if not also a
purely scientific form. Theology ought not to be able
to exist-^ under any other condition;
As far as philosophy is concerned, it is in any
case a development in the form of knowledge of the highest
religion. Far from destroying religion as to its essence,
34* The fact that only a limited few had the capacity
for the study of philosophy was a familiar note in BostrOm.
For illustration of a caustic use of this idea see SB, III,
181.
35. "Bttr teologien ej kunna £tga best&nd."
36. ’’Till dennas inre.”
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philosophy itself has the same religion as its living
principle; and far from refusing a dogmatic manner of
presentation, it rather requires it, namely, for the
less educated, but without itself becoming dependent
on it, and always purifying the dogma, as well as the
cult. Philosophy cannot have the tendency to destroy the
cult, but it rather gladly overlooks the less perfect in
it, only so that the essential and the substantial ap-
pears in it.
The same relation that philosophy has to the myth,
morality also has to the religious usage, which rests
upon an externally represented authority. Its purpose
is not to destroy it, because morality itself has the
same principle,,, but to transfer this principle from' the
significance of an external restraint to an inner and free
willing. Like the science, namely, morality supports it-
self on the willing itself, or the spirit’s own inner
law, but in such a way that it has taken up into itself the
highest law, without which it would be a lower practice;
for it would be either empirical or a subjective and nega-
tive philosophical morality, which can arise, either be-
cause a person apprehends God as a principle of every-
thing incomplete (pantheism), or also, if one insists
that man’s knowledge is limited to the sensuous, in which
case morality assumes a limited character.
A correct philosophy does not deprive morality of
1C - i V.
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its religious character, but destroys the manner of pre-
sentation according to which the law lies outside man,
and shows that morality does not have an external pur-
pose. It, furthermore, removes the froth in the prac-
tical manner of presentation, which consists in the fact
that, either the cult extends beyond its limits, and
enters into the practical life, or else in this that
morality is confined to a certain sphere of the prac-
tical life. Philosophy does away with the view that
certain moral deeds are more moral than others. It
likewise opposes another frequently appearing onesided-
ness depending upon the contrast between the mystical
and the dogmatic side in the religious manner of re-
presentation, and consisting in this that morality either
is used to draw one’s self from the wo rid--monastic life-
or also in this that a person considers himself religious
without really having any true religion, but only by the
doing of certain external deeds. But a morality without
religion is not a true morality. A common narrowness
is this that certain religious people consider certain
deeds par preference moral (mercy, for instance), which
truly belong to morality, but not as the only thing in
it
.
The highest form of morality does not only in the
first place require, and is not exhausted by the fact,
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that a person wishes to alleviate the misery or overcome
the evil, but that he realizes the good, by which the former
follows of itself, even though philosophic systems have
existed with this shallowness. Therefore, to accept a
holy activity outside of the general morality is a manner
of representation which ought to disappear; and a theo-
logical ethics beside the philosophical, or free and inner,
is just as impossible as theology beside philosophy, and
has its source simply in a lower degree of human develop-
ment,^ whereas on the highest it is evident that nothing
transcendent exists, but that the supranaturalistic is the
rationalistic.
As far as art is concerned, with regard to it also
philosophy leads to the same kind of result. Its eleva-
tion, namely, consists in the fact that it is freed, and
labors for its own sake, or for the sake of the beautiful,
without being bound by a dogmatic manner of representa-
tion; but it receives this freedom from religion, which
also gives it its absolute end, as a revelation of God
in a certain direction. Thus religion directs the powers
of all men to their freedom, or to the liberation of man
from the finite and to the highest blessedness or a recon-
ciliation within roan with God and other people.
37. "Utv ecklingsgrad .
”
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1. In this chapter we have an historical and psycho-
logical study of religion and philosophy. BostrOm says
that religion includes the knowledge of God and man, and
the relation of each to the other. He further says that
God is the ground of man’s power, and the knowledge of
God occasions activity in man. 3^
This is a familiar emphasis with Bostrtfm. It is
intimately bound up with his central emphasis that reality
consists of God and His eternal ideas. 39 He often refers^
to Paul’s statement that it is in God we live, and move,
and have our being. 41 With BostriJm spiritual reality is
fundamental.
2. It is also to be observed that in this study
BostrUm moves toward Christianity, which, he is convinced,
is the highest and the final religion. He says that
there was need of a new and higher deposit in experience
and life before an essentially higher step could be taken
in the philosophical development, and that this deposit
was Christianity This thought is implicit in his
system, but Christianity is, however, interpreted from
the point of view of his rational theology with the re-
sult that man’s reason is unduly emphasized. He says
38. Supra, 106.
39., SB, II, 270. See also supra, 31.
40. Ibid., II, 124, 341, 400, and passim.
41. Acts 17:28.
42. SB, I, 26.
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4
that his system conforms to Christianity, when Christianity
is purified of the forms of fantasy which are found in
it. 4-3 Dons charges that Bostrdm’s system is more religion
than it is philosophy
'
3. BostrOm identifies reason and religion, when they
are taken in their purity. He regards the science of
religion as the normative science, A- 5 and religion as God
Himself functioning as Regent of the rational beings.
^
Man is not reason itself, but a rational being, who shares
in God’s rationality.^? Knowledge is rational, or philo-
sophical, though in an abstract form, in the measure that
it is identical with God’s knowledge, and science is es-
sentially a participation in God’s omniscience
.
Rational activity can have no other purpose than
the realization of reason, i.e., making the absolute,
rational, and divine life actual in human life, and the
\
realization and development of the human life in the
rational (divine). The reality of reason in man is his
religion, and this is his absolute bliss, his blessedness,
43. Ribbing ,FR, 07-68. Since Bostrdm rejects the
doctrine of the Trinity, and since Jesus for him is only
one of God’s many sons (SB, II, 494), it is evident that
he does not mean Christianity in the Scriptural sense,
but from the liberal viewpoint of his philosophy.
44. OB, 27.
45. Ribbing ,( ed^. ) , KR, 46.
46 . SB, II, 483.
47. Ibid.
,
I, 307.
48. Ibid.
,
I, 33.
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which simultaneously is his own life in God, and God's
life in Him .
^
Thus the correct concept of religion is identical
with reason itself, i.e., with the divine life, or the
divine spirit. Reason does not exist without religion,
and no being is rational, unless it is also religious. 5°
It is hereby clear that BostrOm’s system is ra-
tionalistic. In fact, he expressly states that it is
severely idealistic and rationalistic . 51 He calls his
approach to Christianity from a rational and philosophical
point of view scientific, and says that religion and
philosophy both appear with the development of conscious-
ness, especially as it reaches self-consciousness .
^
2
It is because BostrOm applies his rationalistic
system with rigor that he calls some of the elements of
the Christian religion "fantasies.” The real question
here would, then, rest with the validity of his rationality.
He has set up certain rational standards into which life
must fit. But it would seem presumptuous for a human being
to insist as radically as did BostrOm that his standards
are correct, and that his reasoning must be accepted as
valid
.
49. Ibid.
,
II, 187.
50. Ibid.
,
I, 307.
51. Ibid.
,
II, 481.
52. Supra, 123-125.
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4« While BostriJm has a high regard for phiiosop hy
,
53
he does not place it above religion, but criticizes Hegel
for having done so. 5 ^ He finds that religion is not ex-
hausted in philosophy, because it reaches the whole of man
and determines all his activity. 55 Philosophy is a servant
of religion, and religion gives content to philosophy . 5°
Yet it may be observed that there are times when he seems
to equate them. 57 Philosophy is a development in the form
of knowledge of the highest religion. 58 Philosophy, says
BostriJm, has a purifying effect on religion. The con-
clusion of it is that philosophy and religion should go
hand in hand. 59
In statements like these we can discern a fundamental
effort in the labors of BostriSm. As Kant sought to bring
about a synthesis of continental rationalism and British
empiricism, so BostriJm sought to bring harmony between
religion and philosophy under the form of religion as a
philosophical science. Perhaps he wished to restore
theology to its place as queen of the\ sciences. But it
must be as strictly rational theology, and his success is
53. Supra, 119.
54. Ribbing ,( ed. ), .FR, 2.
55. Supra, 119.
56. Supra, 121.
57. Supra, 123.
58. Supra, 124.
59. Supra, 125-126.
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of an equivocal character, because of the limited ac-
ceptation of his system, and its conflict with some of
the fundamental tenets of the Church, such as the doctrine
of special revelation,, and of the Trinity.
5. That there is a note of arrogance in BostrOm as
a philosopher has already been observed. It can also
be noticed in a condescending attitude toward the less
educated. Yet the situation in his very nation today
is that the thinking that is best known is in the field
of theology through such men as Nygren.
In this condescending attitude, he speaks of the
masses as less developed in understanding.^ Dons says
that a consequence of the dogmatism of his system is a
tendency toward intolerance with the adherents of other
systems. ^3 The philosophical dogmatists are just like
the theological. Since they themselves have developed
the absolute truth, it follows of itself that the rest
of us have to be satisfied with falsehood, and on top
of it all be scolded. °^>
Statements of this kind occur rather frequently in
Bostrtfm, and did not help to advance his philosophy.
From Germany came a most sobering reaction to his
60. Supra, 78, note 46.
61. Supra, 124, also note 34«
62. SB, I, 275, 307, II, 3U.
63 . Dons was a Hegelian.
64 . ”Udsk jaeldes.
”
65. OB, 12.
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criticism of Borelius;^ and in the other Scandinavian
countries there were unfavorable react ions. ^7
The explanation appears to lie in the fact that
BostrOm, due to his high regard for philosophy in gen-
s
eral, and his conviction that he had evolved the per-
fect system, in particular, felt that any criticism
of his system was an affront to philosophy, and not
to him. But' this attitude must be regarded as a weak-
ness in him.
6. Between Bostrflm and Hegel we find both similar-
ities and dissimilarities in the philosophy of religion.
Hegel says:
Philosophy, therefore, only unfolds
itself when it unfolds religion, and in un-
folding itself it unfolds religion. . .Thus
religion and philosophy come to be one.
Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it
is religion, for in the same way it re-
nounces subjective notions and opinions in
order to occupy itself with God.° 0
Bostrtfm has this definition:
Philosophy of religion. .. is concerned
66. Dons quotes Ed. Mfitzner in Philosophi Monatsh .
,
III,
207: "Diese Kritik verlSugnet leider in erbitterter
Schmahung des Gegners den Adel des V/ortes so sehr, dass
sie den Leser tief in seinen sittlichen GefUhle verletzt,
wenn er erwMgt dass ein Vertreter der Wissenschaft
,
die
dem HiJchsten und Tiefsten zugewendet ist, gerade am meisten
von unedler Leidenschaft gereinigt sein sollte. Wenn
Bostr^m selber in der That diese Schrift verfasst hat.
Qof which there is no doubt], so ist sie ein Beweis dass
der Vorwurf der Anmassung und Unduldsamkeit
,
welche der
Bostr^mschen Schule gemacht worden ist, den Urheber des
Systems am Schwersten trifft.” OB, 12-13.
67 . Dons for Norway
,
OB, 12; Ilflffding for Denmark,
FS, 5.
68. LPR
,
I, 19-20..
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with religion for man, or man’s religion. . .As
such, it must first present the human religion,
or the religious state of mind, in its purity,
with conviction, and with beauty; it must also
present the immediate products of it, as well
as man’s hopes united with it: and this is the
true philosophy of religion .
°
J
There is agreement on the practical side, with
Hegel speaking of worship, and BostriJm of the religious
state of mind. There is also agreement as to the re-
lationship between philosophy and religion, Hegel say-
ing that philosophy unfolds itself when it unfolds re-
ligion, and BostriJm stating that philosophy is a envelop-
ment in the form of knowledge of the highest religion. 70
Hegel speaks of the religious feeling of dependence,' 1
and BostriJm says that religion is the consciousness of
man’s connection with God and his dependence on Him in all
the various forms of consciousness.
7
2 Here we find
another pronounced similarity. Hegel says that if knowl-
edge is to be valid, this validity can only build itself
up upon the foundation of all truth. 73 in the same
spirit BostriJm says that philosophy is a special expression
of a certain capacity, namely, of reason, whereas religion
reaches the whole of man and determines all his activity. 74
flegel speaks of opposition to philosophy , 75 and BostriJm
69. Supra, 71-72.
70. Supra, 124.
71.. LPR, I, 11.
72. Supra, 119.
73. LPR, I, 43 .
74. Supra, 119..
75. LPR, I, 34.
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likewise speaks of persecution against philosophy
,
,7
5
in
both instances by the unthinking masses. Hegel says that
the consciousness of God. is immediate in our conscious-
ness, 77 and this idea is central in the system of BostrBm. 7^
Hegel says that rational knowledge is not limited to the
sciences, but is an essential element in the Christian
religion itself. 79 BostriJm holds that it is evident
that nothing transcendent exists, but that the supra^
go
naturalistic is the rat ionalistic
.
In Hegel we find the statement:
And thus advance is made to the further
determination that the Spirit’s consciousness
of self is an eternal, absolute moment in that
eternal life in which it is lifted up far above
time, above this distraction of change, and
above the reality of change, above dualism,
when it is taken up into the unity and recon-
ciliation which is presupposed as originally
present in the object of consciousness. 01
In BostrOm there is something of a corresponding
sentence
:
...Religion directs the powers of all
men to their freedom, or to the liberation
of man from the finite and to the highest
blessedness or a reconciliation within man
with God and other people. 52
Hegel says of man that,
76. Supra, 116.
77. LPR, I, 42-43.
78. Supra, 119 and passim.
79. LPR, I, 17.
80. Supra, 127.
81. LPR, I, 73.
82. Supra, 127.
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Knowing himself in God, he at the same
time knows his imperishable life in God; he
knows of the truth of his Being, and, there-
fore, the idea of the immortality of the soul
here enters as an essential moment into the
history of religion. 8 -"
This is in harmony with Bostrflm's recurrent emphasis
on man as realizing his eternal idea in God.
While Hegel deplores the fact that the dogmas of
the Church are neglected, and have been emptied of their
meaning, 8 ^- BostrOm in his system rejects doctrines of
the Church, as the Trinity, revelation, and vicarious
atonement. 8 5 While Hegel says that philosophy unfolds
religion, he seemxto place philosophy prior to religion,
whereas BostrOm says that philosophy is a development
in the form of knowledge of the highest religion.
There appears to be a difference of emphasis here.
In general, it would thus seem that there is more
agreement than disagreement between them.. It is also
evident that Hegel's philosophy of religion is stated
in a clearer style, and with more of the human touch.
3. The Relationship to Other Persons and the Race
From an empirical standpoint, man's relation to
others does not appear to his advantage. Considered
empirically and in his- sensuous existence, man is a
83. LPR, I, 79.
84. LPR, I, 38, 40.
85. SB, II, 494-495.
86. Supra, 124.
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product of nature, just like other beings, and his tend-
ency seems only egoistic, whereby [.life] becomes a battle
for power and the means of sensuous bliss. j^Lifej becomes
different when he sees his situation rationally, in which
case the aforementioned sensuous reveals itself as imper-
fect and irrational.
1
Religion requires that all men should be regarded
as having come from God, or as having their ground in Him
or from^ Him. By such a view of man religion already
achieves respect for others and love for and attraction
to them, and also to God, because God is then thought of
as being present in every person. And clear it is that
religion reaches, not only to a few, but to all, for
"All people are our neighbors and children of the same
Father.
”
The second insight from the religious standpoint
is that the same end has been set by God for all people,
as for the religious person himself. From, this, since
the highest end is always present, it follows that the
religious person must accept his end and that of others
as identical; or is in duty bound to further theirs as
well as his own, because the individual end is not fur-
thered for its own sake, but as a moment in the whole.
In other words, religion brings with it respect for the
1. "FiJrvSnt
2. "Ur.”
M
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right of others,, or leads to the idea of justice between
people, and of a united direction of all, because no
one lives isolated in God, and therefore no one can at-
tain his end except in an organic union with others.
This, as one can all too easily see, does not pre-
vent the faat that the end of one is less inclusive than
that of another,—as is true in every relative system.
The one is not for that reason lower than the other, but
the difference simply consists in the nature of the ac-
tivity; from a religious point of view all people are
alike.
For this reason, the third effect of religion is
that a person discovers that he should subordinate the
lower end to the higher and limit it in such a way that
in this subordination it performs its duty properly.''
It is for this reason that the religious person does not
experience any humiliation in subordinating himself under
a higher; this is what a person actually does in private
[lifej and in the state. Vi/hen people act according to
instinct it is a common experience that a difference
arises between the higher and the lower [order
5 ,
with
the one requirement that there is complete independence
for each one within his sphere, especially if the nation
3. "Riktigt fyller sin plats.”
,.
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is more noble in its inclinations.^
When again a person sees that there are not only
moral individuals, but also moral personalities, then
he also finds by religion that these also come from God
and have a divine purpose. 5 He, therefore, has a high
regard for them, and is willing to subordinate himself
under their more inclusive forms of activity. It is,
consequently,, religion that also gives man the spirit
of unity^ and this for the reason that his own purpose
is achieved to the highest degree only in the community.
On the other hand, as soon as the community is disor-
ganized,? it simply reveals the fact that man has sunk
down to sensuousness, or that there is lack of religion.
Then a demand for. empirical equality arises. The
demand for equality is religious in so far as it implies
that each one is to have a part in the absolute end, but
it is irreligious if it implies that all shall only be
4. It seems clear that BostriJm is here referring to
the social orders in Sweden, which he defended. They
were: nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants. These
orders were abolished in favor of a bicameral parliament
in 1865, the vote becoming effective in 1866, the year
that BostriJm died. See Carl Grimberg, Sveriges historia ,
3rd ed. (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt and siJners fiJrlag,
1915), V, 526-536.
5. BostriJm holds that the state is rational being
—
a personality. See SB, I, 378.
6. "Samhflllighet."
7. "Desorganiseras.
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dots beside one another. 8
Religion also demands work for all kinds of com-
munities, and thus in the last analysis for the whole
human race, but only through and from the standpoint as
to where a person himself is placed, immediately in the
family, etc. As soon as religion exists^ in its moments--
science, morality, and art—no part is excluded from
participation in the purpose of the whole; it is only
on a lower standpoint that a person in this respect can
limit himself. 10 In this manner religion includes all
people as a whole in one single unity, namely, God.
Is the end thereby attained? Is there for man no
higher unity between himself and God? Not in our present
form of life, because there the race is for him the highest
manifold 11 in which he sees the divine unity expressed or
revealed,, even though he already here stands in relation
to higher forms of life, though he is not yet conscious
of these. What has just now been said reveals itself in
the fact that the phenomenal world is a representation
of the essence, and that our earth is merely a moment in
a system, and not even the highest in it. 1 ^ Therefore
man’s effort here for attaining his end is also a moment
in his contribution to the development of still higher
"Punkter jamte varandra.” Here we have an in-
dication of BostriJm’s high regard for human personality.
9.
”Finnes med sina momenter.”
10. ’’Bornera sig.”
11. "Mangfald.”
12. A reference to Bostrtfm’s doctrine of ’’many worlds.”
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forms of life.
We now proceed to cast a glance at the relation of
religion to the history of the world, or the race as a
whole, and its development, where the problem will be
the consideration of evil.
In this we shall first briefly indicate the dif-
ference between empirical and religious viewpoints in
the consideration of world history. If the one who is
predominantly inclined to be empirical has attained any
higher degree of the development of consciousness, the
consideration of nature (which for him is all reality)
will compel him to admit that there is order, law, and
purpose, in it; and since this Is a satisfaction of a
requirement of reason, he will also pay the most attention
to It, or to the observation of nature.
He will, on the other hand, find in the human race
only confusion and lack of order, which leaves him dis-
satisfied, because he sees only the outside; and to such
a view history reveals itself only as a Chronos, who
devours his children, or as a stream without beginning
or end. The past seems to have ceased to have meaning,
and the future has re t yet received any; and the present
seems without being, and appears to be od. y as an ap-
parition, which already is a nothing, or is In a steady
13. Supra, 100-101.
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transition toward it; if one stretches out time to in-
finity,, the relation to it also becomes a larger quantum
of it equal to zero; and if one gives attention to the
parts, or to the individuals which exist in these moments
of time, they also appear to be without purpose, either
snatched away prematurely, or else existing for a little
while-1-^ in strife and struggle.
At times a more calm and more orderly-^ condition
may seem to exist, but only for a short while and, as it
were
,
fasj a foreboding of bad weather. On the whole, all
power appears as a fluctuation, a struggling, or a moment
of eternal change. Even the struggle for knowledge seems
to be vain, because the prospec.t of attaining a goal by
it seems uncertain, and its object passes by so rapidly.
It seems to be the same way so far as virtue and self-
control are concerned. Indeed, if one goes from this re-
flection upon nature, even this loses the dignity which
at the first it seemed to possess. It appears essentially
as merely matter with certain laws, but without goal, and
rather as something monotonous and wearisome. 16
Over against such a world view there early appears a
teleological reflection which lays claim to validity
against, or at least along with, the former; and ([this
reflection} is always a consequence or an expression of
14. "N^gra Ogonblick existerande .
”
15. MMera lagbundet."
16. BostriSm seems here to vie with Schopenhauer, but
his general view is optimistic. See Schopenhauer, The
World as Will and Idea (tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp )
,
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trtlbner and Co., Ltd.,
1883-1886), III, 382-401.
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man's reason, or its demands, but can be better or worse
according to the stage of development of the religious
consciousness. From the highest standpoint this reflection
becomes the only essential and correct one, and the former
l standpointj receives only the significance of an incorrect
form of apprehension. Not to wish to know anything about
the lower view is not consistent with the truth; and re-
ligious reflection cannot deny the relative correctness
[of the lower viewj, nor hide itself from the fact that
there is much in nature that is without purpose and re-
pulsive, just as in the world of men. 1? These imperfections
do not make a pleasant impression on the religious person;
in fact, it is more unpleasant than the one made on the
empirically minded, who only looks to the present, or
upon the egotist who is concerned with his own advantage,
and is satisfied so long as it can be accomplished to
some extent.
But all this can, nevertheless, not disturb the
inner calm of the religious persoh, because he knows
that he, the human being, belongs not only to nature
and time, but has his nature and his eternal determina-
tion in God; and thus he finds a goal and a law for
himself, which also belong to the race as a whole, and
in regard to which there is no before and after in time
17 . "Den mHnskliga v&rlden."
.
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hut [which arej above it, and are thus sought in all moment
This knowledge in the religious person cannot be disturbed
by the purposelessness18 in the given existence, but \ this
knowledgej elicits the i[deepestj conviction of a recon-
ciliation which the world in itself does not possess.
Thus there arise, first, the conviction and the in-
sight that the human race is just as bounded by law as
iisj nature, when we look at his inner being; because
the race has its ground in God, in whom all is harmony.
If this ^harmonyj does not completely appear in the
sensuous world, it is, nevertheless, the essential
^
part
in it, which always to some extent is present, can be
detected, and controls the whole. Thereby the entire
race receives the significance of a unit
,
1<?) in which the
past and the future also are present, and all mutually
influence each other, even the past. Not until then
does the whole become harmonious, even in the activity;
and more so in the degree to which reason appears in it.
By this j^lawj consciousness, too, receives an in-
dependent power28 to exist, and not to become extinct.
Furthermore, knowledge and morality do not become vain;
because, no matter how little they may contain, they,
18. vRndamalsvidrigheten. M
19. "Ett."
20. "S jfilvmakt att existera."
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nevertheless, pass over from the merely sensuous to the
absolute as end. The weakness in the empirical viewpoint
is that it is concerned with time alone 21 and seeks its
end in it, which, however, is not to be found in, but
above, £time_, . This makes an essential difference in
thought. 22 If anyone should assume that the human race
simply emerged out of the stream of time, and there also
perished, the race would certainly be nothing. It is,
however, not thus, but this life is only a phenomenon.
By this ^factj the whole not only receives a different
signification than it otherwise would; but ^this is
true^ even with the imperfect and the evil, to a con-
sideration of which we have now in our thinking come.
Evil is of two kinds: physical evil, and moral
evil. The former consists of all such things as are
unpleasant for man which do not have their ground in
his free will, and of which he, as free, is not the
cause. ^Physical evil_, reduces itself to a disturbance
of his
i
_man'sj lower nature, without going to his inner
being, a disturbance, however, which is sufficiently
painful to arouse religious questions . 21 Moral evil
again is a work of man himself, reaches to his inner
21 ~, "Blott holler sig inom tiden.”
22. "I bektraktelsen.
"
23. There may be something personal in this state-
ment. Bostrflm often, and with reason, complained about
his ill health. See Nyblaeus (ed.), FFS, IV, 5 and passim.
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being, or is essentially concerned with him, and is not
something more or less foreign to him.
Physical evil is of two kinds: that which is en-
tirely independent of man’s will, and that which does not
have its ground solely in man’s will, but becomes evil
only through man’s will. The first mentioned is that
which arouses pain and which without man’s will restricts
his sensuous existence, or his rational activity. 2^ All
such evil is a result of man’s limitation in time, which
has the consequence that he can only successively approach
his goal. This can be general for the race, or again
merely for the individual
.
2 5 But both determine each
other. The religious person approaches it with resigna-
tion, 20 as something which cannot be overcome, either by
God, or by man. This is a consequence of the fact that
man is man.
Such a viewpoint is possible, if one understands
that the world is not a production by God in time, in
which case one could always ask why God did not make it
2k* There is in this statement a suggestion as to
BostrOm’s own experiences. Though he felt that he should
do more writing, and often chafed under his neglect of
it, he was so exhausted by the drain of his duties as
professor on his limited physical resources that during
vacations he was compelled to rest.
25. ’’Individuellt . ”
26. So did Schopenhauer I
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better. But God does not immediately produce the sensuous
world; it is man that does this, and to demand that
it should be better would be to demand that he should not
be man, which would be a contradiction.
j
n accordance
with this, the religious person is convinced that, with
the higher development of man, the evil will also cease,
as a disappearing moment, which will not eternally fol-
low man, and is not an essentiality . Why was I not
placed in such a situation that I became more fortunate?
This is an unreasonable question, because man's essence
is eternal, otherwise it would never have occurred. 2 9
No one, who understands what it means, would wish to
make any exchange with some one else, because that would
be absolute annihilation. Since this -is ture
,
a person
cannot demand that his conditions should become other
than they are. But the important thing is the insight
that these do not belong to his essence.
The other kind of physical evil--that which rela-
tively depends on man— consists in this, that the natural
things and their development do not always harmonize
with man’s vain desires and plans for his bliss. This
27. Yet Bostrflm has said that God is the ground of
man's powers. Supra, 106. Thus on the basis of BostrOm's
own system, God must have at least an indirect part in
the production of the world.
28. For a discussion of this question, see supra,
100-106.
29. It is difficult to see the rationality in BostrOm’
statement. E. S. Brightman’s statement in a lecture that
a thing can have a beginning without an end seems more ra-
tional. By way of illustration, Dr. Brightman said that
a line could have its beginning from the table and extend
infinitely.
'.
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may be an evil in a physical sense, but not for the whole
man; it is a reproof of his foolishness which, if it
prospered, would have a harmful effect on the success
of the whole . It is already something irreligious to
desire to have advantages which do not harmonize with the
whole; and still more so not to be willing to subject
one’s self to difficulties which are common to the whole. 30
It is the same with this form of evil as with legal
punishment, which, as a matter of fact, is a benefit to
the criminal in his struggle against the sensuousness of
reason. 3 1 That, again, incidents occur which counteract
noble plans belongs to the former class of evil, to which
the religious person is resigned. [Hej does not try to
do anything but that which for the moment is possible;
and he believes that it was not determined that he should
do this; and he knows that, if he could see further, he
should find that if that which he purposed, at that time^ 2
and in this manner, were realized, it would accomplish a
lesser good.—The sensuous evil is consequently something
which cannot be escaped; or it may be proper that it
exists.
It is of still greater importance for us that we
give an account of the moral evil. This evil could be
30. Though he did not entirely agree with him,
Bostrflm shared some of Hegel's ideas--here that of the
true being the whole.
31. "Mot sinnligheten av fOrnuftet."
32. "Tidsmomentet .
"
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called sin, but this simply expresses its relation to
God, and refers more to the action than to its internal
nature. Thus also with folly, although this is more
theoretical, whereas evil expresses its relationship to
the end of man.
What is moral evil? The following observations
will serve to give an account of its meaning. 1} It
can hever be found in other than personal beings. Nature
cannot be morally evil, because the difference between
moral good and evil does not, as in the physical, consist
of a greater or less degree of well-being, but is qualita-
tive, and only exists in conscious beings--even though
on a lower level of development physical and moral evil
are confused. Evil is 2), as mentioned, not only separated
from the good qualitatively, but also quantitatively, which
is an important observation. All systems which do not
recognize this develop a wrong idea about evil, like the
doctrine of emanation and pantheism. ^3 If, namely, such
were not the case, the difference between good and evil
would fall away, and one would say that each, by inten-
sification or by diminution, would pass over into each
other. 3) Evil is not as to its essence one with the good,
and separated from it only as an appearance of the self-
33 * Eor Bostrom’s observations about Neo-Platonism
see supra, 111-112; 123*
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same thing, 34 0 r else it would be another kind of good
(thus Spinoza). Neither is it 4) merely or purely nega-
tion of the good, as all realistic pantheist ic35 systems
have taught, because they have designated everything as
modes of God. 36 According to fthesej it is only for the
relative manner of presentation, which does not see the
whole in its continuity, that there is any difference
between good and evil. But [this isj37 wrong, because
evil may in this sense be negative, namely, in that it
is not the good; but it is likewise a position3 s of
something else, i.e., itself.
That good and evil as to their principle are one
can only mean that they have not become real for a per-
son, but are considered as to their potentiality; and
this unity r or that which is identical in both, is man
himself, or his free will as mere capacity; or in ab-
stracto
.
that which, more closely determined, can become
the one or the other, but not both. Evil is positive
for just this reason, that it is a self-conscious and
free activity; but such a one, however, that it is
separated from the good.
5) Innocence is this very condition that has been
343 "Detsamma sjSlvt."
35. "Realistiska panteiskiska .
"
36. ,fSatt allt sasom modi i Gudomligheten .
"
37. "Men orfltt."
38. "Position."
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named, or the will, in so far as it does not yet possess
consciousness of the opposite; and one can say that it is
a form of existence that man has through God: in himself
neither good nor evil, but good provided he through Him
is innocence. This word, however, already expresses the
conceivability of guilt, which cannot be predicated in
God. Man, on the other hand, is not good until he has
made himself good, 39 and thus has come out of the state
of innocence. Because, in order that innocence shall
become good, man must make it such, namely by actually
excluding the opposite from one’s self; otherwise, there
would be no action.^-0
Evil is, then, a free will, or such thinking and
willing as has a content which is opposed to the good.
Such a possibility postulates the fact that man is free
before he is evil, and that through his freedom he has
determined himself for something that is in conflict with
his essence. Evil, therefore, cannot be understood with-
out relation to the good, just as darkness cannot be
understood without light, since for both there must be
something in common, namely, sight. Thus evil is
39. One is left to choose whether BostrOm saw
clearer than Paul. See Romans 7.
10. ’’Annars intet handlande.”
11. It may here seem as if BostriJm says that good re-
quires evil; but in the next paragraph he says that it
is only a condition for the possibility of freedom of
choice
.
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possible only in and by the good, or thereby that the
rational being determines himself to it. Otherwise it
would not be imputable. In other words, for its possi-
bility a rational being is required, but one that decides
not to be rational; 42 and a free being, but one who de-
cides not to be self-dependent. Evil is thus a contra-
diction in man, and its ground is the will as a free
capacity to determine its being, 43 0 r not to do it, the
consequence of which is that he is determined and deter-
mines himself for the sensuous. A being that cannot be
good car} therefore, neither be evil; but a finite being,
in developing himself, cannot be good without the possi-
bility of being evil. 44
\
The necessity of the good is clear in itself, because
it is what it is in itself, and cannot be an absolute
nothing, even if it does not actu appear in man. Evil
again is necessary in the sense that evil is a negative
moment for the possibility of the good in man—as a con-
dition for the possibility of freedom of choice; and it
is just by the use of this, revealing itself in the free-
dom of the will,
;
that the good can be realized in man.
42 . BostriJm here says that to be good is to be reason-
able, or rational. Since God is the absolute reason, to
be good would be to be God-like. Since to be evil is to be
irrational, it can have no relation to God, and must be the
consequence of man's misuse of his power. See below, 153-
154.
4 3. "Besluta sig fflr sitt vasen."
44. That this possibility is the result of man's free-
dom seems evident from Bostri3m’s position that freedom con-
sists in the ability to choose between opposing grounds of
determination. See SB, II, 494.
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Evil is, therefore, necessary for man in thought, or
as to its possibility in idea^-5—although not for God
—
in such a way that, without consciousness of evil there
would not be consciousness of the good, without the good;
or, to become genuinely good is not possible without
overcoming the evil; in other words, evil has a theoretical
necessity when we consider man’s development in time. In-
deed, without propensity^ toward [evil] man could not, gain
the strength of will which is necessary to overcome it.
But from this theoretical necessity of evil as to
its ideal possibility there does not follow any practical
necessity of its real actuality. That man must know about
evil, and have a solicitation^? to it, does not imply the
necessity of determining one’s self for it, or of sen-
suousness. On the contrary, there arises the necessity
of recognizing that it must be overcome. In regard to
this, it can always be explained from sufficient grounds
how it can arise, but not how it actually has arisen.
In this regard, or as to the factual reality of evil, no
other ground can be given than man’s free will or its
45 . "Till sin ideala mtfjlighet.”
46. ’’Propension." BostrOm’s use of the word here
seems to signify disposition, or will.
U7 • "Sollicitat ion. ’’ BostrOm wrote in Swedish and
Latin. His reason for using Latinized words occasionally
in his Swedish lectures is that in such instances they
are more expressive than any Swedish word would be. Among
the meanings of this word are "inveigle,” "seduce," "pro-
voke," "tempt."
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factual decisions.
Thus evil is not without ground, but neither does it
have any other ground beside, or any other ground than, the
will. In any other case the ground would be transferred to
God. Therefore, when we come back to the human will, we
have reached the ultimate on this path. Anything else
that is found in him as rational belongs to his eternal
being. 4-8
God is said to be related to evil in a permissive
way. This is false, becauses it supposes that God could
prevent it, and if He did not ["prevent itj
,
then He did
not will to do it. But such an assumption is also not
needed with regard to God, since we do not accept any
creation, but man is just as eternal as God, and what
proceeds from him is not caused by God. Evil proceeds
only from man’s essence, not, namely, in its totality,
but from that which is identical in sensuousness and
reason, which is the ego; 49 not just from the sensuous,
which is not evil, nor from reason, which is absolutely
good, but from [man] as a unity of both or as possibility
to apprehend both in himself. If one should ask why he
rather determines or decides himself to the one, or the
other, the answer is: because he does it. We can per-
48. Since with BostrOm the good is the rational,
this must refer to the good.
49. "Jaget." Bostrtfm defines the ego as that which
is identical in sensuousness and reason. "Det identiska
mellan sinnlighet och fflrnuft, n&mligen jaget."
.
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haps give a reason for the possibility of evil, man’s two-
fold nature, but not for its actuality.
With regard to the entrance of evil into the sensuous
world, it has according to many views been accpeted that
it had its ground only in sensuousness
,
in which case it
would only be physical; or that it depended on a dis-
proportion between sensuousness and reason, as a conse-
quence of culture and nurture , --but then these would be
explained as evil. Leibniz sought the explanation in
man’s necessary limitation—he could not be like God.
But this is to place the will in subservience to reason;
it destroys freedom, and simply makes evil a negation.
Kant said that evil is beyond understanding, as
grounded in the noumenon, but thereby he merely pushes
the problem aside without explanation. Fichte [said
that it isj a native inertia in conflict with the noh-
ego, and therefore a tendency in the ego to permit this
to determine it. But this is more of an explanation of
what evil is than of its ground.
In the Orient they sought the explanation in a double
absoluteness, an evil beside the good; or in this, that
the former had fallen away from the latter; but this is
no explanation,, because declarandum is just the ground
of the falling away; and if evil is absolute, it does
not become evil. The same thing lies in Plato’s ex-
planation of it, whereby the evil would not in itself
., .
»
"
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be evil, without which it is not explained by Plato whence
matter arises. Spinoza taught that evil exists only in
imagination. Schelling Jftaughtj that a fall of the ideas
had taken place as differentiations in God, whereby evil
is transferred to the absolute, and therefore is not
evil.
Hegel finally [taught j that evil is necessary in the
absolute self, and has its ground there, namely, in the
necessity of the idea of the good to posit itself^ C or to
exist as the result of a process of development, whereby
it becomes a unity of contradictions and consequently
posits evil, which thereby also itself becomes absolute,
and thus practically necessary.
All of these views are therefore unsatisfactory.
My explanation—to summarize it— is that man as finite
develops himself in time from the lower to the higher,
consequently from sensuous to rational. When he thereby
has come to consciousness of his essence, he finds two
principles or types of forces in himself, which both re-
veal themselves to him as possible grounds of determina-
tion, or are motives for him, although it depends on
him which he is to follow. Sensuousness may thereby
have taken a certain form, from which it may take effort
to free one's self, and one can neglect this; but one
50. "Att sStta sig sjfilv."
51. "Efter vilken hon vill bestflnuna sig."
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aan also take up the rational into one’s will. One could
hereby think that there are two forces in man, which war
for him, and that the result would depend on which one of
then were the stronger. But man is not merely passive and
lifeless; and, even though both of these forces work upon
him, it is necessary in order that one shall conquer that
the person himself shall decide for the one or the other.
All determinism comes from the fact that one has for-
gotten that a person is not only a. force, but that,, as
soon as he becomes conscious of his freedom, £man is*j the
highest power within himself. But it is clear that, if
he does not wish to retain his power, then it follows of
itself that he is determined by the sensuous or the lower,
as the first in time; but this happens simply because
he does not use his freedom. We must seek the ground for
good and evil only in man’s will, but only under the con-
dition of the relationship to reason and sensuousness
which has just been mentioned.
We add a few observations. 1) Is man evil in him-
self? No, because his existence in itself is his idea,
and so long as this is not his being for himself, this
being is his innocence. 52 is evil by nature? No,
52. It is regrettable that some sentences seem con-
fused. "Nej, ty hennes vara i och f{Jr sig Sr hennes ide,
och s& lfinge denna ej 9r hennes vara fOr henna sj81v, 9r
detta vara hennes oskuld.”
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because man becomes morally evil through himself . 53 He
first loses his innocence—this lies in its nature— but
to it is added a free decision.
2) The immorality of other people cannot strictly54
contribute to make him evil. But this can [be
said to be truej in the sense that, if through immoral
behavior of others, it can become more difficult for the
individual to attain a higher degree of perfection. In
that way it is indeed correct. No wickedness can be
without influence on others, so that so far as the con-
sequences are concerned, all evil strengthens the power
of sensuousness over a person, and hinders him from higher
development. Inherited sin 5 3 i s just this influence on
each one of that which han preceded.
So far as the individual person is concerned, one
immoral act will not completely estrange him from his
53. Bostrdm's rejection of the doctrine of "original
sin" is at variance with the doctrine of the Church in
which he was brought up. See below, note 55. His position
is also at variance with the Barthianism of our own day.
See Barth and Thurnheysen, Come Holy Spirit (tr. George
Richards, Elmer G. Homrighansen
,
Karl J. Ernst), New York:
Round Table Press, Ind., 1933) » 6-12 and passim.
54. "1 strAng bemarkelse.
"
55. "Original sin" is defined as follows in the Cate -
chism of the Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod (Rock
Island: Augustana Book Concern, 1922), 51-52: "Original
sin is our inherited tendency to do that which is evil and
our disinclination and inability to do that which is good."
Among the Bible verses quoted are the following: "I know
that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing."
(Romans 7:18) and, "We were by nature the children of wrath"
(Ephesians 2:3). In this definition "original sin" and
"inherited sin" are identified. BostrOm, however, denies
original sin, and gives his own interpretation of the doctrine
of inherited sin.
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essence, but it simply has the effect that, if the prin-
ciple for the act continues
.
he will find it more diffi-
cult to turn about; and this can go so far that a per-
son in this present life feels himself incapable of im-
provement. By repetition he becomes increasingly a
stranger to the essence, and can even find it a hindrance
to his present purpose, and develop a hostile attitude
toward it, especially during the struggle between the
opposing principles, since he knows his true end, but
is so enmeshed in the sensuous56 that he cannot free him-
self from it. Then, as a wretched person, he may wish
)
himself done with the good principle, or desire to choke
it. This is one of the highest degrees of evil, although
not the highest, which is hardening of the heart, 57 since
here there is still the possibility of the victory of the
good. The former condition arouses sympathy; the latter,
disgust. This, which can happen with one person, can also
happen with families, races, and periods of time. 5^ In
such instances a desperate condition arises, but usually
there is also just then a turning. He who lives in such
a period of time may indeed have a more difficult time
in overcoming evil, and thus it is an inheritance, which
co-operates, not for his immorality, but for a lesser
56. WS& inkommen i det sinnliga."
57 . "FOrstockelse
•
w
58. "Tidevarv. M
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correspondence to his idea. Inherited sin is thus not
really sin, 59 put only a lack of correspondence to the
idea ,60 which implies that one feels the consequences
of the manner in which the race has developed. It can,
therefore, not be imputed to the individual, but as a
member of the whole he must participate in the conse-
quences of the immorality of others.
3) How is the religious person related to moral
evil? a) he cannot ascribe any part in it to God .
whether it be under the one form or the other. In God
as the absolute good there can be no evil, neither can
it issue from Him, but only from the being through whom
evil becomes possible. Therefore the religious person
does not need any theodicee; such a one has appeared
only in the systems which have accepted a creatio libera ,
at which the thought has always arisen that God could
have made man better, and that with the acceptance of
such a creatio it is possible to justify God because
59. a. It is to be observed that this statement is
not in agreement with many of the pronouncements of the
Bible, such as: "Therefore, as through one man sin
entered into the world, and death through sin; and so
death passed unto all men, for that all sinned" (Romans
5:12). "That whioh is born of the flesh is flesh" (John
3:6). "...Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart
was only evil continually" (Genesis 6:5) • "For out of
the heart come forth evil thoughts" (Matthew 15:14).
"...Sin which dwelleth in me" (Romans 7:20).
b. Ethical theory takes the position that there can
be no moral guilt where there is no choice. William
Henry Roberts says: "Where there is no choice, there is
no problem." The Problem of Choice (Boston: Ginn and
Company, 1941),”^
60. There is here a strong resemblance to Hegel.
See Hegel, LPR, I, 156-160.
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of the evil in a different way from what Leibniz did.61
The case is entirely different with us. Since, ac-
cording to our view, God did not create man, He can also
not have made man wicked. But since man is a self-exist-
ing being, he must also in time decide what he is to be, 62
the ground for which cannot be sought in anything else than
in himself.
b) The religious individual thinks of evil not only
as his own and that of the race (through the consequences),
but as the absolute evil for man, or that which is the
greatest evil for him, and in that sense as his own. This
does not mean that it would in itself be absolute, or that
the sensuous life per se is evil, but that by choosing it
as end man is deprived of that which for him is absolute
good. In that sense evil is absolute, and this is true in
each moment of time, and throughout all of life, when it
is considered as a preparation for the higher life, which
is his idea, and the only thing that has eternal worth for
him.
Evil is, therefore, for man an eternal evil, because
he cannot again enter into this present life and use it
again as a means for his end, but has here played out his
61. BostrOm holds that God did not create the world,
and therefore He is not directly responsible for it. Where
there is no responsibility, there is no need for defense of
justification. Supra, 146-147.
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role, and not used this life for that which he should have
attained in it; and also, because he knows that this miss-
ing of the mark cannot be remedied by himself, but only by
God.
Another question, and a still more important one, is
whether evil is eternal in the sense that it must have for
man an eternal substantiality or reality. How does the
religious person regard evil 1+) in relation to other possible
forms of life , and in specie with regard to his own absolute
end? It cannot be thought that the moral evil be trans-
ferred to succeeding forms of life. Then man would have
ceased to be free, and consequently also ceased to be in-
dependent, and a man. But he enters into a succeeding
life, as into this one, with power of self-determination.
But this does not prevent the fact that, even though he
does not need to be actu evil, in the event that he has
been so here, the consequences of a preceding immoral life
will, nevertheless, in part have the effect that in the
succeeding one he does not have those moments fully devel-
oped which he would need in order to reach a higher degree
of life there; and in part that there will be obstructive
moments in the determination of the will for the good;
that is, he will there have-a harder struggle to become
good than would be the case if the reverse had been true.
This fact, in connection with the consciousness that these
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deficiencies in correspohdence^ are the consequence of
man's own will, is designated as punishment in the popular
religions, and, in the contrary situation, rewards.
In some religions there is connected with .this con-
sciousnessj the false manner of representation, that out-
ward punishments and rewards should follow. This is a
vulgarity that disappears with higher development, so that
the punishments and rewards fuse with the consciousness
of a self-caused possibility of greater or less morality.
Both the punishments and the rewards can be represented
by fantasy in various ways, but always with this similarity
in all religions, that therein a connection between this
and the following life is assumed. In this manner the
important influence and significance of the moral evil is
usually depicted by means of the most severe pictures of
punishment, dim and dark, sensuousness being that which is
dim for man. They also picture it as a life of bondage
and chains,, because the spirit is bound by sensuousness;
and this continues in the succeeding life, in so far as it
is dependent on the present one.
The connection between the preceding and the succeeding
life, and the influence of the former on the latter, finally
elicits the question 5) whether the religious person can
63* "Oemotsvarigheter . " There is similarity here to
the use of the term "correspondence" by Emanuel Swedenborg.
See his Heaven and Hell (Rotch ed.), (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1920), 347 and passim.
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regard the moral evil as continuing after it has once become
actual, or if it will finally be destroyed. On the basis of
the religious feeling this question has been variously
answered. Certain persons have had a very vague notion
about the life after this one, and with these people such
a question can, therefore, not arise. Thus, for example,
[it is with j Chinese and Egyptians, who accept the im-
mortality of the soul, but sensuously considered. Among
the Israelites immortality was also slightly apprehended
in a conscious way, but to begin with all reward was limited
to sensuous advantages. This manner of representation dis-
appeared in the course of time, but with the effect; that
there was little questioning about eternal blessedness.
The problem was grasped in a deeper manner in Hindustan,
where it was accepted that man passes through many stages
of life, and that the present is, as it were, a middle
boundary, from which he passes, either to unity with God,
or else downward. Then he has a new life-series to pass
through, with a sort of circular motion, in that he finally
always returns to this life, and from it raises himself to
something better, in the event that this is to happen. But
whether or not this final „ statej is to be better is not
said. On the other hand, in Persia the express doctrine
is found that everything ends by becoming the kingdom of
Ormuzd. Among the Greeks there was a wretched view about
the next life. The picture is taken from the fantasy that
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they had about the dead, because the memory of them is
poorer than the present existence. They are all repre-
sented as shadows, but with a boundary between the better
and the worse—and thus, no answer.
Which, now, of the opposing views is the more satis-
factory? The thought which is prefigured in the Persian
religion must, as the only correct one from a philosophical
viewpoint, be accepted as the only one that is consistent
with the standpoint of the religious life. If evil should
continue forever, it would have to possess an eternal sub-
stance, which is impossible. The only thing that is posi-
tive^ in evil is the sensuous will, 65 which rather belongs
to the non-sensuous
,
but only the formal in the same, which
also belongs to man’s sensuous nature. Since we must believe
that man more and more continues in the development of his
being, that which does not correspond to his being must in
this development be increasingly removed. 66 From one point
of view, this has been found necessary, but, in order to
reconcile it with other statements in the revelation, other
hypotheses have been invented, as, for example, the one that
the evil persons sink deeper and deeper into evil, or into
a life of mere appearance ,67 and finally disappear. But
64 . "Det enda positiva."
65 . Here obviously Bostrflm is concerned with moral, not
natural evil.
66. "Avstrykas. " Note the apriori method of argument.
67 . ?, I ett skenliv."
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this is in conflict with the truth that man has eternal
substantiality, and accordingly the immortality^ of the
soul does not hang together with man’s morality, but only
the form of this immortality.
A second reason for the impossibility of the eternal
continuation of evil is the fact that many people do not
here reach any higher development of their life, so that
by far the greater portion of human ideas^9 a0 not attain
any actual existence in our world; others may indeed at-
tain such a one, but give it up again with haste. Yet
these [who have not reached a higher development^, cannot
be excluded from communion with the others; a possibility
must also be found for them for just as high a development,
otherwise this ^development 5 would depend on a certain dura-
tion. 7° It is of still greater importance that the religious
consciousness would imply a contradiction, if man did not
hope that there would be a higher development. The re-
ligious individual, therefore, calms himself in [hope of»
the earlier participation in eternal life by the one or
the other—which would be impossible if a portion of the
race were excluded from the development. Indeed the re-
68. For a discussion of BostrOm’s idea of immortality
see below, 186-198.
^
69. "M8nniskoide*er. " Reference to Bostr&n’s system
of God and his eternal ideas.
70. This does not seem clear, but the words of the
text do not afford any other rendition: "Annars skulle
denna bero pit en tidslMngd.”
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ligious person may already in this life find himself living
in God, but only as to the principle of his higher life,
whereas the consciousness of sin is, nevertheless, always
found in him. No one can be said to be so perfect that
he can consider himself to be without guilt.
Therefore, if he also knows that he is raised above
the immoral persons, he is, nevertheless, not absolutely,
but only relatively, separated from the evil ones. But
if upon reflection on good and evil one takes into con-
sideration also the next life, this leads to the repre-
sentation of a final complete difference between good and
evil, and thereby also to a raising of the antithesis be-
tween good and evil to its greatest height. From this the
imagination of the eternal damnation of the evil has a-
ris3>--which, however, if it existed, would destroy the
blessedness of the religious person.
^
We sum up what has been said in this manner that, on
the one hand* sihce man cannot think of himself without
relation to the others, therefore the consciousness of the
absolute unblessedness of some would imply a decrease in
his own blessedness. On the other hand, the thought of the
eternal existence of evil does not harmonize with the
thought of God as absolute end of all life. It is possible
71. A different spirit from the one that suggests the
joy of the blessed will be increased by beholding the misery
of the damned.
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that certain individuals for a certain period of time do
not share in this life, but it cannot be absolutely unat-
tainable for anyone.
Therefore the piously inclined has the conviction that
evil may indeed in time work sorrowfully and cause a di-
minishing of his blessedness, but he also knows that only
the true striving can have real success, wherefore he
never has more than a relative sympathy with evil, and
never any absolute sorrow over it. Neither does he con-
sider evil so gross that it would be a complete lack of
correspondence with the idea. To a certain extent this
lack of correspondence may consist in a wrong tendency,
without being actual sin. Therefore the religious per-
son is careful and charitable in his judgments of others,
because the exact state of perversion in a person can be
known only by that person himself; and neither does he
make too great demands on others.
It is easy to discover that the view of evil, which
herewith has been presented is intimately bound up72 with
the certainty of the immortality of the soul. Therefore,
we must also, in our consideration of religion, or the
religious man, proceed to a consideration of other forms
of life. 73
72l ”Sammanh8nger .
"
73. As in other instances, the last sentence is not
completed, but leads into the caption of the next section.
It is here completed by a reference to what is contained
in section 4*
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1, Bostrfim holds that God did not directly create
the sensuous world, but that this is done by man, 74
There is an idea in God, man, from which the world has
its explanation, and it is through this that God is its
cause, 76
Bostrflm says that for finite man there is, beside
the absolute and supersensible world, also a relative and
sensuous world, which belongs to him immediately, and to
God (through him) mediately, which in itself is the faulty76
one, but which, nevertheless, relatively for man, is the
necessary and correct phenomenon of the former. Since this
world is the relative antithesis of the absolutely true one,
its parts must te more or less temporal and transitory,
existing in space (extended, external, remote), not spiritual,
but material, not absolutely alive, but (relatively) life-
less, unconscious, not free (passive), impenetrable, 77
etc, 78 As a matter of fact, this world is nothing else
than a less perfect perception or consciousness of the
content of God's spirit. 79
t
In other words, this sensuous and temporal world is
74. Supra, 147.
75. Ribbing (ed.), PR, 119. One may ask if BostrCm
holds that man causes the laws of nature. He does indeed
say that what we call nature does not, according to his view,
have any existence of its own independent of man. SB, II,
491. See also SB, I, 85, Aberg, BV, 30-31.
76. "Oriktiga."
77. "Ogenomskadliga. M
78. SB, III, 14-15.
79. See also Ribtt ng (ed.), PR, 75-76, 116; Aberg,
BV, 47-49, 54; SB, I, 3, 118, IP3; II, 276-279, 284-286,
487, UP 24, 488-489, 491-492.
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the result of man’s imperfect perceptions. 80 It is for
this reason that Bostrflm can say that to demand that this
should be a better world would be to demand that man should
not be man, which would be a contradiction. 8 -^ This is not
the only world that has its ultimate cause in God. 82 He
would often say that, if there were only one world, then
Hegel would be right. 83
2. In criticizing and evaluating Leibniz, Bostrfim
says that when Leibniz © nceived of God as thinking of all
possible worlds^ then they were also in His consciousness,
and could there possess harmony as an ideal reality; then
He could also have created them all, provided His will
were not weaker than His understanding, although this idea
of creation is impossible, and not explained by Leibniz.
An infinite number of worlds is not only possible, but is
actual, in God, because each one of His ideas is the whole
from a certain viewpoint, so that He ha s within Himself
the perfect world, but each monad with a certain degree
of Imperfection. That God should choose the best possible
world would not be reasonable, 84 because, if He could have
them all in His consciousness. He could also have produced
80 . SB
,
I, 245. Here is similarity to Leibniz and Hegel.
See Leibniz, The Monadology (tr. Robert Latta), (Oxford: At
the Clarendon Press, 189^)
,
259-245, especially paragraphs
42, 49. See also McTaggart, SHD, 177.
81. Supra, 147-148.
82. Ribbing (ed.), PR, 119.
83. Wikner, STB, 17. Yet there is diversity in Hegel’s
"one world.’"
84. "Har Intet skfll f8r sig."
4.
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them, whereby both the world and God would have been more
complete, just as He was more perfect in His thought by
thinking them all. BostrSm holds that the correct part
in Leibniz* view lies in the fact that the world which is
God's is absolutely perfect, and that the imperfect worlds
are already contained in it as to their possibility. Thus
comprehended, the view of Leibniz becomes like Bostr8m’s.85
BostrCm criticizes Aristotle for accepting the idea
of a substance other than God, which he says is an un-
proved supposition. He charges Hegel with something of
the same procedure when he speaks of the passing over
of the idea into the "Anderssein," which he says is also
a supposition.
3. Bostrflm believes that he interprets the Christian
viewpoint, as different from the Jewish, and freed from
the empirical additions of theology, in this manner:
God is eternal and unchangeable. He is
not only God, but also man, as the Son, who is
begotten of eternity. Consequently He exists,
not as a production in time, which is only a
symbolical expression, but as an eternal re-
lationship. V.re think of the one who has the
idea as priori and the idea as latter, though
both are the same in essence, and the idea,
furthermore, has his own personal existence.
This Son has in the fulness of time assumed
human nature, or entered the sensuous world,
which consequently is an immediate creation
by Him. It is thereby said^S that God indeed
£5. Ribbing .( ed. ) , PR, .95-96.
86. Ibid., 122. in short, he is more a monist
than Hegel. Then why not "only one world?”
87. "Frius."
88. "Vilket ock anmSrkes.
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is the Creator of this world, but not immedi-
ately, but through the Son.
This is, therefore, our view: [.There are]
God and His thoughts, which, as His ideas, are'
each Himself in a determinate way (just as with
me and each one of my ideas); therefore Xeyo;
is originally I v with God, and is God,
or God is He.°9 But each such idea creates,
i.e., comprehends himself as a mode90 of life.
When he thinks himself, he also perceives the
entire systems of God’s ideas, but since he
is not the absolute reason, he perceives them
with determinations relatively opposite to
those which they have in themselves or for
God. Such an antithesis is that of succession,
and the fact that within man’s world there is
origin, change, and corruption, and that it is
completed in time. This means that in a certain
period of time each human being becomes con-
scious of his world; if one gathers the whole
'Series of his finite existence into one, then he
must in certain moments of it be more self-con-
scious, i.e., these [momentsj must for him be
more present, and other [momentsj less.°^» 92
4* There is a marked similarity between Bostrflm
and Royce in their conception of the material world.
Royce says:
The result, so far, is that the world of
endlessly consolidating matter can’t be the
ultimately real world, but must be only a
seeming world whose anomalous character is
89. V/hen a pastor once asked a class--age about 14
which were the older, the Father, the Son, or the Holy
Spirit, the answer was ’’The Father.’’ He then pointed
out the eternal relationship. Here BostrCm appears to
be a pretty good Lutheran •
90. "Modus .”
91. "De andra tvfirtom.’’
92. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 122-123.
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due to our private and human point of view.
Seen as we see it, the empirical truth about
matter and energy must be only the show of a
deeper truth... The substance, the soul of it
all, must lie beyond. 93
With Bostrflm, as has been indicated in the foregoing
paragraphs, this sensuous world belongs to the phenomenon.
His development of the explanation of th6 physical world
has also been criticized in the Scandinavian countries.
Dons of Norway charges his system with hanging in the air. 94
Wedberg of Sweden speaks of his airy idea-fiction. 95 He
questions whether Bostrflm has been conscious of the problem
of how the phenomenal worlds in their concretion are to be
deduced from the composition of his doctrine of ideas. 9^
He also charges that BostrfJm does not make a clear dis-
tinction between the arguments that most immediately are
directed against the acceptance of an external world, and
those which are aimed at proving the spiritual nature of
the true reality. 97
BostrOm, however, insists that he accepts the ex-
istenoe of the phenomenal world as a material world. He
says that we also have perceptions which are called sensa-
tions, which are the perceived98 material things, 99 as in
93. *Jhe Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Hough-
ton, Mifflin and Company, 1893), 334-335.
94. OB* 21.
95. LSBF, 124. "Luftiga begreppsdiktning. n
96. Ibid., 171.
97. Ibid
. ,
82
,
note.
98. "Senterade.
"
99. SB, III, 234.
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Berkeley, He says further that the sensuous reality is
certainly not false, provided It is not taken to be any-
thing other than what It Is, which is the case when it
is taken to be the only true reality, 100 i.e., as any-
thing other than man’s world and manner of perceiving, 101
He takes an unnamed writer sternly to task for having said
that he [Bostr&n] does not believe that the world sur-
rounding us in space and time exists. ^02 He makes the
/
statemeit s that the individual works with the external,
material things. 103
5. Wedberg quotes BostrSm as having said, M I should
perceive God Himself in a grain of sand. If I perceived
it perfectly. ”104 Bostrfim makes the statement that in
a somewhat modified form he accepts the phrase by Ana-
xagoras, ev tn^ytC hoCvto* i.e., in each individual
[being] the whole universe is present in a certain way,
just as was the case with the monads of Leibniz.
It thus seems perfectly clear that Bostrdm accepted
the physical world, although the charge tin t he had more
100. Bostr&n was an unyielding foe of realism. See
SB, II, 270-281, 481-482; Ribbing (ed.), PR, 20-30.
101. SB, III, 232, note 128.
102. Ibid., 244, note 142.
103. Ibid., 517.
104. LSBF, 154.
105. Fragment 11. See John Burnet, Early Greek
Philosophy
.
4th ed. (London* A. and C. Black, Ltd., 1930),
259.
106. SB, I, 241.
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difficulty with it than with the spiritual world also is
true. His system appeared to be very clear to himself,
but it was not always clear even to his best students, as
is evidenced by a controversy which reigned between two
of them, Edfeldt and Nyblaeus, in which Edfeldt held that
the ideas immediately for God, or as God’s content, are
absolute beings, just as absolute as God, and Nyblaeus
held that this was out of keeping with BostrOm’s theistic
view. 10?
6. BostrCJm’s philosophy is that of a theist, and an
idealist. Such a system will be attacked both by the
non-theist and by the realist. There are statements in
Wedberg which at least indirectly indicate that he is of
the neo-realistic school. 10 ^ Herein lies the basis of
much of his criticism. LandstrOm calls attention to the
difficulty that is found in all philosophical systems in
the relationship between the absolute and the relative, 109
a difficulty that is aggravated in BostrOm because of his
rational idealism.
7. Of moral evil BostrOm says that it can never be
found in other than personal beings. 110 There can be evil
107. Leander, LGI, 8. This controversy is found in
Edfeldt, BI and DBF, and Nyblaeus, TUBF.
1G8. LSBF, 37-38, 98. Wedberg makes special and
sympathetic reference to the new-realistic school in
America.
109. 0TB, 46.
110. Supra, 149.
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only in morally responsible persons. 111 Moral evil has
its roots in the will. 112 These statene nfc s are in harmony
with the position of P. A. Bertocci, who holds that there
can be moral evil only where there is a possibility of
choice. 115
It Is significant that BostrSm does not escape the
doctrine of inherited sin and natural depravity. 114 It
is another indication of the truth of his own words that
a philosopher does not get away from the influences of
his training. This is also a doctrine of the Lutheran
Church. Yet he cannot be classed as scripturally ortho-
dox.
A contradictory element appears in his treatment
of evil, between his statement that the consequences
of evil will follow a person into the succeeding life, 115
and his doctrine that evil would be increasingly removed
and annihilated. He appears to be coming back to the
idea of atonement and the thought of cleansing, but it
will not fit into his system, where man himself is to
do the reforming, and he consequently slips back into
111. Supra, 152.
112. Supra, 152-154.
113. Said in class in Ethics, 1945. This is the
position of many modern ethicists, especially all in-
fluenced by Kant. See, for example, N. Hartmann, Ethics
(tr. Stanton Colt) 3 vols. (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1932), II, 145; III, 114, 161-162, 257-259 and
passim.
114. Supra, 157-159.
115. Supra, 162-165.
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a position of uncertainty as to how completely evil will
ever be removed. He does, however, believe in the eventual
salvation of all. 1^ God is in no case to be thought of
as the source of evil.H-7
8. The eventual salvation of all must be the hope
of every person in whom there is a spark of compassion.
Thus far there can be no disagreement with Bostr8m. But
on what can one base the statement that the one who
has refused to meet the conditions of salvation in this
world is going to do so in any other? It may appear to
be a good doctrine, but it cannot be called more than
doctrine. In fact. It may be called pure dogmatism.*
In his emotional article on the doctrine of hell,
Bostrttm in the concluding paragraph says:
To hell, therefore, with the entire old
barbaric devil- and hell-doctrine; and thither
also--we were about to say—with all the crude
and thoughtless beings that yet in our day pro-
cL aim it.
To believe that Bostrflm meant to encourage any
kind of license by his doctrine wan Id, of course, be
to miss the central thought of his philosophical system,
which is the unity of the idea (man) with God. On the
other hand, the question may be raised whether Bostrflm
has not failed to see an element that is to be found in
116 . See below, 203-204.
117. SB, III, 261-265; Aberg, BV, 68-73, 119-122.
118. SB, III, 282.
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righteousness. There is something terrible and consuming
in righteousness—and in love, too
Evil in nature does not receive the attention by
BostrOm that he gives to moral evil. This is perhaps
due to his view of nature as being dependent on rnan.^- 2^
It is as if one could detect in Bostrflm an echo of
the words, ’’Cursed is the ground for thy sake,”^-2 ^- and,
"For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for
1 pp
the revealing of the sons of God."
4. The Relationship to Other Forms of Life and to Their
Totality
In the idea of the human soul there is also contained
the thought of a reconciliation and harmony in man between
the essence and the phenomenon through his successive
development, both in the entire race, as well as in the
individual. V/hen this idea is apprehended by the in-
dividual consciousness, it leads to an imperative longing
and hope, which is valid for the entire life, especially
for the life to come; and the certainty of perfection,
when it is referred to the life in time, becomes hope of
immortality and of blessedness. Faith in immortality is,
therefore, necessarily connected with the religious con-
sciousness, just as is the consciousness of God and man
119. See Hebrews 6:4-8 and Matthew 23:37-39.
120. Supra, I69 .
121. Genesis 3:17.
122. Romans 8:19.
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in their relationship to one another. For this reason
it has been accepted in all religions, just as it has
been taught in all higher systems of philosophy.
It was already foreshadowed in the Pythagoreans, who
had the first practical philosophical system in Greece.
It is found again in Socrates, and is carried out in Plato.
Even if all of his arguments do not seem to be completely
satisfactory, this is due essentially only to their
popular form. For his system as such, as a consequence
of its entire point of view, special evidences would be
superfluous. In the popular forms of religion among the
Greeks the consciousness of the immortality of the soul
was only imperfectly expressed; but it existed, on the
other hand, in the mysteries, or the esoteric side of
their religion.
This consciousness also has its expression in the
Neo-Platonists
,
as a union of the human being, or the
soul, with God, not as annihilation, but as a continuing
enjoyment of himself in Him. With Leibniz immortality
was an axiom, and according to him the soul could be
annihilated only by a miracle. It also appears as in-
dubitable in Kant; even though from his theoretical
philosophical viewpoint immortality became indemonstrable,
nevertheless, as a consequence of its connection with
the practical ^philosophy
,
he presents an ethical proof
of it, which proof, however, can be reduced to a theoret-
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leal one.
There are only two kinds of systems that never can
accept the doctrine of immortality: the materialistic
or atomistic, in which no religious person remains, and,
further, all pantheistic systems. This is true, in the
very first instance, with the strictly pantheistic systems,
with which immortality is incompatible, ih which man simply
has a passing existence in the motion of the absolute, or
scarcely can be said to have any existence, since it simply
belongs to the substance.
But the same thing is true with all such viewpoints
as affirm^ motion in God, even though He is not thereby
apprehended in an essentially pantheistic manner. So it
was with Heraclitus, Aristotle, 2 Schelling and Hegel, as
also with Fichte. For even though, according to these
^thinkers
,,,
there is something perduring in the motion,
namely its forms, this perduring
t
is, nevertheless, not
anything personal or individual, but the whole could only
be considered to be such, although even the personality
of this can be questioned.
Our problem in connection with the question of the
immortality of the soul does not touch only the eternity
of the soul (which pantheism also could affirm); but in
1. "Jaka."
2. BostrOm does not here explain Aristotle’s Unmoved
Mover, whose highest employment is self-contemplation.
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addition to this comes the demand that man shall perdure
and further develop. The spirit, in relation to its de-
velopment, is called soul, and as such has within itself
an obscure moment. The problem of the immortality of the
soul finally includes [the thought that man is to perdure
not only as spirit and soul, but also as person, that is,
as an individual being, and thus not simply as to his
general nature, but that he shall be the same being,
identical with himself, and distinct from all others.
For the rest, it may in passing be remarked that
certain adherents of Hegel’s system have accepted im-
mortality as consisting of descendants,—in which case
many would not have a part in it;^ or in deeds that per-
dure,—in which case it would also be small or nothing
for many; or finally, in the consciousness of the
universal human being as eternal, although not perduring
in time. Here it is not a question of any one of these
types of so called immortality.
At the consideration of this problem, the correct
thing from a strictly systematic point of view^- would be
to pass over from the eternity of the spirit to his per-
duration and personality. But I shall use the opposite
method, going from the lower to the higher; in other
words,, I begin with the question as to how the con-
3. Bo striJm remained all his life unmarried.
4 . "Strflngt systematiskt rStta."
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sciousness of immortality arose in man. It is immediately
grounded in his consciousness of his personality, which
also comprises the eternal ground of the expectation in
question. At a certain stage of development man arrives
at a consciousness of himself as a person. That he is a
person means that he knows himself as an independent and
conscious being, capable of all his activity, or that he
differs from others in a manner that is conscious to
himself; this is also his individuality.
In man's idea lies the consciousness about self-
consciousness, just as all the other attributes of reason,
and therefore also the conscioushess of identity through-
out all of life, so that he includes in this unity^ not
only the present, but also the future and the immaterial;
no matter how much he may change, he still knows himself
as the same being. This identity is expressed by ”1”,
and in this he is a timeless and spaceless being. In
man's ego is expressed not simply a thought or a condition,
but a thought which, moreover, is activity, and the ground
of all his other activity, and in that very fact is the
most certain of all. It is, therefore, also in this
that the consciousness of immortality most immediately
is grounded. The consciousness of personality^ is really
^
5~"Enhet."
6. "Personlighetsmedvetande .
"
7. MI sjfilva verket."
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the ground of all evidences of the immortality of the soul;
they would not have arisen without it. Not a single one
of them proves anything in itself, just because they all
posit the ego; but they are correct in this^ that they
express various ways for man in which he is able from
certain facts to clarify his consciousness of personality,
and, with this, the consciousness of his perduration.
All other proofs base themselves on certain attributes of
the personality, or have their source in such, and con-
sequently lead to the concept of personality, but first
through this to the one of immortality.
Such a one is found in the fact that man finds him-
self, as thinking, to be a subject that has determinations,
but cannot be a determination, and also to be a being
that perdures amid changes, i.e., to be a substance. Nov/,
since accidentals^ arise and perish, but not the substance,
therefore the soul cannot, as substance, perish. All this
may be correct; but if we recall how I determined the
concept substance, then, as a consequence thereof, the
concept of personality constitutes ground; and since [the
concept of substance] is only an imperfect apprehension
of it, consequently the proof suffers from the imperfection
that it moves from something secondary, or from result to
8. "Men hava det riktiga."
9. "Accidentier .
"
10.
Consciousness.
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ground. It is, therefore, valid as throwing light on some-
thing that is certain in itself.
The same is true about the argument of immateriality
,
namely, that a dissolution is impossible without division,
which again cannot be found in a simple ("substance
This conclusion also posits the fact that consciousness
is one and simple, and it is only in this way that it can
prove anything. The simpleness is also a determination
in the personality, but only a secondary one; it can,
furthermore, be charged that simplicity is only a negative
determination, and that such a one is too feeble to es-
tablish the immortality of the soul.
Thus also with the other proofs, for example
,
Plato's,
namely, that opposites must pass into each other; if,
therefore, death were the last, it would finally be alone
in the universe, which is unreasonable. This proves some-
thing only if one can establish from man's idea that suc-
cession and stages of development simpTy are product,
and that the soul in his essence is eternal; otherwise
one would be able to take the same view as Hegel, that
life may not cease, but that it is not the same life.
Again, take Plato’s proof from man's inner conscious-
ness of the eternal ideas, which he had before and con-
sequently also has after this life—that therefore his
being is of the same quality as the idea. But this does
11. "Immaterialitetsargumentet . '*
12. "Ett enkelt."
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not prove that the spirit must pass over into new forms,
but he could be thought as returning to potentia
,
just
as he has developed himself from it. Plato’s most
speculative proof is the one which is taken from the
spontaneity of the soul or, as he says, self-motion,
which as such cannot cease; thus neither can the soul
cease to be, because then all life in the universe
would cease, which is unreasonable. This is correct,
except the concept of motion itself, which posits a
higher principle, namely, that motion is not the first
in life. But this positive in motion is just life and
self-consciousness, i.e., personality.
But even though personality is ground and postulate
of the immortality of the soul, these two concepts are,
nevertheless, not identical. The concept of immortality
is, namely, the thought of a life perfecting itself in
time, and of one in time which is eternal, which does
not yet lie in the concept of a spirit, which is time-
less. Man must consequently take up time in his eter-
nity. He is as to his essence an idea in God, but, as
subject for himself, finite, and thus inconstant, and
as such not perfected; and the spirit, as also in itself
temporal, and not only eternal, is being and phenomenon,
or soul, whose essence and ground the spirit is. As
finite, man strives for the actualization of himself, and
13. "Sj&lvrflrelse." See Phaedrus 245*
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thereby he receives a nature for himself. The spirit,
or personality, must not be thought of as separated from
man, but it is his being; or the soul is the spirit
himself as active and real in time. Both are the same,
in the one case as essence and ground, and in the other
as activity and consequence; 1^ and it is just with
respect to both of these viewpoints together that we
speak about "man."
In the consciousness of the soul itself, we now
say, is also comprehended the consciousness of immortality,
and thus the concept of it; because it is the conscious-
ness of a being that in and by himself lives and works,
and who consequently in his essence is eternal. It is
for this reason that man’s substance cannot share the
fate of the merely phenomenal to change; but he is the
substance of this change, for which reason his life and
development cannot cease. This is the expression of the
general thought and feeling, and the problem now is to
verify it.
This verification we now gain in this that man re-
ceives consciousness of the perfection of his life in
the very fact that he struggles upward to the production
of life and self-consciousness in time; but, since this
does not fully succeed in any moment of time, he must
repeat the same act, and thus time is thereby procreated.
14. "FBljd."
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Since this struggle is intent upon a goal that has not
yet been attained, the necessity arises of a continua-
tion of life in order to reach it. This is the necessity
of becoming in time that which he is as to his essence,
or the struggle of the soul to become spirit. But what
he can become through his essence, for that he must have
essential inclination, that is, such a one as cannot be
separated from him, but belongs to, or is, his essence.
As such, it cannot be merely empty possibility, but a
force of action, ^5 which tends to realize itself, or the
necessity of realizing all his inclinations.
But in no moment of time does man reach his goal in
his present form of life; and this is something that he
also feels in this that he constantly struggles for some-
thing greater than he reaches. Or, the fact that he has
an essential necessity means that he finds in his being
something more than that which is developed in time
,
and that he, therefore, cannot be completely satisfied
in this, or in any certain life, but only as a whole in
all the forms of life, which are possible for him. But
which time or form of life is for man only partial, and
which is complete, is a question which cannot be decided
from without
* or from the viewpoint of time, but only
from the viewpoint of his eternal being; because each
time is ohly a part of his time, and every form of life
15. "Verkningskraft .
"
..
.
-
.
.
• i
VIII • Translation of Bostrtfm’s Philosophy of Religion 188
is only a partial one, since time becomes a whole for
him just through this, that he actually realizes his
essence. Only when this has happened is the being satis-
fied, and then his time and struggle ceases.
Thus man moves through the struggle to rest and
eternity, and this is just the idea of his immortality,
or of immortality in the highest sense, as one with his
goal. For, in order to be perfected, man must have taken
up in himself all his tenses; and with the consciousness
that no other ftense] is possible, his life would be
eternal, with the consciousness of the fact that these
tenses are successive, even though they are not so for
him, since he has taken them up in his consciousness.
As long as we are in time we must, moreover, change, but
at the goal man should have all the tenses present in his
consciousness as exhausting all the states in which the
spirit can move.
Then motion would be at an end, and the content
of his consciousness would be just about like God’s.
From this it does not follow that he cannot have the
thought of change, which in itself is not change, but
is the thought of it and as such unchangeable; only as
representation does he have change. This would accord-
ingly be the goal, and would be his immortality from
this viewpoint; but in his life,-^ or when he conceives
16. ^1 hennes tid t»
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of himself-1-? in time, immortality consists in moving toward
perfection in all his moments of time, so that it is possi-
ble to distinguish between immortality as a goal and as a
continuous development of his content. Both mutually im-
ply each other, although the former is in reality called
immortality.
The necessity or tendency just mentioned is not only
a wish which is a guarantee of its satisfaction. Mere
wish is a sensuous desire, which does not lead to execu-
tion, because it is too weak, or the thing seems impossi-
ble. But neither one is true of this desire, which is
elemental, 1 ^ i.e., appears from the certainty of that
toward which man ih his temporal development is directed;
this is, namely, to realize his eternal essence, and
this goal toward which he strives is not posited arbi-
trarily by him, but is of his essence. In other words,
the consciousness of immortality and the tendency toward
perfection are already given in the original notion of
man, namely, in God’s eternal idea of man.
If we now put together what we have said, it is
clear that man's self-consciousness is the eternal
ground of his immortality. It is timeless, and were
there no question about anything else, no further proofs
of the immortality of the soul would be needed. But
17. "Tanker sig."
18 . "Ursprungligt .
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time enters in, or man is in time, and the question is
whether he also as [existing in time} is infinite, or
if his existence is just as long as time itself. Yes,
because his eternal nature is to attain his essence.
This is also expressed in this way that man returns to
God from Whom he has issued; which is quite correct,
because the more man is composed-^ in God, the more per-
fectly is he composed, and when he has gained this [com-
posurej he has gained what he needs. Then also time
does not exist for him, except in the idea.
Before man can arrive at the thought he must have
lower perceptions, but in reality the goal is that these
shall become thoughts, even if they do not become such
time-development, which still is finite. But as soon
as he has apprehended his idea he has attained his goal;
and this he must be able to do, because it is his es-
sence. And this is not something in the future; for
God all the stages of development of man are present;
but in order to come to the point where he can thus ap-
prehend them, the human spirit must extend itself and
its determinations in time. God shall finally become
all in all. This is the correct expression for immor-
tality as goal, of which, as perduration, it is the
condition.
But it is still not an expression of a truly
19. "Fattar sig n
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scientific deduction; for it would be possible in this
to think of the whole man as only a moment in a higher
spirit, whose striving in him it would be. This depends
on the manner in which God is comprehended. But before
we speak of it, a remark must be made about Kant's proof
of the immortality of the soul, which in many ways corre
sponds with ours. Man, says Kant, feels in himself the
unconditional necessity of continuation in moral and
blessed perfection. But this requirement postulates
that his noumenon is higher than the phenomenon; and,
since this perfection is not attained in any certain
moment of time, therefore infinite time is required for
the advance toward it. It is the same reasoning as we
have presented, except that it is taken from man's dis-
position in general, and not only from a certain one
—
that toward morality; it is, namely, to permeate all
one’s sensuousness with intelligence, i.e., to pass
over into pure spirituality.
There is also in what we have presented only one
other change, 20 namely, that if man's essence should
cease, the demand of reason that sensuousness should
in certain instances be negated because of what reason
dictates would be sheer absurdity, because this demand
would then imply that man should sacrifice his whole
existence. This again would not be necessary, even with
20. '^En annan vfindning."
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the giving up of sensuousness, when we understand that
this life is only a form of transition; then one casts
away the lower in order to gain the higher, which es-
sentially is man's whole end. This argument is also
completely satisfactory, but posits that man's entire
life shall not cease with death.
What has here been advanced are reasonings from ex-
perience or from man's point of view, which lead him to
belief in immortality. What now remains is to see whether
they also find verification from the idea of God. This
is possible only if God is pure reason, and man's essence
is conditioned, but only by. Him. If now God is thought
of as [thej highest reason, not only as unity in multi-
ple, but also as possessing the rest of the ontological
and noological attributes of reason, or as to his
personal ideas; then man must also consider himself as
having the same general nature; that he is conditioned
by, or lives in, God, does not prevent this, but on the
contrary implies an affirmation of it.
The chief point is simply that God is without all
matter and without change; with insight into this there
arises in man the consciousness that he can never be
without life, or cease, which only belongs to his phe-
nomenal existence.—The religious person, furthermore,
21. See Appendix, par. 62, 6 /+.•
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does not need to understand clearly what we have here
said about God, and his relation to Him; but he feels
it, wherefore also it is essentially only the religious
person that is convinced of the immortality of the soul,
and has need of it. 22
We now proceed from the idea to which we have come,
in order to demonstrate the necessity of several forms
of development for man. At this we include the reminder
that God must be considered as an infinite reason with
the determinations we have indicated about it; and also
[the reminder] about man f s relationship to God, in which
he is the subject, so that consequently the idea He has
of man is Himself, as He apprehends His determination in
a certain form of His consciousness, but integrates it
in His total consciousness. In this idea God can think
change, provided the idea is something else than Him-
self; thus His thought of change is not inconsistent
with the eternity of the idea in Him; change can take
place in it without being change in Him; and at the
same time it is true that, in the case that God thinks
several forms of development as belonging to the idea,
this is not a development in Him. Thought i_s, namely,
that which is fully developed and as such also un-
changeable .
22. Here BostrOm seems to substitute feeling for
reason.
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We further call attention to the fact that it is said
about the idea of man2 3 that it is of eternity begotten
of God, or subordinate in conception, but not in time,
and that the subordinate is, nevertheless, self-existent,
as the begetting— in analogy with father and son. Thus
the idea of man is itself also alive in itself, and has
its own independent existence, because in God there is
only life and self-consciousness. But, since the idea
apprehends itself as living and self-conscious, it must
find itself changeable, not only in the idea, but must
actually experience this change, because he is finite,
and by this differs from God; he apprehends his deter-
minations relatively.
It is now asked if in man himself, or from his
I
viewpoint, there can be any ground on which the present
form of life can be said not to be the only one. We
know God’s ideas as such only by knowing ourselves;
therefore also it is only through this knowledge about
ourselves that we understand that the necessity of
change is included in the idea. Such a necessity is
given in the essence of man, and already follows from
the argumentation to which we have recently called at-
tention. Because, if man were not by God determined
to go further, neither would he feel any need of it,
but would completely correspond to his end. Just be-
23. "Mflnniskoideen."
,.
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cause he does not feel completely satisfied in any moment
of his existence, it follows that a higher life than the
present belongs to his essence; and, therefore, he must
conclude from this necessity that other forms of life
are included in God’s idea of him than the present, or
that this idea is the thought of these in the whole, or
of a system of forms of development. 2^
It could be objected that God may have had a higher
idea of man than the one of which his present form of life
is the expression, but that He has determined him in such
a way that he should not ever attain this higher [goal,,
or his idea. But this is a pure contradiction, because
in that case, as soon as he had consciousness of himself,
he would also feel that he ought to strive further, but
also that he could not attain more than he does, which
is opposed to his consciousness of being able to be
and become better. Thus we properly conclude from this
that man is conscious of his tendency to go forward,
and that more is deposited in his idea than he can at-
tain in this life; that in God’s idea of him there are
many forms of life, not ahead of the present one, but
all just as present, although for man they have that
appearance.
Immortality is not only something in the future,
24. This is a form of reasoning that would hardly
convince anyone not already inclined to believe.
-.
.
.
.
'
VIII. Translation of BostriJm’s Philosophy of Religion 196
as belonging to man’s essence, eternally present, but by
man as sensuous it must be grasped as in the future, so
long as he has not attained his highest standpoint. His
own determination is successively to become in himself
what he is in God, at which the final point would be to
have passed through them all, so that all the forms would
for him appear present and clear, as they are for God,
although indeed, as has been said, this development must
continue for him, and thus appear as a before and after.
Since the individual cannot attain his goal except in
union with the race, immortality and the various forms
of life are, nevertheless, valid, as for the former, so
also for the entire race, even though we do not know
these forms more closely.
The question of man’s blessedness is the same one
as that of his immortality, only viewed from another side,
because both of these needs are essentially one and the
same. Man has no need of immortality without blessed-
ness. The most common form of the hope of blessedness
is the consciousness that it shall go well with man in
consequence of his morality, and vice versa.
But this word can have a meaning of two kinds:
25. If BostriJm means this only logically, the force
of his logic may be admitted. But practically—and
there may also be logic in this—his argument fails.
Man has no need of a prison, but when he breaks the law,
the state decides that he needs one.
,.
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either the act of the one requiting, which equates the
consequence with the activity; or the consequence that
befalls the doer. It is this latter that people expect,
and even require or have need of, namely, as the require-
ment of justice; this is needed, not only as an external
necessity, or as something accidental in relation to the
deed itself, but as something absolutely necessary, be-
cause the moral person is worthy of blessedness, and vice
versa. If a person would think of the relationship as
being something else, he would come into indissoluble
disharmony with himself, and it is for just this reason
that he requires it.
This is so certainly given in consciousness, that
from this consciousness, or this requirement, Kant sought
a proof both of immortality and the existence of God.
Although one ought not to do the good except for its
own sake, reason recognizes the virtuous person to be
worthy of [immortality]. Now, since this blessedness
is not the virtue itself— it was a mistake in Kant’s
reasoning, that virtue is rationality, and blessedness
again is something empirical—therefore the soul must
continue to go on in virtue; God exists in order that
He may mete out to the virtuous a blessedness proportionat
to his virtue.
This reasoning of Kant's is, however, hardly correct.
For it may be asked: Is it true that morality and blessed
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ness are so heterogeneous? And,, Is the hope of their
harmony, even though grounded in itself, here, however,
rightly understood? Finally, Is it true that the mean-
ing of both is the same for the present life and for
the future forms? None of these questions is answered
satisfactorily by Kant. This much, however, is certain
and right in it, that the moral person is not good, and
does not strive to be good, in order that he may be re-
warded, but because it is the demand of his life to be
such; and only such a life as is an expression of this,
therefore, has any value for man. But the sensuous ad-
vantages, which he would not exchange for morality, do
not [have value). But from this it follows, or is in-
herent in it, that morality is independent of retribu-
tion; and this is even more apparent, if the latter
had a sensuous content.
Blessedness is rather only an inevitable con-
sequence of morality and a form of the consciousness
that the most moral life is also for man the most blessed.
From this it also follows that the concept of blessed-
ness must be changed before it can be endorsed by the
religious person, because he cannot wish a blessedness
for himself that does not have its ground in religion.
Man can indeed in this life feel himself far separated
from blessedness, but he also knows that this depends
on the fact that he Is far separated from moral per-
'.
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fection, and that in so far as he has this perfection
,
he is blessed and has a foretaste of the highest in it.
By this it is not denied that the religious person
may also find himself in such circumstances of life,
that he must wish that they were different, such as
sickness, etc., and that, therefore, he also can and
must wish deliverance from it, and long for a better
life. But there is in this, or it implies, a longing
for a condition where man is delivered from everything
that disturbs his moral life, and can feel his blessed-
ness extended to his whole existence. u
The concept of blessedness, consequently, includes
two moments. The one is positive—an advance in morality;
the other is negative—the absence of pain. This is the
concept of blessedness of the thinking person, and that
he becomes a participant of it in the measure of his per-
fection the religious person never doubts, because this
blessedness is already present here for man in the measure
of his advance in morality, by which he comes closer and
closer to God, and is more and more independent of the
external. This is his law here and also in succeeding
forms of life.
This certainty also gains additional strength by
26. In spite of his claim of absolute rationality,
BostrOm was also something of a mystic. Supra, 121-122.
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observing the relation of man, in the first place, to
nature, as to his own body; for the person who organizes
his inner being well, receives greater power ovef his body
and deeper harmony in it, so that the disturbing influence
that man receives from his body disappear in the degree
that he raises himself to higher perfection; and also
^by observing his relation] to the external things, which
also are placed in his power, and are made subject to
law in the measure that man raises himself. The great
revolutions in the earth, which took place before man
existed, and the wild forces in the wild life, subside,
in part by the deeds of man, but also without this
directly, through the arrangement of God. 2 ?
Furthermore, we think of his relationship to other
people. In doing so, we discover wild scenes taking
place among savages, but not in the same way among the
cultured. 28
Finally, we have the relationship to God. In the
measure that he understands that his goal is unity with
Him, the subsequent forms of life also become more har-
monious, both inwardly and outwardly, because God is
27. Like a commentary on Genesis I-III and Romans
8:18-25. See Brightman, PR, 216-218; 318-319. Bowne,
MET, 102-103.
28. BostrOm did not live (on earth) during 1914-
1918, and during 1939-1945.
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not only creator, but also ruler working with holiness
and justice as the guiding principle of man’s activity.
This is the ultimate ground of the certainty of
blessedness as a consequence of morality, so that in the
same measure that man is ennobled, the concept of blessed
ness is also ennobled, and his certainty of attaining it,
but not as compensation for previous sufferings, but as
something far higher. "There is a moral hope for im-
mortality, but also an immoral one," says Schelling.
The idea of retribution is thus changed by the idea of
blessedness into this, that the discord which forces
itself into life through immorality is not to continue.
It ought not to continue, can
,
therefore not continue,
since it does not belong to the essence; consequently,
retribution consists in this, that the moral person by
his morality enters into a higher form of life.
Hereby the question of evil returns: Shall it
also continue? A retribution is also found immediately
for it in the very disharmony that results from being
evil. But its final punishment is its annihilation.
It may indeed continue in its effects even in another
life, as in the consciousness that, without it, 3° it
could have been better; but forever it cannot exist.
With the entrance of the good into the world, the evil
29. See Appendix, par. 64 .
30. "Annars."
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is expelled, and the evil person is annihilated, that is,
as evil, and he can only remain hy a return to God.
This is the idea with regard to the final judgment:
the evil will be annihilated. This is apparent also with
the individual person; at the beginning of his conversion
he may feel himself wretched through the consequences of
the former life, and the memory of it; but in the measure
that he comes to a full harmony with himself, the evil
disappears. Furthermore, it is to be observed that even
the person,, who has been converted later, may develop to
greater clarity than the one who for a longer period,
but less constantly, has worked for his improvement.
For that reason we can never imagine a form of life
where conversion would be impossible. Such a thought
would alone be enough to destroy the whole man, if he
took account of all the consequences of it. Therefore
a final repentance is also accepted in certain religions,
and for the reasons already given, this is philosophically
more correct than the acceptance of the opposite, al-
though such a view can be explained simply by an abstract
antithesis of blessedness and misery in genere and by
a representation of the spiritual life without stages,
as, for instance, to come to the bosom of Abraham di-
rectly from this life.^ 1
But for such an imagination, as we have seen, there
31. Luke 16:19-31.
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is neither any philosophical ground, nor any religious
^ground j. The latter of these reveals itself factually
in this, that, as mentioned, there are religions which
have denied it. There are many statements even in the
Jewish religion also, which are meaningless without the
representation of an advancement even beyond this life.
It could be asked if indeed it would be satisfactory
for the religiously inclined person that the lot of the
good and the evil finally becomes the same. It does not
become the same. Already in the course of this life the
religious individual is blessed, and the evil one is
miserable—which already is a difference. But the
character of the present form of life influences the
succeeding one, and this can, therefore, reveal itself
there as punishment and reward; and one certainly suf-
fers punishment, even if it is not endless, even as
within the state a limited punishment is satisfactory
to the sense of justice.
The antithesis, or endless punishment for the
wicked, would even lessen the blessedness of the good;
it is, furthermore, at variance with the very idea of
absolute good. Finally, the race, although extended
in time and space, is still only one single being, or
a whole, and just as little as the various members of
an organic body can be without feeling of the suffering
of the others, just as little also the one person in
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relation to the other.
One could ask if such a doctrine as this one ought
to be presented to the public, and if this would not lead
to false hopes, even with regard to continuing in evil. 32
The answer depends upon the purpose of the presentation.
If it were a matter of gaining security against the evil,
but nothing higher, then it would be proper to use the
doctrine of eternal punishment as an instrument of fear.
But on the other hand it must be said that it is not
necessary to hide the truth even from the uneducated,
because in itself it never brings any evil with it.
It is thus possible that the doctrine of the final
dissolution of evil could lull some to security, because
one can overlook the forms of life that lie between; but
the opposite doctrine could also lead to despair. 33 Fur-
thermore, it is not necessary to present everything to
the less educated that we do to the educated, for it
would be enough to call his attention to the fact that
evil, from a moral point of view, is absolutely evil,
and brings its own punishment.
Here also we must add some observations. 1) Must
we regard fortune or misfortune in this world as re-
ward and punishment, or not? Yes, in general, as a
32. BostrOm’s position here is clear and reveals
moral courage.
33» By way of illustration, BostriJm refers to an
incident in Dalarna, Sweden, where a mother by flogging
had martyred and tortured a nine-year-old daughter to
death, in order to save her sinful soul from the devil
and hell. SB, III, 280.
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consequence of the fact that the laws of providence put
nature in harmony with freedom, and thus also man, and
by digression from the right he also brings down upon
himself an evil, even if this does not always immediate-
ly or in the same measure appear as something external*
On the other hand, such fortune and misfortune can sel-
dom in detail be used as a measuring rod for the judg-
ment^ of goodness and evil, since in part man as a
consequence of his finiteness is subject to many necessary
limitations, and in part, further, because the evil and
the good live together and both must participate in the
consequences of the evil deeds. 35
The religious individual is in this respect not
superstitious either with regard to himself or, even
less, with regard to others, because in their case,
less than in himself, can he know the relationship
between will and external consequences, because much
can be evil, which in relationship to the moral character
34. "FOr slutande till.”
35* That Bostrtfm disavows retribution by God is
evident from his statement which is condensed and para-
phrased in the following: From God there comes to man,
just as to any other finite being, nothing but the good,
even though this cannot be realized by him in any other
way than gradually, since the finiteness of his being
does not permit it to happen at once; wherefore he also
must, in each lower stage of development be only rela-
tively good, i.e., also be afflicted with something
morally as well as physically evil. This is the only
Theodicee that is valid and satisfying; because it does
not place God in any causal-relationship to our human
evil, which exists only in and for us and in our sensuous
world of phenomena. SB, III, 263- 264 .
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is merely temporary.
In the Orient this view was in force; but the Book
of Job has already in a beautiful poem revealed the correct
ness of the opposite [viewpoint]. The difference between
natural and positive rewards and punishments, which are
found in man, is, furthermore, not valid with God, be-
cause human punishment is also a means of security^ which
God does not need, and therefore punishment has another
meaning with God. His will is that every being should
follow his elemental laws; then there is bliss, and in
the opposite situation misery; both the rewards and
the punishments are a consequence of the life itself and
thus also of eternal, divine laws.
It could be remarked, in connection with what has
now been said, that slips and folly are usually punished
more severely in this life than immorality; and the
question could arise as to why . It is because immorality
lies more inside-^ and does not need to disturb the sur-
face, or the end of others; and therefore [does; not
[need toj be so severely punished as external deeds which,
even though performed in indiscretion, in a higher measure
cause disadvantage to others. Furthermore, it is not to
be forgotten that consideration ih the relationship to
others is a human virtue that is required of man.
36. "Sgkerhetsatgflrd
.
M
37. "Mera ligger i det inre.
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2) Is death necessary for man? The positive doctrine
of religion says that it has come into the world through
sin, and thus, as it seems, indicates it as something
necessary for man so long as he can sin- Death is not
unconditionally necessary for man, because it does not
follow from his being; from this we also have the con-
viction in the religious person that he does not really
die; but it is only a phenomenal form. But it is
relatively necessary as the dissolution of a special
form of life; it is an expression of man’s finiteness,
and by this [also an expression of the factj that each
form for him, as well as for the race, has a center and
a periphery. To that extent it is a consequence of man’s
temporariness, and, in relation to a succeeding life,
it is a transition. Therefore the religious person
does not long for death, but neither is he afraid of it,
because the eternal is continually present with him. 56
How long must the individual remain dead, since the
race and the development of the world is so long? Time
exists only for the one who has life and memory, and if
we cannot say how long man is dead, it is because for
38. What does such a change as death imply according
to BostrOm? It implies that the natural life in man
ceases, and nothing else. The human spirit then sinks
to potentiality in one of its forms of life, but this can
be a condition for the appearance of another and higher
life in him. No matter how strange it may seem, one can
say that it is nature that ceases to be for the dying,
while he himself lives on. Aberg, BV, 60.
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him there is ho time, since he is not alive When he
no longer continues here in time, then the succeeding
life lies on another time-line,^0— just as there is no
time during sleep . hi it is, therefore, correct that
between this life and the following there is no difference
in time, but that only in each form of life man has in-
finite time a parte ante et post .
Must man die several times? According to the fore-
going there are without doubt several forms of life, and
so long as none of these integrates the full content of
man’s consciousness, they must have beginning and end.
The transmigration of souls has been a symbolizing of it,
and one can see in what sense the acceptance of it is
correct. It is certain that a past never returns, and
that the transitions can become different, although we
do not know this difference. But more and more death
is conquered by life, and the subject becomes increas-
ingly conscious of the fact that they may indeed follow
each other, but that they simply are forms of the same
life.
39* BostrOm here becomes involved because he denies
the ontological reality of time.
40. "Tidslinie .
”
41. Perhaps no time for the sleeper, but Rip Van
Winkle learned there had been time while he slept I It
may also be observed that all dreams are in temporal
form.
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Man dreads death as a consequence of his inner being,
which has an eternal force, and, therefore, must find
death in genere struggling against his nature, although
under certain conditions it can reveal itself differently,
and merely be united with a sensuous dread. But in
general what has been said is true, because each force
struggles to continue in its development. There is also
i
a moral and an immoral love of life. The latter is the
one that is determined by the consciousness of losing by
death everything that has value for the person who lives
in the sensuous. From this it is also explained why such
a person also easily turns away from life, in case it
becomes apparent for him that it is impossible for him
to attain his sensuous purpose in it, or if the sensuous
itself has turned against him.
3) Should man be regarded as having lived before this
life? Man has no consciousness of it, in so far as is
the meaning of the expression, if he has lived here in
this world; if again it is meant whether the soul
existed in, or with regard to, his present existence,
which is a consequence of the soul, but that it indeed
has existed as to its essence, which is eternal. The
representation of pre-existence is an expression of the
feeling of eternity;^ but We do not know this life as
42. "Evighetskfinslan tt
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having been preceded by any other.^ If, on the other
hand, one wishes to assume that man has lived before in
lower forms, it is easy to show why he does not have any
consciousness of it. It is because he cannot previously
have been conscious of himself, and of time, just for the
reason that he stood at a lower point.
Why has not man come earlier into the world? This
question can be taken in two meanings. Why not earlier
in the race? Because the race forms a system in which
each one assumes a certain place. Consequently no
answer can be given to the question in this significa-
tion, except that his place in time is determined by
his eternal place in the system. The other question.
Why not earlier in the whole? has no meaning, because
time does not exist before man.^
Why does man discover himself for the first time
in this form of life, and why does he not know any pre-
ceding ones? So long as one has the present form, one
cannot have the succeeding ones, but one can ask why
man does not know a preceding one. For one must reveal
itself as the first, and the human is the first, where
there is self-consciousness
—
just as man receives con-
sciousness of childhood only at a higher age, ex analogia
with what he sees happening to others without in himself
43* Here BostrOm is empirical in his reasoning.
44. This seems more like an evasion than an answer.
Compare McTaggart, SHD, 162-163
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having any consciousness of it.
4) How long is the later form of life united with
the former? That there is a connection: is a necessary
consequence of the unity of the human ego and of the
continuity of everything, or the coherence, in man. But
one must not imagine the latter as simply a consequence
of the preceding, in which case all higher development
would be impossible. But a new form is a form in itself,
a unity, even though it can recognize a former as preced-
ing; because it is a form in which a new moment of man's
eternal idea wishes to develop itself, and it is the more
determined by this idea in the measure that it is a higher.
Therefore it is vital that man in no life ought to live
only for the future, just as "vita " is a " continua medita -
tio vitae ," not "mortis " (Spinoza), because the eternal
is present in every form of life.
5) Furthermore, certain questions appear, which are
designed to determine more closely the form and the nature
of man's immortality, and it behooves us to see whether
they can be answered, a) Is man in a later form of life
to have a body? This is necessary so long as he has not
completely filled his measure of time and has all his
content under the form of his thought. Thus, so long as
he withal is temporal, or so long as man is finite, he
has an impenetrable moment, i.e., the body, which always
must be an expression of the soul as its principle. But
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it is also true that he must have "a glorified body," be-
cause the more he develops, the more a higher vitality
also appears in the body. In order to express or explain
this, it has been assumed that there is in man’s present
body a siderea^rinciple that is supposed to be indestruct-
ible. This is unnecessary, because as man develops to
greater consciousness of the rest to which he stands in
relation, he must create for himself a body through which
he stands in this relation.
b) Since man in his very idea is sensuous-rational,
can he ever cease to be temporal or in the process of
development? In other words
,
is the progression infinite,
or does it finally cease? Man must indeed always consider
himself changeable, but it must be carefully observed that
the thought about this _is_ not the real change, which exists
for the senses. Should man have developed all his content,
so that further development were neither possible nor
necessary, he should indeed think himself as changeable
—
just as G-od in His idea of him—but without the fact that
this thought were a real transition, in fact, just as
little as in God's idea. Since man’s content is God, it
could here be remarked that this content nevertheless for
him must be exhaustless, and thus always a limit exists for
him. 4-5 Yes, he must have such a limit, namely, that some-
thing of God’s world becomes impenetrable for him; but
45. tfhe sentence seems vague, but is clarified in
what follows.
.
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from this it does not follow that, when man clearly under-
stands what is his true being, he should then need to go
further. But, if man has attained this goal, would not
the eternal, as eternally one and the same, become
monotonous? So truly as this is valid, so long as man needs
further development, so little does it have any signif-
icance when the need has ceased
—
just as in God; on the
other hand, if man for the present should remain in a
lower form of life, this would be unsatisfactory for him,
and would bring distaste for it, as all sameness in the
sensuous, because this itself constitutes a warfare between
the forces which tend toward development.
c) Will personality continue, so that man will find
himself bounded by others as fully individual, or as the
same identical subject? Aristotle and Hegel have denied
this, and the latter even considered the desire for this
immoral.^ But we deny such a point of view; according
to ours, every person is absolutely individual in part
through his positive content,. and in part through his place
in the system, where nothing not individual exists. The
antithesis for us people between general and individual
is purely relative r or exists for us through the activity
of abstraction.^? But if one turns away from this rela-
46 . The reader is directed to the article on im-
mortality by L. Harold DeWolf in Fern (ed.) ENC REL,
360-365.
47. "Abstraktionsverksamhet .
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tionship, every concept is purely individual, since in
rerum natura there is no more than one such. The entire
difference that has been mentioned has essential bearing
on the sensuous or relative world; within the rational
world everything is individual or personal, reflecting
the entire universe in itself.
Which powers will man possess in the future life?
The same as now, even though in his highest form of life
those moments disappear which only have regard to time,
such as activity, so that only the idea of it always
must follow him.
d) Will man remember the present life? At this it
may be remarked that man’s memory is conditioned by the
body, and that therefore with its disappearance, or if
it becomes another, memory will also cease, or become
another. But memory is also an essential attribute of
the spirit, a retention of the former as a possession of
the spirit, and the reminder is the ability in the present
under the form of thought to retain the past. Consequently
he can all too well comprehend this life as a lower form
of development, as even empirical examples show, namely,
that nothing of the past is entirely gone from conscious-
48. There was considerable philosophical kinship
between BostrOm and Leibniz.
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ness. ^9
I place great emphasis on this, because by this very
thing man possibly has his eternal punishment for his
transgressions in a previous life, even though he may
in a later [life] develop into that for this the highest,
namely, in the consciousness of the fact that the con-
dition would have been better, if he had used the previous
life better. If a large surface were illuminated by a
light, only a small part of it would be illuminated, if the
light were weak; but if it were directed along the surface
all the parts would be successively illuminated, although
those lighted up at the first would become dark again as
the later ones are lighted up. Thus a part of the surface
would,, as it were, arise, and a part disappear. Or, if
the light should increase as it moves, the former would
not to the same degree disappear, as if the light were
less, even though it would to some extent grow dim, namely,
in the fact that the extent of the illuminated would be-
come increasingly larger. Or, if the light became so com-
plete that the entire surface would be illuminated, then
49. Bostrflm’s treatmentof memory is confusing.
Previously he said that man has no consciousness of having
lived before this life. Supra, 209. Here he contradicts
this statement. There is a clearer concept in Bowne’s
statement .The agent does it only by memory and con-
sciousness, whereby a fixed point of personality is secured
and the past and present are bound together in the unity
of one consciousness. " MET, 64 .
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the center would be the brightest, but it would then also
be possible to see the periphery.
The analogy: As sensuous, nan does not have the
power to illuminate a larger expanse, and if he did not
have more than the sense, he would know little more than
the present; but as memory he has also the ability to
know the past, and by means of fantasy to picture the
future (without which, for example, all plans would be
impossible, which as a consequence we constantly do).
Or, if man thinks, he thereby apprehends that which as to its
nature is eternal, and which permeates everything that
is in time; and the intellect can use fantasy even more
completely than the reproductive capacity to grasp the
past and picture the future. If man should advance in
perfection, he would more and more have the eternal be-
fore himself, and the boundary of it would then be that
he would move all of his world into himself, so that he
would have it, not only as fantasy, but as thought. So
long, however, as he exists in a finite way, he has fan-
tasy and sense, and these are not only thought as change-
able in their determinations, but the latter actually
pass over, 51 wherefore genesis and dissolution are
necessary for him. In the final form of life all the
others will also be present, although this presence would
50. "Analogice .
"
51. "Overga."
,.
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not necessarily be the presence of everything in them since
not everything in the former developed into consciousness.
e) Is there a meeting again? For this there is a
valid ground in the fact that humanity comprises a system,
in which all the links posit each other. Where? In con-
sciousness. Commonly nin heaven,” as that which is not
present on earth for the sensuous human being, although
heaven is in the consciousness of each one. It is, how-
ever, in this not necessary that the same world shall
appear to us then as now. It may be the same in essence
as the present, but not necessarily the same form, so
that we should be able to say how in advance.
In general it is true about these questions that
the religiously inclined person does not dismiss them,
but rather seeks to find an answer to them, of which
he has need. The value in answering them is this, that
thus one escapes both dreaming and skepticism. Many
have considered it right to omit^ 2 the questions ad-
vanced
,
since they cannot be answered in a completely
definite way. But the religious person at least seeks
to gain a general consciousness with regard to them;
and he has such in the higher life which already is
present for him, wherefore also the means for finding
the answers that are sought is simply to investigate
52. "L«mna dflrhfin n
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carefully what he strives for now as his true and essential
good. But these answers always become more indefinite
than one could wish. The reason for this is that man can
indeed have a sure consciousness as to what has its ground
in himself, but that he cannot have a definite conscious-
ness of what for him is not yet temporally present. A
general consciousness of the future is possessed by each
one, gathered from the present, but anything definite
is not possible except by analogy with what has happened
to others; thus it is also with the future life.
To this must be added the fact that man in the
present life is so occupied with it that he only with
difficulty is able to comprehend the purely spiritual in
the unity of his consciousness. How incomplete our knowl-
edge of the absolute and the higher really is is revealed
by the large portion of the world that is impenetrable
for us. Therefore man is occupied altogether too little
with the spiritual; the greater portion of the race is
far more sensuous than rational, and the first steps in
the comprehension of the latter are very weak and childish
in connection with the march of development of the whole
speculation.
That which is important to emphasize in the present
regard is, nevertheless, the fact that the doctrine of
immortality has appeared in all religions. This shows
that, even though the thought of it has appeared in a
..
'
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sensualized form, it nevertheless is found in the nature
of the human spirit, for which reason it, as everything
such, has revealed itself as something essential for
philosophy. Only in imperfect systems has immortality
been denied, that is, in the systems that have attributed
relative determinations to God. Another difficulty in
the present instance has been due to the imperfect way
in which the concept of time has been apprehended, in the
fact that one has imagined time as very long, and finally
as eternal. Time is, nevertheless, only something rela-
tive, which, therefore, in itself does not have any dimen-
sion, but receives one only through the quantity of what
enters consciousness and is successively apprehended there.
This is true about all quantity which only depends on the
relationship to the measure; if this is decreased, what
is measured is still the same..
Time itself does not have any dimension, but this
depends on the quantum of the content of consciousness and
the succession of it; but if a person were able to appre-
hend all at once, then he could measure the one with the
other within ^the whole, but this last would not have any
dimension.
We must think of our world as infinite, because the
quantity of reality in the world is greater than our
capacity, and, therefore, we place ourselves in a certain
'-
.
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space of time. 53
We add a general remark to the previous [ones],
namely, this that the world in time and the temporary
perception of it does not absolutely perish, just as it
does not during sleep; but it remains in and with man,
and can, therefore, be brought to consciousness again,
which also is necessary, since it belongs to man’s nature
and development. Further something tmore] is included in
>
this, namely, that in the highest form of life all the
preceding ones must be present. The world exists in and
by man, not vice versa.
Caution must be practiced in two respects in con-
nection with the questions that have just been considered:
the one is not to become a visionary dreamer,, and the
other not to fall into skepticism. 54- The one who is
truly religious does neither one, but stays by what he
knows, i.e., the general, and is undisturbed by the
other
—
just as the moral person with regard to the future;
one is not for that reason indifferent, but occupies one’s
self with the present. In general the entire temporal
53 * "Tidsspatium.
”
54. The warning about mysticism was, no doubt, also
addressed to himself. He has said: "Every genuine thinker
is also a mystic in order that he may gain and give deeper
meaning to his research." Supra, 122. On the other hand,
he was fearful of every influence where reason might yield
to feeling. See Aberg, BV, 48. Also, below, 226.
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life is an activity from within, wherefore the eternal
life in man is already present, and the difference with
respect to it consists only in the degree of its vivid-
ness for consciousness.
With this we have concluded the presentation of
man’s religion as it is in its verity. It remains for
us to consider religion as it appears in time. 55
COMMENTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORMS OF LIFE AND TO
THEIR TOTALITY
1. BostrOm says that at a certain stage of develop-
ment man arrives at a consciousness of himself as a per-
son,^ and that man’s effort is to clarify his conscious-
ness of personality . He further states that we know
God’s ideas as such only by knowing ourselves. 5® Here he
follows the well known procedure of Descartes. It is also
in keeping with Brightman's emphasis on situation experiences
as our present consciousness. 59
This places BostrOm among the personalists. Edfeldt
says of him that he started from the principle of per-
sonality. 6° Another one of his students, Nyblaeus, says
55 . The caption of the following chapter.
56. Supra, 182.
57. Supra, 183.
58. Supra, 194.
59. PR, 164, and as expressed in class lectures.
60. In BostrOm, SB, I, 49.
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that his view could properly be called the philosophy of
personality in a more correct and comprehensive sense than
that of any view previously presented. For BostrOm per-
sonality is the only essential reality, and everything
impersonal is only a form, a manner in which the personal
appears to the finite consciousness.
Leander says of him that his view establishes itself
as a rational idealistic philosophy, whose principle is
found in the idea of self-consciousness, and which seeks
the only true and fundamental reality in the eternal and
personal. Ljunghoff makes the claim that BostrOm’s
idealistic personalism helped to save Sweden from atheism
and pessimism. ^3 Karl Pira, a more recent sympathetic and
able interpreter of Bostrflm, says that he felt that the
truth that life and consciousness are identical was an
original discovery with him, a conviction Bostr8m also had
about his version of the statement that to be is to be
perceived. ^4
2. Thus BostrOm finds in personality the ground of
immortality .^5 He holds that in the consciousness of the
soul itself is comprehended the consciousness of immor-
tality.^ In other words, self-consciousness is the eternal
ground of immortality. 67 BostrOm differs radically from
Kant with whom immortality was a postulate, because with
61.
" Art. (1897), 2.
62. LGI, 4.
63. BSP, 13.
64 . SS, VII, 177. See also supra, 26.
65 . Supra, 185.
66. Supra, 186.
67 . Supra, 189.
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Bostrtfm immortality was intimately united with his
doctrine of man as an eternal idea in God, whose function
is to move toward a perfect realization of that idea. 68
At this point BostriJm is in harmony with the words of
Paul, as he speaks of God as having "Chosen us in Christ
before the foundation of the world, that we should be
holy and without blemish before him in love: having fore-
ordained us unto adoption as sons. ”69
3. Bostrflm says that in man’s ego is expressed a
thought or a condition which is activity, and the ground
of all his other activity. The soul is the spirit him-
self as active and real in time.?1 There seems here to
be a relation with Lotze in his doctrine of being as
activity, and with the similar doctrine of Bowne. This
is true so far as Bostrtfm’s system will permit it. It
has been pointed out that in BostrOm's central idea
—
to perceive—there is the element of activity. 72
This activity, however, must be understood in its
relation to the finite being, for
...It is only the character of the finite life
to be thus active self-consciousness, for be-
yond the finite being's imperfect way of per-
ceiving there is no change. The Infinite Being
is indeed active in and by the finite, but He
68. See also Aberg, BV, 41-42, 57-58, and supra,
100 - 106 .
69. Ephesians l:4-5«
70. Supra, 182. Bostrflm holds that life, or self-
consciousness, is the primary and substantial element in
everything. Supra, 33»
71- Supra, 186.
72. Supra, 56
,
note 18.
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neither can nor needs be changing in and
for Himself. 73
There is considerable kinship with the Eleatics in
BostrOm. He says that they finally understood that motion
in itself is impossible, for which reason it could only be-
long to the phenomenal world. 74 When they had to face the
argument of experience, which neither questions the mul-
tiple nor origination, Zeno criticized experience, and
proved that, as absolute, it is more unreasonable than
the Eleatic doctrine of all as one. He was able to do
it because of the validity of the Eleatic concept. 75
BostrOm says that that which is to come into existence
must be; that ideas originate or are formed by the spirit
only means that they are thought by him... 76 He further
says that God is not in Himself active, but rather active
in relation to man, which BostrOm considers consistent with
His immutability. 7?
BostrOm' s faithful disciple, Nyblaeus, says:
The Being which in all respects is alive
or absolute cannot need any development or
change. It is also generally admitted that it
is
in
It is thus apparent that BostrOm is aligned with the
73* Beck, RLB, 50.
74* See below, 225, note 81.
75* Ribbing .(ed..)
,
ER, 83.
76. SB, I, 156.
77. See below, 248. See also Ribbing .( ed. ) FR, 61-62,
64-66
,
78 .
78. Art. (1897), 9. See also Aberg, BV, 56 .
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eternalists. There is no motion, no change, and no de-
velopment in God. Because of His omniscience, He knows
about development and change, but only as it appears in
and through man.
Here he reveals his affinity to Plato, by whom he
was greatly influenced. Bowne’s "agnostic sigh," in
which he says that the "thought of a developing God is
a scandal to reason," 80 was called by Brightman, Bowne’s
"surrender to Parmenides." 81 BostriSm may be charged with
having made the same surrender.
There is more conformity to what we see and experience
in the words of Jesus, "My Father worketh even until now." 82
Bergson’s words may serve as a corrective to an emphasis
on the intellect alone:
Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes
of the intellect alone, which grasps only the
already made and which looks from the outside,
but with the spirit, I mean with the faculty
of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of
acting and which springs up, somehow, by the
twisting of the will on itself, when action is
turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say,
into light. To movement, then,, everything will
be resolved. Where the understanding, working
on the image supposed to be fixed of the pro-
gressing action, shows us parts infinitely mani-
fold and an order infinitely well contrived, we
catch a glimpse of a simple process, an action
which is making itself across an action of the
same kind which is unmaking itself, like the
79. See Republic , II, 380.
80. MET, 119-120.
81. See Parmenides 138. Compare Franquiz, Borden
Parker Bowne’s Treatment of the Problem of Change and
Identity (Rio Piedras. P.R.: Univ. of Puerto Rico, 1942 )
,
171-179.
82. John 5:17.
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fiery path torn by the last rocket of a fire-
works display through the black cinders of the
spent rockets that are falling dead... The im-
petus of life, of which we are speaking, con-
sists in a need of creation. It cannot create
absolutely, because it is confronted with
matter, that is to say with the movement that
is the inverse of its own. But it slezes upon
this matter, which is necessity itself, and
strives to introduce into it the largest possP
ble amount of indetermination and liberty. ^
We quote once more from Bergson:
God... has nothing of the already made;
He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Crea-
tion, so conceived, is not a mystery; we
experience it in ourselves when we act free-
ly.84
This emphasis, which we also find in Alexander,
Perry, Dewey, Brightman, Whitehead, and others, may be
regarded as a refreshing and wholesome antidote to the
rigidity of eternalism.
BostrOm tries to save himself by desiring that it be
understood that he does not mean that God is inacttive for
the reason that activity and inactivity can no more be
ascribed to God than warmth or cold to a mathematical
figure. Because God knows everything, He is conscious
of change and activity, although He is not directly
responsible. But Bostrflm has already involved himself
by more direct statements to the effect that there is no
change in God:, and his reasoning here does not seem con-
33. CE, 273-274.
84. Ibid., 271.
85. SB, I„ 364-
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vincing.
4. In his doctrine of time, BostrOm says that for
God all stages of man’s development are present. 55 He
says that the Absolute Spirit is the only one that is
infinite in the absolute sense. Infinity here means that
in reality there is nothing that is, or that can be per-
ceived, which is not already perceived and known by Him
in an eternal (timeless) manner. God is not determined
by time or change. BostrdJm says further that man,, in
order to be perfected, must have taken up in himself all
his tenses; and with the consciousness that no other
tense is possible, his life would be eternal... since he
has taken them up in his consciousness. 5 ^
This strongly reminds one of the time-span of Royce,90
and of Bowne’s ’’conception of that tideless fulness of
time . ”91
Bergson, on the other hand, says that ”a self-suf-
ficient reality is not necessarily a reality foreign to
duration ..’’^ Of God’s relationship to time Bergson says:
While the ancient conception of scientific
knowledge ended in making time a degradation, and
change the diminution of a form given from all
eternity--on the contrary, by following the new
conception to the end, we should come to see in
86. Supra, 190.
87. SB, I, 251-
88. Ibid.
,
283.
89. Supra, 188. See also supra, 184-1S5.
90. WI, II, 122-138.
91. MET, 119.-
92. CE, 324.
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time a progressive growth of the absolute,
and in the evolution of things a continual
invention of things ever new. '3
There is a certain relating of time and timeless-
ness in BostrOm, through his subjectivity of time. It
exists for man in the sensuous world, and God knows
everything; therefore He is conscious of time, although
only in an intellectual way.
When Jesus said that His Father worketh even until
now, he was imputing time to God, for there cannot be
work without a before and an after. Brightman says:
God is commonly thought of as the Eternal
and it is reasonable that he should be
,
for
religion is concerned with the permanent and
trustworthy aspect of the universe. Never-
theless, the religious idea of the Eternal is
not that of an utterly timeless being. 94
Of Royce he says:
By all odds the most persuasive attempt
to overcome temporalism is Royce’ s doctrine
of the absolute time-span, which includes all
activity and striving of the universe in its
true temporal order. Yet such a view does
insufficient justice to the reality of time
experience
,
Qwith its free acts and its genuine
evolutions.
There is no kind of human experience, including
thought, which does not require time, and of which a
tense must not be used within a second after its oc-
currence. Whether there can be something mysterious
in God, about which we now have no knowledge, it is,
93T?E, 374.
94. "A Temporal! st View of God". Jour. Rel .
12(1932), 544.
95. Ibid., 554-555.
-.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
VIII. Comments on the Relationship to Other Forms 229
of course, impossible to say. But from our present
knowledge it seems apparent that any and all experience
requires ontological time.
5. When BostrSm says that the most common form of
the hope of blessedness is the consciousness that it
shall go well with man as a consequence of his morality, 96
he is indeed within the pale of rationality ,9V so far as
it goes. It is also the kind of reasoning that we find
most current.
But it may reasonably be questioned that it is a
coherent and inclusive rationality, and one of Bostrtfm’s
recurring emphases is his insistence on seeing life as
a whole. In this insistence he was undoubtedly in-
fluenced by Hegel, Beck says that Bostrflm was greatly
influenced by Hegel, although he did not want to admit
it. 9*
If, for instance, a person is sick, it is rational
for him to do everything in his power to win his health
back again. One can admire him for submitting to what-
ever discipline he believes will help him. But if it
happens that there is a doctor who could effect a cure,
then a larger, or more inclusive, coherence demands that
96. Supra, 196.
97. By rationality is meant a logically consistent
thought-structure from which the empirical is excluded.
98. RLB, 8. One is tempted to wonder if the reason
is that there is more similarity in their systems than
BostrOm wanted to grant. Supra, 133-136.
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he seek the doctor, and accept his help. We should,
furthermore, say that this is perfectly rational, in fact,
that it is the only rational thing to do.
From the moral standpoint, it is the duty of each
one of us to try to improve himself. But, if it must
be admitted, as it would seem that every rational being
must admit, that we are imperfect; and if the confession
of those who have made the most serious efforts is that
of comparative failure, which it is, as is evidenced by
the confessions of the saints; and if at the same time
it is true that there is One who is willing and able to
help, which has also been revealed in changed lives;
then rationality demands that we should be willing to
accept the help that is offered. 99 if iif e itself is
a gift, then there can be no rational denial of the fact
that there can also be the gift of a new life.
BostrOm places too great confidence in the unaided
human power, whose weakness is amply demonstrated in
the contemporary scene. He does use the word Savior in
relation to Jesus, but it is so involved in his doctrine
of the eternal ideas that in the last analysis it is
man saving himself, since he does not accept any satis-
factis vicaria . 101
99.
Romans 3:20, 28.
100. Supra, 176-177; 187-190.
101. SB, II, 495.
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The person who has regained his health, even if it
is with the aid of the physician, can be of greater
value to himself, and to his fellow men. Likewise the
person who has found the new life in God—Redemption in
Christ, salvation, forgiveness, or whatever we wish to
call it— is also a better individual, in himself, in
his home, and in his community. A system like BostrOm’s,
which rather looks away from experience, runs the danger
of becoming an arm-chair philosophy, and needs to be
brought into the stream of life.
Bostrflm's insistence on a person’s working out his
own salvation was considered a mark of manliness. But
it appears that it fails in rationality, because it does
not take in all the facts, such as sin and grace, and
redemption in Christ. For this reason it fails in co-
herence .
It is perhaps for reasons of this character that he
has not gained the place in the Lutheran Church that it
might seem he should have won. One of the central
doctrines in the Lutheran Church is justification by faith,
and BostriJm rejects it.

CHAPTER IX
RELIGION AS IT APPEARS IN TIME
This study includes elements of two kinds. 1 In it
we must observe
2
how religion, even though in its idea
it is one, nevertheless, partly because of man's limita-
tion, and partly because of his misuse of the free will,
appears as several imperfect, or relatively false, re-
ligions or religious forms of life even to the point of
relative negation of religion; and in the second place
we must observe how man is sanctified by religion or
continues in religious development,, which is the re-
ligious life in its existence in time. We can, however,
in this part of our presentation only give a brief
synopsis of the main points.
1.
False and Incomplete Forms of Religion
Religion is universal for man, and is not limited
merely to some one specific expression of it . 3 For this
reason there arise imperfect forms of religion or religious
life as soon as any certain faculty thereby gains the
upper hand, or the true relationship between the individual
faculties does not exist or prevail. In this regard we
1. "Innefattar tveggehanda .
"
2. "Tillse."
3. "Icke inskrgnkt till allenast nagon viss hennes
yttring.
"
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need first of all to remind ourselves of the fact that
man consists of reason and sensuousness, the former, ac-
cording to the nature of both, as directing, but the
latter, during man's existence in time, as first actual.
By an incorrect relationship between these two, such re-
ligious forms arise as imply a partial negation of re-
ligion.
Atheism may not be very widely spread, but does
exist often enough, in speculation and in life.^ Atheism
if we think of it not merely in a negative, but in a
positive sense, based on motive and principle, consists
in a purposeful suppression of the demands of the re-
ligious consciousness, and expresses itself either in
a certain way of thinking or of acting; [it is] theoret-
ical or practical empiricism in religion. 5 It always
depends finally on the will* Theoretical atheism always
arises by accepting sensuousness as the only source of
knowledge, and can be caused either by a demand of proofs
(in the strict sense of the word) for the existence of
God, or by a false study of nature. The one who requires
the former does not have God present in his consciousness
and a one-sided occupation with the physical sciences
can lead to a similar result; because the more one re-
4* Note that BostrfJm is right here, against frequent
popular denials.
5. "I religiOst h&nseende."
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fleets predominantly on the external, the more life re-
cedes, and matter alone seems to remain. Practically,
atheism has its ground in the supremacy of the sensuous
demands. It appears in part as impiety
.
a flippant and
frivolous treatment of things divine; or as a disregard
of them, when it expresses itself in actions that injure
the religious consciousness of others; or as defiance
and scoffing, when in hostility it turns against God.
In part it is hypocrisy . when one uses religion as a
means for temporal ends—the greatest practical bane.
Indifferentism is not, as atheism, a denial of God,
but the recognition of Him remains without influence on
the thinking and activity of the indifferentist . This
standpoint often has its source in early training, ^ since
the consciousness was not in time directed to religion;
or in desire for pleasure, and in one-sided desire for
external activity (for example, political); or if one
is brought up in a form of religion which one later con-
siders unsatisfactory, as, for instance, the dogmatic,
orthodox, or pietistic. ? Not infrequently it passes over
into pride or vaunted higher enlightenment than the masses
have, and is often more difficult to correct than atheism.
Formalism is not exactly a negation of, or indifference
6. "T uppfostran. n
7. All of these trends have been found in the Church
of Sweden.
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to, religion, but arises when essential importance is
placed on something which in itself is not religion,
whether it be a certain dogma, or an external mode of
action. The formalist desires to have religion, but
because the restrictions and not the life in it, have
come to his consciousness, he conceives of religion as
something which is not religion. This form appears
theoretically as dogmatism , or orthodoxy , which practically
has its equivalence in pietism . Orthodoxy fixes [the es-
sence ofj the religious in a certain view about God. It
often develops into pride about having the correct view,
and often into the desire to force one’s conviction on
others, and into inhumanity because of fear that it does
not stand securely, since it is not based on arguments.
On the other hand, he is a pietist who has religion
in his heart, and who protests against locking religion
within certain definite dogmas, and rather places it in
pious living; in this he has an advantage. It is often
united with a truly religious life, but as a rule it
sinks down to the one-sidedness that it places altogether
too much emphasis on certain religious deeds, which in
themselves have no weight, wherewith also vanity often
appears and the desire to show one’s preference over
others. With this the doctrine of man's total depravity
through the fall is not seldom united, and his reparation
through God's absolute grace. It satisfies man’s vanity
-.
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to be God's pet. Often the view is united with mysticism.
One could think that thereby the right view would appear,
but often the two simply increase each other's faults.
In mysticism
,
which is the theoretical side of
pietism , the rational has the upper hand, but it appears
in a one-sided manner, which is also true of two other
forms, which we shall mention immediately. Mysticism
essentially implies an abstraction from all definitely
religious content, with the thought of thus apprehending
God purely; but in this one has difficulty in separating
one's self from the influence of fantasy, or enthusiasm,
which is the same as accepting the creations of imagina-
tion as true.^
Mysticism is usually employed to designate a re-
ligious aberration—that of indifferent ism. But even with
its faults it is better than the emptiness of empiricism.
In a speculative sense mysticism is a longing from the
limited to the unlimited, and the drawing back of the
subject upon itself; its mistake is that it stops at
the beginning of the religious life, at the standpoint
of feeling and the immediate intuition. It can be 1)
mysticism of feeling^ and 2) mysticism of fancy.-1- 0 The
8. Supra, 213, note 1+9 •
9. "Kfinslomystik.
"
10.
"Fantasimystik."
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former stops with inexpressible presentiments in which
it finds the highest bliss and a sharing in the life of
God. This is the correct [element3
,
namely, that blessed-
ness is life in God. The latter believes that he has
advanced further with regard to a content, but it is an
arbitrary [onej; he attempts to philosophize, and thereby
vaguely apprehends God as simply a unity.
The reason for these forms is dissatisfaction with
the external, and the need for a higher life; the error
lies in the desire to come to it in a singular way, and
not in the fact that God is in constant relationship with
man; hereby the thought easily arises of a select few,
or of an inbeaming of God in the soul. [These are j
signs of a faulty activity of the understanding and a
tendency toward a life of contemplation turned away from
the external cult, and of a disease, because it is con-
tagious. If a person only wishes to follow his own heart
he falls easy prey to the power of evil.
Quietism
,
practically, is the same manner of re-
presentation as mysticism, theoretically. It has its
source in a vital love of God, but stops at this beginning,
whereas man also ought to realize his religion; one be-
lieves that one’s religious blessedness is disturbed by
its being realized in life. But the practical is so es-
11. "Aningar."
12. "Instralande
.
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sential that without it there is no true religious life.
When people have sought improvement through solitude,
it is to this extent negatively correct that in this way
they have guarded against external provocations. Quietism
has three dangers: that, at an advanced age, when the
feeling is less excitable, it easily develops into mere
external ceremonies; that sensuous elements easily unite
with the religious feeling; that the feeling of humility
easily changes over into the feeling of pride. Its
general fault is that the duties of life are neglected,
which can never be excused.
The peculiarities 1 ^ which are the opposite of
mysticism and quietism are to confuse religion with
speculation, or else with a legalistic 1 ^- morality. Both
can be pursued for their own sake, for the sake of knowl-
edge, and out of regard for duty, and from fear of the
necessity of having contempt for one's self; 1 ^ and they
are useful for religion, but are not religion. They also
suffer from the same defects as, from a lower standpoint,
dogmatism and pietism.
Superstition is the activity of religion in man, but
tainted with so much that is sensuous that religion is
falsified. In the strict sense of the word, all Christian
13. "Ensidigheterna .
"
14. f,Lagbunden.
"
15. "Att behCva missakta sig sjaiv. n
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religions 1^ are not superstitious, but here we are con-
sidering superstition only as it appears in Christianity.
As such, it appears in the concept of God, which concept
can be higher or lower according to higher and lower
culture and religiosity.
Thus, God is thought of anthropomorphically when we
ascribe to Him attributes which are found only in man,
and when He is imagined as having feelings and desires,
or being able to be led by the influence of man. Thus
the usual way of representing prayer, superstitiously
understood, essentially belongs to the lower forms of re-
ligion, but it can also appear in the higher. The true
end of prayer is to lift man to God and to cause him to
be subject to His laws.
It is also a superstition that God should be able
to perform miracles or change the laws of nature—because
in the laws man only sees the commonplace. This belief
has its roots in a higher consciousness that is but
poorly developed. 17 [a miracle or] a work of wonder18 is
an act about which one wonders, that is to say, for which
one does not see the cause. Prom God's viewpoint, and
in themselves, miracles are thus unthinkable, and for man
16. Here the word "religion" is apparently used to
denote denomination, or church body.
17. "Ett fttga utvecklat hdgre medvetande."
18. The literal rendering of the original, "under-
verk," is used in order to bring out Bostrftm's play on
words.
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they have merely a subjective, and not an objective,
significance. The thinker can indeed also marvel, but
at the same time he knows that what happens, happens in
a natural way.
This is not fatalism, because freedom is also a
natural ground; miracles are thus impossible, partly
because God is eternal and unchangeable, and partly be-
cause the laws comprise the common and constant nature
in many phenomena; if it is to change, it must conse-
quently change in the whole universe at the same time,
because it is the same law in all things that obey it.
Another superstition with regard to man’s relation-
ship to God is the faith in a special inner enlighten-
ment, or special revelation, either through the soul’s
rising to God, or through God's shining into the soul,
whereby man should receive khowledge which does not
otherwise belong to him. In this there is something
that is correct, namely,, that religion cannot arise by
activity of the understanding, but is always found in
the human soul, no matter how dimly. This more vague
consciousness can at times break forth more vividly,
either by a gathering in upon itself, 1 ^ or by outward
circumstances, and is then regarded as extraordinary
or supernatural. 20
19. "Genom inre samlande p£ sig sjfilv.”
20. One is reminded of the words of Bergson: "You
must take things by storm; you must thrust intelligence
outside itself by an act of will." CE, 212.
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The incorrect [element] in this is that man should
go outside of himself, depending on the fact that in
feeling and fancy he places everything in space. And
the incorrect [element] consists in the representation
that God does not stand in an eternal and unchangeable
relationship to man, and, furthermore, in the external
conception of God in space. To the same kind of super-
stition belongs the acceptance of predestination; it
comes from a wrong manner of representation of God as
either arbitrarily free, or foreseeing, and implies
vanity and love of self. 21
The idea that God should be arbitrarily free is
that He gratuitously determines man, not only for salva-
tion, and contrariwise, but also to virtue and vice.
Freedom in God is not arbitrium . The explanation of
God’s justice as foreseeing is just as incorrect. History
shows, for example, that whole tribes are found on a
lower standpoint, with scarcely any possibility of im-
provement, while others seem to be religious by nature.
It is believed that God has foreseen this, and deter-
mined accordingly. But God does not foresee in the
human sense of the word. If certain tribes are on a
lower plane, this has its snurce partly in themselves
21. It seems apparent that BostrOm has two things in
mind: 1) God is not arbitrary; 2) man has freedom of
choice, a doctrine that BostrOm vigorously defends (SB, II,
494), but which is denied by the doctrine of predestination.
..
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and in this, that they previously misused their freedom,
and partly in the organic unity of the race. Such a
representation of a special election is dangerous, be-
cause vanity and national pride easily unite with it in
those who consider themselves chosen, the caste spirit
in the higher, and dejection in the lower. Those who
live in monasteries furnish examples.
A third form of superstition is the belief in good
and evil spirits and their influence on man. The reason
for it is vague consciousness of God and the relation
of the spiritual to the sensuous. There is something
correct in this manner of representation, namely, the
consciousness that between God and man there must be inter
mediary beings, 22 but it is incorrect that higher beings,
which are beyond man's power of comprehension, should
appear and work in his world; no one gets outside of
his consciousness.
The view is founded on faith in apparitions, which
comes from a vivid fancy in connection with weak under-
standing, 2 3 and on faith in evil spirits; it has its
cause partly in this that he is unable to explain evil
from the physical reasons for it, and partly in the fact
that he is led to bad deeds by his own desires, and later,
22. "Mellanvarelser.
"
23* This sounds like Bowne. See MET, 246 and passim.
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when reflexion sets in, he finds that he did not wish to
do so, and then tries to remove the blame from himself;
finally [.the view is founded} on this, that an evil
spirit should have deceived man, who was by God created
perfect, to become evil; but man is neither created by
God, nor r is he, except in his idea, perfect. Even
though the belief just mentioned has been widespread,
it only proves that the cause has been widespread.
Another superstitious view is the one about angels,
a sensualizing of the omnipresence of God; the sensuous
in this is to think either that God is not powerful enough
or that He is too exalted to do everything. The imagina-
tion about guardian spirits is a sensualizing of man’s
own higher nature. The belief that the pious departed
should effect with God through prayers what man himself
cannot do is superstition; man as sensuous thinks him-
self as standing nearer to the lower beings than to God,
and that it is, therefore, easier to turn to them than
to God Himself.
A further form of superstition is this that man
clothes the spiritual in a material form, usually that
which he here regards as the highest good or evil. Thus,
for example, the imagination about Hades, Purgatory, an
interim between death and the judgment, etc.
Some think of the world as a vale of woe 2^ and heaven
24 . "Jtomerdal.
"
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as a hall of bliss, 2 5 which shows that they do not here
find their rational needs realized, but also that they
have not grasped the significance of this life. Accord-
ing to Christianity, God's Kingdom comes to us, not we
to it. There are, furthermore, many other forms of
superstitious imagination, for example, that blessedness
consists of something different from the religious life,
or that man as a consequence of immorality can suffer
something worse than the diminution of spiritual life;
all of which has its ground in the preponderance of the
sensuous over reason.
COMMENTS ON FALSE AND INCOMPLETE FORMS OF RELIGION
1. In this chapter Bostrflm deals with some of
the practioal religious problems, namely, atheism, in-
differentism, formalism, mysticism, superstition,
miracles, special revelation, and freedom. He also
touches some of the doctrines of the Church. He is
grappling with questions of theology, and in doing so ap-
proaches them with a strict application of his rational
philosophy. He does it fearlessly, following his reason-
ing wherever it leads.
In his analysis of the religious life he displays
a keen insight into the psychology of such forms of re-
ligious life as mysticism, quietism, pietism, dogmatism,
25. "FriJjdesal tt
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atheism, and indifferentism. Here he is familiar with
life, and to this extent the charge that he was not
able to deal well with the things of earth cannot be
made. However, he does not specify empirical facts or
historical situations.
2. While BostriJm criticizes dogmatism, it is to be
observed that he is at times extremely dogmatic, as ap-
i
pears throughout a large portion of this chapter. He can
be charged with dogmatism in his insistence that his form
of rationality is invincible and that his system, based
on this rationality,, is the full and final one. It is
true that he is sincere in this conviction, but sincerity
in itself never made anything right.
He speaks frequently about the whole as the true,
and his system is synoptic, but it can hardly be said to
be coherent for any human being to claim that he has in-
cluded all the facts within the system of his thinking.
There are times when the question can properly be asked
of him, "How do you know?" as, for instance, when he says
that it is a superstition that God should be able to per-
form miracles or change the laws of nature. If he pre-
sumes to be speaking from God’s point of view, it may be
true. But BostrOm is not God, and for him to speak dog-
matically for God is presumptuous. The law of nature is
not changed by the act, but it is, nevertheless, true
26. Supra, 239.
..
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that every time an arm is raised something happens that
may be called a miracle. It is, furthermore, apparent
that Bostrflm is speaking from our human point of view,
and that is something different. We do not know what
powers can be introduced to cause what we call miracles.
What we call laws are a statement of the way we usually
see things happen, but laws do not in themselves work.
There may be more than poetry in the words, "The miracles
of earth are the laws of heaven."
3. When BostrOm speaks of faith in a special inner
enlightenment and in special revelation22 as a super-
stition, and explains it on the basis that man cannot go
outside of himself, 2 ^ he fails to take into account the
mediacy of knowledge; in fact, he thinks he has refuted
it. 2 9 yet his own doctrines were mediated by his voice
to his students, and they are mediated now by having
been preserved in print. To say that there is no ex-
ternal relation is to accept the pantheistic view that
Bostrflm vigorously opposed, although he was in grave
danger of surrender to it—at least as much as Hegel. 20
4 . It should perhaps be stated that BostriJm has
a keen desire to vindicate God, but it is a desire to
vindicate Him as BostrOm’s God, that is, as the God who
27. Supra r 240.
28. Supra, 241.
29- Supra, 39 and 52, note 13.
30. Supra, 36-37.
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can be moulded according to bis rational pattern. He
wishes to remove from God everything that is arbitrary
and whimsical, and in that effort he is to be commended.
But in doing so, BostrSm accepts the doctrine of a time-
less and motionless God. There seems to be a hint at
the idea that there may be temporality in God,^1 but the
idea vanishes in the time and activity of man, of which
there is consciousness in God, because He sees and knows
everything. This subject has been discussed at greater
length in the comments on the preceding chapter. 32
5. BostrOm does not admit any fall of man, 33 and
still he speaks of imperfection and of evil from which
man endeavors to free himself. On the other hand, he
does not seem to endorse any kind of material evolution,
because it would be contrary to his central system of
thought, since it would give too much recognition to the
sensuous, which comes into existence only by man's im-
perfect perceptions. Here he presents an unsolved
problem. Why should man misuse his freedom, if he is an
eternal idea in God, and has not fallen, or if he is
not making his way up along the slow trail of evolution?
6. The negative comments added to this chapter do
not imply a negative attitude to BostrOm's system in
general. His central concept of ideality and his emphasis
31. Supra, 238-240.
32. Supra, 221-231.
33. Supra, 242-243.
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on Cod as the source of life come as a refreshing ration-
alized intuition. There is also merit in his constant
emphasis on the supremacy of reason over the sensuous,
and the spiritual over the material.
But the negative criticisms are placed here, be-
cause of their relationship to theology, and the effect
of his rational idealism on it. Many of his doctrines
are directly opposed to the teachings of the Church;
and here we think especially of the Church of Sweden.
Whether, for instance, the great mind of Paul or the
rationality of BostriJm, keen as it was, is to be ac-
cepted as the more rational, is a question. There faith,
which is also a part of human experience, will play a
part, and perhaps its part will be determining.
2. The Effect of Religion on Man and the Means for It
Religion, in so far as it is real in man, is activity.
God is not in Himself active,-1- but rather in relation to
man, i.e.
,
in man’s relation to Him, which indeed is con-
sistent with God’s immutability. Religion is an activity
to determine the lower according to the higher. Action
is either by man or by God; here the two fall together.
All activity moves from a principle to a goal; here
reason, or God, is both. The activity of religion con-
sists in realizing one’s self in the sensuous, or to
1. It may be questioned if this is really possible.
..
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change this in such a way that it becomes an organ or
a form for the activity of reason; just as the activity
of the individual in the community, by working in agree-
ment with it, becomes public.
There are various names for this. One is redemption
,
which is based on the Oriental representation of war
between the good and the evil, as well as the fact that
man at some time should have been perfectly good. Another
is deliverance
.
which implies that man is bound by the
sensuous, and that only reason gives him independence;
salvation—that the sensuous life is an evil; conversion—
that man must change point of direction 2 in his activity;
justification and sanctification (by partaking the holiness
of God): with regard to the consequences.
The ultimate ground for the effect of religion on man
is not man’s temporal, but his eternal, nature in God,
and can be considered as to its essence and its expressions
in the individual and in the race. This ground is called
in theology vocatio
.
which man does not have as sensuous,
but through his essence in God, i.e., from God; from
this vocatio secundaria must be differentiated, which is
based on the former, and occurs in certain moments of
time. This is vocatio generalis
,
extended to all through
the Christian doctrine; however, beyond this doctrine,
[the call] also advanoes to the heathen, although less
2. ’’Riktningspunkt .
"
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clear and active (this against the Calvinists).
It [the vocatioj must finally reach its goal, even
if not in this form of life. These works are in theology
called God’s works of grace, which is correct, even
though the expression can lead to the misapprehension
that it is an act of God which man without Him would not
be able to achieve,, which is grace in the theological
sense; but all arbitrium on the part of God must be
strictly separated from it [grace].
As a consequence of this general call every person
must be certain of his salvation; God cannot fall short
of His goal, i.e., evil is not fundamental. With such
a doctrine the doctrine of the final judgment in a strict
sense is at variance; but it is not certain that this
doctrine comes from Christ Himself, but from the authors
of the gospels; it is also only a parable about the re-
lationship between the evil and the good.
Furthermore, it is observed here that with this
doctrine there would be need of a special order of grace
also in the next world—but the scriptures do not speak
of such a one. For us, from the standpoint just given,
there is no need of anything such [grace]. Such an
order of grace would not be needed because even the best
are not worthy and mighty to enter the highest blessed-
ness. One could say that God could forgive them, but
this is based on the false view that salvation is con-
.-
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ceivable without man’s free cooperation, or consists in
something else than actual religion.
It could be observed that this doctrine just pro-
posed by me about the unconditional salvation of all
is dangerous because it induces a sense of security;
but this can only be true in the case of the one who
already is evil, and thus would be led to continue in
his evil. But it is never worth while to keep silent
about the truth to save anyone; and through fear no
moral, much less spiritual, improvement is ever made.
Evil, without being eternal unblessedness, can, never-
theless, be as great as sin; it is, furthermore, well
known that the better a person is, and the more insight
he has into the spiritual life, the deeper repentance
does he feel for that which has been neglected.
It could further be observed that the doctrine
often mentioned3 is at variance with the morally strict
spirit of Christianity, which definitely separates
between good and evil, since here, on the other hand,
all would come out the same.^ To this it is already
replied: It is not the same if I am fully well, or
only after sickness can gain my health. Each one has
to suffer what he deserves, and only through repentance
is salvation attained; thus the good and the evil are
3 . "Meranflmnda .
”
h. ”Komma ut p& ett.”
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absolutely separated.
It can also be remarked that the doctrine would
minimize the call of God. No, but the exclusion of one
single person would minimize the blessedness of the
blessed—as Schleiermacher properly remarks. God is
never absent from any human being, which is an idea
that only bases itself on the empirical thought that
God, after He had created man, left him to himself;
but without his idea man would be absolutely nothing.
The human race is one single organic whole, where the
one part cannot be separated from the other, but what-
ever anyone has done of good or evil, he has done it
for the whole race, and the very misery of the evil is
a benefaction, and drives them to repentance.
Repentance is the condition for redemption, and
means the acceptance of a new principle for one’s life,
which is repentance in the narrow sense; in the wider
[sensej it is the advance of the entire person to a
higher ^lifej. The question has been raised as to whether
a man can convert himself; this was the concern of the
strife between Pelagius and Augustine. That he can is
proven by the fact that he has consciousness of the
command^ to do so; as free he can also tear himself
5. It seems evident that BostriJm here means moral
command.

IX. Translation of Bostrtfm’s Philosophy of Religion 253
loose from the sensuous and decide on the one thing, 8
and if he does not do this in the present life, being
sunken in sensuousness, then in another form of life.
Conscience? is both a summons to repentance and a witness
to its possibility, wherefore also man always has the
consciousness of good and evil; otherwise he would be
absolutely annihilated, which is impossible, since he
is of the essence of Cod.
The doctrine of man’s incapacity with regard to
repentance depends upon an abstract conception of God
and His relationship to man, namely that of thinking
of the sensuous as man’s nature and of reason and God
as outside of him. This view does not find any support
in the doctrine of man’s corruption; if he were absolute
ly corrupt
„
he would not feel the need of repentance, 8
but the expression of sorrow for the corruption shows
that it has not gotten hold of the whole man. Many
have zealously defended this doctrine, which is a re-
pulsive expression of self-love, as if one would place
more value on what has been received through grace than
Kl ’’Ettdera." Note Bostrflm’s conviction of free
will and his pantheistic tendencies. Supra, 36-37, and
below, 280-281.
7. Regarding conscience BostrOm says that it does
not decide between right and wrong, but is only pleasant
or unpleasant. FE, 91.
8. Compare Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny
of Man (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sohs
,
1941), 255-
2^4, especially 257.
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by one's own la hors. 9 Thus it happens in relation to
despots. Analogous with this is the excess with which
the converted speak of their wickedness before conver-
sion.
But, irrespective of the fact that man has the
power of conversion, a conversion without God is incon-
ceivable. In this lay the common mistake of Pelagius
and Augustine, namely, to place man outside of God, and
then ask what he could do, which is an absurdity. 10
Pelagius consequently placed salvation in something else
than the religious life, which is heathenish. If by
man’s own power a power were meant that is not also
God’s, then it would not be good, and man could not by
it be converted.
The sensuous man does not reform himself, but is
reformed by the higher nature that is in him; and it
is not conceivable that two beings can work together
toward one goal; this is shown by the community and
the citizen. Without taking God into himself, man can-
not become religious, but it is also God who is present
9. People with ample means have been observed to find
more happiness in gifts given in love than if they had
been bought with their own money. Aside from its con-
flict with the Bible, this statement is at variance with
experience.
10. BostrSm here reveals a valuable insight. Salva-
tion cannot be divorced from the religious life. One is
reminded of Paul’s words: ’’...Work out your own salva-
tion with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh
in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure.”
Philippians 2:12-13.
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in man and causes conversion; this is not something
that has come from the outside, but develops from within
and has of eternity potentia existed in man. The two
statements are united in this that man is converted by
God, who is in him, and that man acts quite humanly.
As far as conversion, as it appears in time, is
concerned, it is given and complete in his [man'sj inner
being as soon as he has made God the principle of his
life. But he can also be considered from the viewpoint
of the multiple with regard to his life as a whole. Ac-
cording to the first viewpoint, each act has its own
consequences, and conversion is one act; but, viewed
from the viewpoint just mentioned, the conversion is
grounded in a multiple of decisions and is carried out
in a multiple of acts.
After man has determined to reform, he has peace,
but this decision does not occur all at once, but gradual-
ly, and even thereafter he, therefore, has a struggle and
battle, and a relapse is possible..^ 1 For that reason man
also needs external means of help, which by the providence
of God, or God’s presence and successive development in
the world, are not wanting; thus [we find it] in the
church, the family, the state, the union of states, and
world history. These are the summing up of God’s ex-
11. Life, however, records countless sudden con-
versions.
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ternal workings of grace, and the one who does not
neglect12 them receives unmistakable efficacy from them.
Many people are not essentially evil or indifferent
to religion, but still sensuous egoists; in them a con-
version is not really necessary, but only a continuous
development of the higher life, by suppression of the
sensuous, which, however, is always accompanied with
some suffering. Others slave under sensuous passions,
which must be uprooted through strife and struggle, in
which one is not always the victor, nor achieves it
without noticeable consequences . For this reason it
has been said that man must experience contrition1 ^- be-
fore he can repent. Evil always brings its own punish-
ment, if not here, then in another form of life, where
the good appears more clearly. 1^
Reconciliation is repentance r because the conscious-
ness of God brings disharmony to the sensuous person.
Since salvation is a work of God, 1? one must from this
side say that He reconciles man through His eternal
love, as principle for his higher life. Reconciliation
12. "Ej lflmnar dem A si do."
13. "Kfinnbara fCljder."
14. Near to Christian theology. But all must pass
before the bar of his rationality.
15. "Kan bMttras."
16. Hell, or Purgatory, back?
17. One has to walk along rather circuitous paths to
follow Bostrtfm in his theology. Here he is in danger of
becoming very orthodox, although he did guard himself
against it. Supra, 253-255.
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results in deliverance from sin, and thereby from its
punishment, and not only [from] the latter [i.e.,
punishment]* The servants of the Church can consequently
never grant the forgiveness of sins, or reconciliation,
to the one who does not himself have the power of re-
pentance .
The workirgs which have now been mentioned are the
same for all people, and for the entire race, for which
reason all people have had a consciousness of the need
of repentance, and have regarded it as of the greatest
importance. It is necessary for all; all must take
part in the doing of penance, i.e., in suffering and
disharmony because of sin. The best person will con-
sequently suffer the most for the sin of all; but this
is not a positive evil, for he will afterward enter
into so much the greater glory; and it works so much
the more for the improvement and sanctification of all.
The next question will concern the means which
man employs for the attainment of the religious goal.
False ones are, for example, reconciliation through
discipline. The reason for prescribing them is the
thought that man for repentance needs to keep his
sensuous nature under discipline, to which is added
Qthe fact] that he feels the need of reconciliation
through chastisement as causing sorrow and pain. The
false element in it is to consider the chastisement
.;
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necessary and good in itself; therefore contrition is
also considered sufficient among the more cultured. The
contrary view depends on the fact that God is regarded
as a despot. In the more sensuous person, who imagines
that the evil comes from without, this conviction leads
to faith in the necessity of physical chastisement of
himself, partly to place himself in opposition to the
external world, and partly in order to set himself
against his own sensuous nature.
But it is foolish to deprive one’s self of the
means of help, in order to set one’s self in opposition
to the sphere in which religion is to be realized, and
injurious to true religion, because in this-way man makes
himself more and more incapable of it. It can, further-
more, easily happen that [man’s] nature treated in such
a hostile manner turns inimically against man, which can
proceed even to madness, just as in general it is natural
that the sensuous powers, if they are not employed as
means for the rational, will take another turn. The only
helpful external measure is activity, wherefore also
hermits, and such, have complained the most about tempta-
tions, whereas the active person does not have time to
feel^-9 them. To this further belongs the belief that
matter is the principle of evil and the organ by which
18. Supra, 199, note 26.
19. ”K£nna efter dem.”
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evil spirits tempt man. Such a belief easily passes over
into vanity and to faith in some merit, and a desire of
admiration by the multitude. True ennoblement hever has
this result, 20 because it is never absolute and never oc-
curs without the help of God.
Religion does not require of man any sorrowful mo-
ments^l for their own sake; the one who has attained the
religious life can move about in the external world with
security and joy. The doing of penance is often a neces-
sary consequence of conversion, but is not in itself a
principle or a necessary condition. Another measure
that is often urged is sacrifice
—
gifts brought to God
in order to win a friendly relationship with Him; or
love and gratitude in order to win His grace; or as
reconciliation for transgressions.
The first mentioned may take place even in the
higher religions, but only with a symbolic signification;
the last named comes from the concept of Him as despot.
It arises through the belief that we must make amends
for sin, in which the false [ideaj is this, that this
could come through anything else than repentance. In
gloomy forms of religion there are in this respect not
only personal sacrifices, but also the acceptance of
20 ~, "Leder aldrig dit."
21. "Sorgsna stunder."
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substitution, which are supposed to be more effective
and better, the more costly they are: from which we
have human sacrifice.
This form of representation is united with a certain
activity of the fantasy; sin rests heavily on man, and
he, as it were, suffers with the one sacrificed, who by
his lesser guilt would have the right to claim some kind
of merit. In addition, [this form of representationj is
united with the idea of the connection between the blood
and the life, and that by draining the warm blood one
should rather mean the life. 22
Finally, there is also connected herewith the idea
that God indeed is loving, but also just, 2 ^ and that one
arouses sympathy in Him by punishing one’s self; and
also that He is offended, and therefore less kindly dis-
posed toward man. But God’s justice is one with His
love.
It is now asked if sacrifice has any side from which
it ought to be retained. It may have the symbolical mean^
ing that we have all from God, and that all ought to be
subjected under Him. But the only real sacrifice is [the
giving up of] sensuousness
,
provided it is in disharmony
with reason, although this can only by mistake be con-
22. Perhaps if Bostrflm had had a son give his life
for the sake of his native land, which he dearly loved,
he would have been more cautious about such a statement.
23. Doctrines of the Church of Sweden.
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sidered as equivalent to repentance. By such a sacrifice
man does not lose his sensuousness, but it is only this,
that sensuousness should not be the end, or something es-
sential, but that he rather gains by the sacrifice of
the sensuous. 2 ^ Occasionally religion may even require
the sacrifice of the entire sensuous life, but this life
is from a religious point of view of no essential signifi-
cance, and thereby man attains just that for which the
sensuous life exists, and it would be foolish to sacrifice
the end for the means. --From what has been said the im-
portance of the doctrine of immortality can be seen,
[a doctrinej which is so important for man's morality that,
if it did not exist, the whole man, as Plato says, would
be a contradiction.
All the acts belonging to the religious cult, such
as prayer and the Church, are, furthermore, means for
the influence of religion upon man. The Church is a
house where people gather for divine service. Further,
in a transferred 2 ^ sense, [it is] a moral personality,
the congregation extended into the signification of the
"Mflnniskan fflrlorar med ett s^dant offer ej sin
sinnlighet, utan endast det, att sinnligheten skulle vara
findam&l, eller nagot vSsentligt, vilket hon tvfirtom just
genom offrandet av det sinnliga vinner."
25. Here BostriJm seems to forget his nice distinction
between divine worship and divine service. Supra, 92.
26. "Translat."
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unity of the people, who confess the same religious
teaching. L^he Churchj
,
finally, receives a still
wider significance, that of all people; as such, it
has its unity from within, including all people in whom
religion exists, and is active, consequently, in the
last analysis, all humanity.
Here we think of the Church appearing in the sensuous
world, a community of people, among whom the same religion
prevails. The Church, in this sense, is thus 1) unity of
rational beings, 2) a rational community, which has reason
as ground, law, and end, and consequently the same attrib-
utes as reason. It is, therefore, not an association,
but a community. There are two kinds of these: private
and public. The Church is not any special one of these;
it is the unity in all, i.e., all are communities only
to the extent that they comprise more limited forms of
the highest community, the Church. Each community is,
therefore, a Church, provided it assumes the highest
human end, religion, which does not exclude the possibility
that it likewise is a special [religion]. If this is true,
one may ask wherein the difference between Church and
state exists. It has an historical ground. In ancient
times people did not know any difference between them.
But at the spread of Christianity the state was heathen
at the beginning, and from this came the idea that the
Church was something higher and more noble than the state,
..
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which was only worldly. In the Middle Ages the battle
was essentially not between Church and state, but between
the private communities which wished to maintain their
right against the state, and the state or the public;
thus also with the order of the priesthood, whose members
are the functionaries of the Church, but who has usurped
the right of the Church, and who themselves wished to be
regarded as having this right,, or comprising it. Protes-
tantism united Church with state, which is Church in an
eminent sense, because it is an independent community,
which does not need to be integrated by others. Every
state is essentially a Church, and if one is spread
over several states, this only means that it is common
to all-
Every Church has a definite doctrine, or confession,
i.e.
,
a definite theoretical manner of representation of
God. Every religion also necessarily has a cult, i.e.
,
a unity of acts,, which are directly designed to lift man
to God, and with respect to his will to subject it to
God's. Cult and doctrine cannot be separated, because
they mutually determine each other, although the one,
especially in the lower forms of religion, can be pre-
ponderant, as, for example, the cult among the Greeks.
Neither one is anything accidental, even though certain
moments in it may seem to depend on arbitrium . The Church
should never forget that it is a living being, which is
.,
'
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to be developed in time. For that reason there must be
no norms, which prevent such a development, because then
they are deserted by people, and it causes divisions,
since they no longer find themselves fully satisfied in
it. Confession should, therefore, only touch the general,
which is given for a certain time in the religious con-
sciousness, as a symbol or norm of doctrine for the
priests. Certain attributes of reason^? should be re-
quired of the ministers to prevent error, but not in
such detail that there is no freedom for feeling and
imagination.—An order of clergy is necessary, since
there is in religion a unity of the theoretical,, practical,
and aesthetic, which is represented by the ministers.
The question is now raised as to what means the
Church has for the attainment of its goal. The Word and
the Sacraments. Both ought to be purposeful for a definite
time. Further, living organisms, the servants of the
Church, [who are] "spiritual"
,
since they work especially
for the purpose of the Church. Their responsibility is
to keep the doctrine and the cult in power, and to com-
municate it to the congregation.
The teachers must necessarily comprise a separate
order. The regent is at the head of it, but not himself
a teacher, because the general is only determining for
the individual. The state does not in fact have ministers.
27 . "FOrstandsbestfimningar.
"
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except the highest, who have general guidance of all that
belongs to the Church. 28 The rest have their place in
the community, and even larger families may wish to choose
organs for their religious activity, namely, home preach-
ers.
2<? The highest functionaries of the Church itself
participate less in the execution of the divine service
than in the guidance of the whole of it. Under these
we have the entire spiritual order, thus also men of
science, artists, and others.
A distinction must, however, be made between the
last named and those who directly work for the arousing
of the spiritual consciousness and for the care of souls.
The religious activity is a unity of theory and practice,
and therefore the servants of the Church should also
have scientific training. Herein is revealed the dif-
ference between men of science as such and teachers of
religion. There should be no secrets, but everything
should be revealed to the people; the ministers are
not definitely separated from the others, not holier,
as if they were nearer to God; therefore they must not
build a hierarchy.
The spiritual order is political, provided it carries
out deeds enjoined by the government ; 3° in other respects
28. "Det kyrkliga hela.”
29. "Huspredikanter.
"
30 . The minister in Sweden, for instance, issues
certain certificates that are here issued by the state.
,
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it is a private order. From this it comes that, as a
rule, the ministers are appointed by a choice of the
congregation, although, since it is not certain that
thereby in all cases the right is done, there is reason
why the government has reserved the right of appoint-
ment in some cases. ^
The ministers should not fall into any kind of
formalism, i.e.
,
consider the teaching and the worship
as something holy in itself, but rather the spirit as
leading to blessedness. The opposite fosters a caste
system. 32 They must be careful not to impart supersti-
tious ideas, as, for instance, that the Sacraments have
any miraculous power; they should not work exclusively
on the feeling; nor should they teach philosophy , 33
although clarity in the teaching is most highly important
to strive for. Extremes in this regard are formalism
and mysticism.
Founders of religion or reformers are such men as
especially express the religious consciousness of their
age; there have been such in all ages, but those who
have really been epochal have naturally had an influence
on man's entire life, since religion is its principle.
31. For instance, the archbishop is appointed by
the King. BostrOm here seems to assume that the govern-
ment is always right.
32. "KastvSsen .
"
33. Sic I
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That the old forms should rise in opposition at the ap-
pearance of a reformer is natural, especially since re-
formers appear at times of great religious abuses, and
when the time is far advanced without a like advance in
the forms of culture. The reformers have their authority
from within, from God, and do not need any external
authority.
What right and power does the Church have in general,
and what external means should it employ for the further-
ance of its end? The same as the state itself, and it
can thus also defend itself with force against attacks
against its objective laws. These general laws bear
upon jurisprudence, whereas, with the question of con-
viction as to the religiously and morally right, the
right of force falls, since it is impossible, because
the essential is free and independent. But an irre-
ligious act can indeed be such that one can understand
that, if it were permitted to continue, it would be
inconsistent with the very continuance of the state,
and then forceful means are necessary, not for the
sake of improving the criminal, but in order to stay
the consequences.^
The right of the state with regard to confession
34. From this point of view. Elsewhere BostriJm has
said that purpose of punishment is the improvement of
the offender. SB, III, 266-275, especially 272.
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is that the Church must have certain norms for its con-
fession. Therefore it is properly punishable-^ if anyone
falls away, or spreads contrary doctrines, 36 or sets a
poor example. Deviations, however, can be tolerated so
long as they do not touch anything essential. The
punishment here is naturally exile. But this is not
really punishment of the individual, whose faults are
based on theoretical conviction, but is established for
the security of the state. 37 if the one who has fallen
away changes his convictions, the punishment is can-
celed.
In what has been said it is not a contradiction
that other confessions are permitted within the state,
which, in the measure that the state is sound, can be
tolerated, 38 however, without the right of their members
to manage the offices of the Church or the state, and
with the provision that they do not strive to make pros-
35. "Belagt med straff.”
36. This hardly seems consistent with BostriJm's
general rationality, and the right that he claims for i't
.
37. Here it seems that he regards the state above
the individual, which is inconsistent with his usual em-
phasis on the person. Bostrflm holds: 1) that the in-
dividual is a person. Supra, 221, 222; 2) that every
human community is to be a Church or an organ for re-
ligion and its end. SB, II, 496; supra, 262; 3) that
the state is in itself a rational, personal being. SB,
II, 501.
38. The non-Lutheran churches have had various ex-
periences in Sweden. The late Archbishop, Nathan Sflder-
blom, for instance, was friendly to other denominations
in Sweden.
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elytes, and with such a purpose turn to the non-think-
ing. 39 But when one who falls away thereby gives a
poor example to those who are uncultured and indifferent,
he places himself in the same relation to the state as
a person who is not a citizen; wherefore the state must
investigate whether he should be permitted to remain in
it, which should not be permitted, if he can be ^proved
to be eager to make proselytes. The right of the Church
in this does not, however, extend beyond the right of
the state, because jjthe right] of no one goes beyond it.
No one can, therefore, be said to have fallen away who
has not declared it. The Church has the right to main-
tain a certain discipline, and for that reason it can
deny certain advantages to the one who has revealed him-
self as not possessing a religious attitude. The Church
certainly has the same right as other communities to
protect itself against others, but only the state can
decide about the right to use force and the general con-
ditions for it.
A holy catholic Church is to this extent a correct
representation, if one means thereby that the various
Churches simply are manifestations of only one; or as
39. In many ways, Bostrflm antagonized leaders of
the State Church. Here one can see how he also would
antagonize the independent Churches.
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it is the expression of faith in the possibility and
actuality of religion in the race in general; or in the
appearance of that which is eternal in a Church bringing
salvation to man. Religion saves, and the Church is re-
ligion in its complexity, i.e.
,
it appears in many per-
sons who have the same conviction; and in this sense,
consequently, the Church saves. But, on the other hand,
[to sayj one certain Church should be the only one that
has salvation is a mockery against Providence, and this
so much the more, as this Church can claim age,^-0 whereas
humanity constantly moves forward.
It remains to speak about the Divine revelation .
Revelation reveals that which is not hidden, but which
is, or can become, familiar, which is known, or can be
known. All knowledge is thus revelation, and revelation
is, consequently, either an activity in the one who re-
veals, or a quality in that which can become known, or
both, and their cooperation.
Divine revelation, then, becomes the act through
which G-od becomes known, or at least possible of being
known; [it is] that quality in God through which it is
possible to know [Him]; or [it isj God’s being, pro-
vided it is possible for man to learn to know [Him]
,
and the comprehension of man’s knowledge of Him. Such
a [knowledge] must exist in the world, provided there
40. ”Har aldern fOr sig.”
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are rational beings; man does not know God because he
is rational, but he is rational because God’s essence
is present in him (because nothing exists outside God);
He must,, therefore, always be more or less clear to man;
and by man’s reason is meant just his complete perceptions.
God is revealed to man through Himself in this way,
that He is in man, and man in Him; that is to say, man
comprehends himself in relation to God, i.e., comprehends
Him. This relationship is eternal. In time it reveals
itself as man’s development toward rationality, and is,
therefore, successive. By that which is divine in man
God consequently reveals Himself to him. At times it
has not been possible to understand this, because man
has been placed in one space, and God in another, and
then a revelation extra ordinem has been required.
Originally, revelation is from God’s side, even though
successive on man’s. God has also originally revealed
Himself in a perfect way, or, in His revelation eternally
reached His goal, and a higher revelation than the one
through God is impossible. From man’s side again this
revelation must be successively realized, through inter-
action with external nature; this must be done, however,
with the provision that in this he also lives in inter-
action with other people; and this successive revelation
is history, seen from the highest viewpoint.
A special Divine revelation must mean, either such
. . *
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a one as would be separated from the original relation-
ship between God and man, and given for some special
purpose; or one that had its ground, not in this rela-
tionship, but in some immediate contact between God and
man in a certain time, and which only had validity for
it. As reason for such a one could possibly be alleged
man’s need of it, and this can appear to be a correct
point of view. One has thereby said that God’s original
revelation was not sufficient. On the other hand, this
shows itself at war with the fundamental principle of
religion. Creation must then be regarded as imperfect,
and the essence of man be such that it needed an im-
provement by means of a new revelation.
The essence of man is eternal and unchangeable.
It could then seem more correct that the original revela-
tion had become inactive as a consequence of man’s misuse
of his own freedom, and that God in love had given man
His help. But at this it is asked how such a renewed
revelation is possible, and how one can convince one’s
self that it is genuine.
The revelation is given either in an external way,
through the senses, preferably sight. But if God thus
has given man signs, these would only provide representa-
tions, and as soon as they would be developed into
thought, they would be recognized as man’s own; but the
whole outer world is only a phenomenon of the spirit, and
..
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consequently not outside of him.
Or else this revelation could have occurred in an
inner way—by inspiration, or effect on roan 1 s spirit, and
not a development of what exists in man’s own conscious-
ness. This again involves the difficulty that one can-
not understand how a thought can be placed in man’s being,
since every such is consciousness itself in a certain form
or determination.^1
There are thus here three alternatives. Either man
must have the capacity to apprehend what is deposited in
him. This is, however, not exactly accepted by supra -
naturalism, since there would not be anything miraculous
in it. Or man is said with the revelation to receive
the mind and understanding to grasp it. But if he has
not in his essence had the need of such, why then this
change? Or finally, it is said that man’s capacity is
raised and developed in and at the revelation, so that
this capacity becomes sufficient, though it did not
exist before, or was insufficient.
This could be thought of as an external quickening,
i
but by this revelation loses everything miraculous; and
these external quickenings should be alike at all times,
because one can see no reason why a certain time should
have preference; and to think of the ability, once called
U. That is, according to BostrOm’s system.
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forth, as again lost or destroyed, is absurd, because then
the essence would be destroyed.
Revelation is, consequently, conceivable only if man
has the ability to apprehend God; but then this is the
thing itself, only undeveloped; God is everywhere present:
why, then, should He not always be so in man? But, even
if the original revelation is sufficient, this does not
prevent the fact that there may be need of mighty revivals,
which, appearing in time, receive the appearance of a higher
divine revelation,— but this is not extraordinary.
What next concerns the certainty about the nature of
the divine revelation to comprise such a one, provided
this certainty has been apprehended as an immediate ex-
perience, people have tried to explain and to retain it,
either by something sensuous, and not divine, accompanying
the revelation; or through something spiritual, an in-
tuition, or a light shining in; or, by being transported,
as it were, to a higher world.
This has, however, been attempted more by philosophers
than by real theologians, who preponderantly have held them-
selves to the doctrine of inspiration.
Concerning these three methods it may be remarked that
one can indeed convince one’s self of a change within, but
not about the fact that it comes from God, except by way
of inference, as v/ith the poets of ancient times; namely
this that, because one is aware of things of which he is
; .
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not aware at other times, and performs acts which are
not done at other times, and that since they both are
true and satisfying, therefore they come from God. This
is correct to thi3 extent that higher consciousness of
what is true and right really are revelations from God. 42
But is this extraordinary? One may not be able to
give the reason why it appeared just now; but this ground
may possibly be the development of the race and of man’s
nature. But, on the other hand, it is difficult to know
which revelation should be regarded as the true one, be-
cause all have their reasons. Therefore people have
ascribed the reasons to immediate miracles. Those who
have had revelations have discovered that they could per-
form deeds which at other times are not possible, --which,
therefore, have come from God.
With regard to such deeds we have already expressed
ourselves about miracles. Here the same is true as about
creation, that of giving shape and form, but not of pro-
ducing anything new. One wonders about that which one
cannot understand; and thus there are miracles for man as
a consequence of ignorance about the laws which exist for
that which happens. The only miraculous thing is the
whole, and the existence and power of the spirit itself. u
42
. The force of this criterion must be recognized.
The problem lies in man’s ability to apply the criterion.
43. Perhaps it should be rendered "Himself." Note
the Hegelian force of this sentence.
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This is inexplicable, for otherwise the existing would
be explained out of the non-exi3ting. God T s presence and
activity in the sensuous world is only miraculous for the
sensuous man. Further, if we should agree that some one
performs miracles, it would not follow from it that he
is supplied with, or does this in the power of, divine
might; one must first discover him to be good and
beautiful in his activity, because man's divinity con-
sists in this. Consequently one must investigate and
find that which has been said and done to be true by
this, that one finds it to be rational. The miracles of
the Bible here signify so much the less, because, for
example, the magicians of Pharaoh performed miracles.
This was a common thing at that time.
No revelation needs anything else to be recognized
as divine than that it is true. The divine cannot be
anything militating against the truth, neither can it
be above reason, because this is a system above which
nothing can exist. The whole controversy with regard to
the point in question is based on the conception of the
relationship between God and man.
Both parties—those who have affirmed, and those who
have denied, miracles and special revelations--have be-
lieved that man was outside God, and thu3 worked with
powers that are not His. Man would then be able to get
-.
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along without much knowledge that God needs, and what
further knowledge might be attained by him would come
from without. The strife is consequently easy to con-
ciliate, when one knows the right relationship between
God and man.
No supranaturalism has, furthermore, been consistent
with this lower conception, because exegesis has always
been admitted to be necessary. But this is impossible,
if we do not believe that God is the true and that the
true is God. It is only imagination when anyone believes
himself to be a supranaturalist. When a person does not
feel that he himself has the strength to search out the
truth, then he accepts that which is presented from with-
out. This is also correct in this sense that the revela-
tion is divine, but it is not extraordinary, which latter
one accepts when one thinks that God would permit man to
pronounce the true without first reflecting upon it.
COMMENTS ON THE EFFECT OF RELIGION ON MAN
1. Our attention is again called to the arbitrary
use BostrdJm makes of the Bible, as it is subjected to the
test of his rationality. Every person must be certain of
his salvation . kk This statement may be taken in connection
with his doctrine that there is no hell, which he vigorously
44. Supra, 250.
'.
.
s
r
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
IX. Comments on The Effect of Religion on Man 278
defended in a special article.^ He tries to demonstrate
the irrationality of the doctrine on the basis that man
is an eternal idea in God, and that he cannot fail finally
to attain his idea. What he seems to fail to see is that
when the New Testament speaks of hell, it is with the ad-
monition that man shall live so as to escape it. It can
hardly be thought that he did not see enough of life on
earth to realize that people make hell for themselves,
and that there can be no escape except by meeting the
conditions for the escape. This view would perhaps be
consistent with his system—no hell, but many hells l
It can also in general be said that BostrdJm quotes
Scripture when it fits into his system, for which he can-
not logically be blamed. He does not treat Scripture
as authority. But the test will come in the consideration
of his system; and there the thought that it is perfect
is presumption.
2. Bostr£5m makes the statement that man can convert
himself .
^
Here he runs counter to the teaching of the
Bible and that of his Church, where he undoubtedly had
learned as a child what the Lutheran youth was taught,
and still is taught:
I believe that I cannot by my own reason or
strength believe in Jesus Christ my Lord or come
to Him; but the Roly Spirit has called me through
45. SB, III, 255-291.
46. Supra, 252-253.
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the Gospel, enlightened me with His gifts, and
sanctified and preserved me in the true faith...
Not only does he have the testimony of Scripture, and
the doctrine of his Church, in opposition to this view,
but there is much in human experience that is evidence
against it. Bostr&n, however, does not seek the real in
the objects of ordinary experience, but in the unchangeable
eternal ideas of the world of absolute reality.
^
BostrOm’s system here seems to involve him in contra-
dictions, or at least in circuitous reasoning. For he
says that if by man’s own power a power were meant that
is not also God’s then it would not be good, and man could
not be converted by it. ^-9 Again he says that true ennoble-
ment never occurs without the help of God. 5° Yet he has
said that man can convert himself. 51 This seems to be an
>
instance where it would be better if he descended from
his lofty thinking and came down to earth, where it would
be evident that we are helped,, not only from within our-
selves, but where we experience ”a power not ourselves
that makes for righteousness.”
BostrOm seems to discount the significance of
sacrifice, including the death of Christ. Ljunghoff
says, however, that, according to BostriJm,
47. Part of Luther’s explanation of the Third Article
of the Creed. See Catechism (Rock Island: Augustana Book
Concern, 1922), 13.
48. Beck, RLB, 34.
49. Supra, 254*
50. Supra, 259.
51. Supra, 278.
52. Supra, 260-261.
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The redemptive element in Christ is not
His suffering, or death, or doctrine, or any-
thing private or external, taken in itself,
but His very personality, or what He in the
very essence of His being ijs in what He thinks,
does, and suffers. The reconciliation in its
deepest sense is the same as the Redeemer, and,
therefore, eternal; not something past, but
something eternally present. Only the external
can become past. Not so the inner I And the per-
sonality thus leads us from the world of history
to that of eternity. 53
Here we are reminded of the words of the Bible,
"God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto him-
self ."54
3. BOstrflm holds the doctrine that the free will
is the good will in its teleological aspect of man’s
realization of his idea in God. He speaks of man’s
development as being better or worse, depending on man's
use of his freedom. 55 He says that the freedom consists
in man’s ability to abstract from the desires, so that
they sink down to potentiality for the will, or he can
determine them to acts of will. 56
In his own summary of his philosophical system
BostrOm has the statement:
BostrJJm vindicates man’s freedom in the
usual sense of an ability to choose between
antithetical grounds of determination. He can
do this with more success and thoroughness than
all others, since according to his view the
sensuous world is man's own possession, and since
his present life is a continuing development
53. BSF, 111.
54. II Corinthians 5:19.
55. SB, II, 495.
56. Ibid.
,
183.
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(actualizing) of it, and is potential in his
essence, or at least a consequence of it. There-
fore he ought to a certain degree himself to be
able to direct and determine the course and
nature of his development after he has developed
to the degree of personal power57 or self-con-
sciousness or independence which we designate
with the words intelligence and will.* 8
Wedberg, whose approach is analytical and critical,
says of his doctrine of freedom:
In the ethical as well as in the psycho-
logical proof of the freedom of the will Bostrflm
consequently ascribes to freedom the meaning
that it is not determined in advance how the
decision of the will is to be made. It may with
a certain degree of correctness be said that this
is the primary meaning in Bostrflm’s concept of
freedom. 59
BostrOm holds that freedom is a necessary condition
for the possibility of morality. 6° The freedom of God is
His independence, and the more free man becomes, the more
L *1
like God does he thereby become. x
He is thus opposed to all deterministic, predestinarian,
and fatalistic systems, and defends man’s freedom in time.
But his usual difficulty arises in the relationship between
sensuous man and his-idea. While he is developing toward
the realization of his idea there is freedom of choice;
but there is, nevertheless r a certain determination in the
fact that he is destined to move toward that realization.
57. "Sjaivmakt.”
58. SB, II, 494.
59. LSBF
,
248.
60. Ibid.
,
246.
61. Ribbing ,( ed. ),FR^T. But since man becomes like
God through God, it may be asked, where, then, is real
freedom?
..
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Also, the world in time is not metaphysical .^2
Thus there is something closed in his system in spite
of his words about freedom, which is true of every eter-
nalist. Something of the vigor of Bergson is needed as
a supplement
:
All the living hold together, and all
yield to the same tremendous push. The animal
takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides
animality, and the whole of humanity,, in space
and in time, is one immense army galloping be-
side and before and behind each of us in an
overwhelming charge able to beat down every re-
sistance and clear the most formidable obstacles,
perhaps even death .
6
3
4. Revelation is given extensive treatment by BostrOm*-
He says that all knowledge is revelation.^ Divine revela-
tion is the act through which God becomes known, or at
least possible of being known. Man does not know God be-
cause he is rational, but he is rational because God’s
essence is present in him. God has originally revealed
Himself in a perfect way. From man’s side, this revela-
tion must be realized successively, and this successive
revelation is history, seen from the highest viewpoint.65
62. BostrOm says that God is, religion. Supra, 65.
He says that the freedom of God is his independence.
Supra, 281. Thus in morality man’s freedom is his freedom
of choice, and in religion, as he becomes like God, it is
his independence.
63. CE, 295.
64 . Supra, 270.
65 - Supra, 271-272. This reminds one of Hegel’s
statement, ’’The history of the world is the world’s court
of judgment,’’ in his Philosophy of Right (tr. S. W. Dyde),
(London: George Bell and Sons
„ 1896 ) , 341.
.••
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In his extended discussion^ Q f revelation he says
that revelation must be identical with the content of
reason, provided the revelation is true and divine. The
rational is identical with the true. That which is not
true and good is consequently not rational .
^
The truly
rational is the absolutely true, and the absolutely true
is the really rational .
^
In this emphasis on rationality we find the core of
BostriJm’s doctrine of revelation. He also emphasizes the
fact that he is referring not only to the Christian re-
ligion, but to every claim of revelation. ^9
BostrfJm’s argument that a doctrine cannot be accepted
simply for the reason that it lays claim to being revela-
tion must be accepted as valid. Jesus advanced this
principle in the words, "By their fruits ye shall know
them. "^0 maa e it even more pointed in the challenge:
."If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the
teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak from
myself. "71 That claims to revelation must be put to the
test, must be recognized as necessary. BostrSm himself
makes the concession that higher consciousness of what is
true and right .really are revelations from God. 72
<d6. SB, III, 3-81.
67. SB, III, 7.
68. Ibid., 9. This is Hegelian doctrine.’
69. Ibid.
,
7.
70. Matthew 7:16.
71. John 7:17.
72. Supra, 275.
..
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That BostrOm comes close to accepting the Bible’s
general position that revelation is hecessary because of
man’s sin is evident in his words, ’’It could then seem
more correct that the original revelation had become in-
active as a consequence of man’s misuse of his own free-
dom, and that God in love had given man his help. ”73
Again he says that man’s reason is his consciousness of
God, separated from Him because of its less inclusive
clarity. 74
He seems here to admit that some explanation must be
made of human imperfection, whether it be through a fall,
or because man has still far to go on the way to perfection.
But BostrSm says that a person cannot get outside of his
consciousness ,75 and that not a single truth can be above
or outside him. 76 His difficulty here is with what, at
least in this connection, must be considered an epistemo-
logical monism. But for the person who accepts the fact
that knowledge is mediated—or epistemological dualism
—
this difficulty disappears. BostrOm himself seems to
waver, and at times to accept the position just mentioned,
as in the words in his own summary of his system:
The Holy Spirit can in certain individuals
work and realize Himself in part immediately
from within, and in part mediately from without
(through othersih whom He already is realized). -7
73. Supra, 272.
74. SB, III, 9.
75* Supra, 242.
76. SB, III, 33.
77. SB, II, 495.
..
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But the difficulty is that he immediately in the very
next sentence abandons this thought by saying that it is
always the one and same Spirit that is present and active
in all, and Who is this (from his side) in all in the same
way. 7®
BostrOm says that beside the sensuous and the non-
sensuous, or rational, there is no third [being] of whom
it could be said that it is neither the one nor the other;
and consequently a third source of knowledge cannot be
possible for man. What the theologians say that man has
received through revelation he has, nevertheless, found
only in and through his reason. He holds that Christian-
ity, just as reason, is older than the Bible. Christ’s
own Christianity was His deep and clear consciousness of
God and of Himself in relation to Him. In our own reason
the Christian truth is accessible to us, if we earnestly
seek it there, and do not simply wish to gather it from
other sources.^0
Thus we find BostrSm back again at his unity of
reason and revelation. Dons observes that, as a good
dogmatician, BostriJm believes that only that is true in
7$. Ibid.
,
495.
79. This statement, while often made, is unfair to
the Old Testament, because it has specific doctrines and
practices, which are annulled in the New Testament.
80. SB, III, 256-257. This emphasis is similar to
BostrBm’s statement that "Everything that exists has
self-consciousness as its determination." Supra, 52,
note 13. This emphasis is a natural consequence of his
epistemological and metaphysical monism.
..
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religion which corresponds with his own views. He says
that the consequence of it is that the philosophical
element disappears to the extent that there may be a
question as to whether at this point Bostr&n’s system
should be turned over for consideration to the history
of theology, or perhaps, to the history of religion. ^1
5. Bostrflm accuses those who disagree with him of
not having the capacity for philosophy, but even in the
face of such a criticism, one may be permitted to dis-
agree with him. One can take a stand with Bowne, and
say that man is created. 82 This created being, endowed
with selfhood, stands in relation to God, and as such he
can fall back on some word of revelation. 8 3 This position
appears fully rational.
If we are able to hear one another’s voice, ’and ex-
change ideas with one another; if nature can speak ”a
various language then it does not seem irrational that
He Whom we recognize as the Creator can also speak to us.
Now and then individuals appear that we call geniuses,
whether it be in science, in art, in poetry, in< thought,
or in religion. By their genius they can see further and
go further than men of less incisive mental or spiritual
powers. If they leave a record of what they have done or
experienced, then that record becomes a deposit from which
3l. OB, 51.
82. MET, 97.
83. Ibid., 379.
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others gain knowledge. Life is greatly enriched be-
cause we have the written records of man’s achievement in
science, in literature, or any other field of human en-
deavor.
In the spiritual realm it has also been true that
there have been individuals whose keen spiritual sensi-
bility has brought them into closer contact with God.
Thus Isaiah could say: r,In the year that king Uzziah
died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted
up."84 Amos had no hesitancy in declaring, "Thus saith the
Lord. "85 Paul was certain that he had seen the Lord. 86
What they have recorded becomes a revelation to us, most
of whom without that revelation would never receive that
spiritual knowledge.
It would be unrealistic to deny that here a problem
arises due to the fact that there are unlimited and indis-
criminate claims to revelation. So we are back at the fact
that revelation must find some kind of validation. That
Jesus was not fearful of the outcome of such a test is
indicated by His invitation to put the teachings to the
test. 87 Two thousand years have given opportunity to see
that Jesus is the highest revelation of God, in word and
8k. Isaiah 6:1.
85. Amos, passim.
86. I Corinthians 15:8.
87. John 7:17.
,.
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in life, and that, if the world would follow His teachings
and His example, the problems and the hatreds that now
threaten the destruction of the human race would not be
possible
.
J
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this work is that Bostrtfm has in
some respects established himself as an independent thinker.
He has done this by bringing his rational idealistic phi-
losophy to its logical position, namely, that ultimately
nothing exists except God and His eternal ideas. He vin-
dicates his claim to being a rational idealist by pro-
ducing a logical thought-structure in which space, time,
motion, and change are excluded from true and original ex-
istence.
Bostrtfm is a personalist in the sense that the prin-
ciple of his philosophy is found in the idea of self-con-
sciousness which seeks the true and fundamental reality
in the eternal and personal. With him self-consciousness
is life, and life is self-consciousness.
In this study it has been discovered that, even though
BostrOm is especially critical of Hegel, his system, never-
theless, resembles Hegel’s in many respects. There are
similarities, for instance, in Bostrdm's emphasis on the
fact that to be is the same as to be for someone, or to be
perceived; that nothing can be a determination without
being something in consciousness; that God could not be
omniscient, if He did not possess the form of system;
that the rational is the true, and the true is the rational.
$8. Supra, 25, 133-136, 282 and passim.
.-
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But BostrSm differs radically from Hegel when he leaves
no place for development.
In his denial of time in God, and in his doctrine
that God, since He knows everything, is conscious of time
in an intellectual way through man, ^9 Bostrttm strongly
resembles I. M. E. McTaggart, who speaks of the "mani-
festation through time of the timeless. "9°
BostrSm's rational theology is in several respects
unacceptable to biblical orthodoxy, because he rejects
some of the fundamental doctrines of the Bible, such as
the Trinity, vicarious atonement, and special revelation.
His use of the Bible is in harmony with liberal theology,
in which the Bible is not regarded as an infallible norm
of faith and practice,, but is accepted las it fits into the
system of the liberal theologian. 91
BostrOm’s philosophical system is of interest as a
chapter in the history of philosophic thought. But it
is more than that. It has elements, such as his per-
sonalistic idealism, that will be of abiding interest
to those who try to see beyond appearance to the reality
that is its essence.
89. Supra, 227-228.
90. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge:
At the University Press, 1896), 159-202, especially 179,
195, 198.
91. See, for example, Harry Emerson Fosdick, The
Modern Use of the Bible (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1924)
,
1-31 and passim. See also his A Guide to Under -
standing the Bible (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub-
lishers, 1938), and Frederick May Eliot's Pamphlet, Uni -
tarians Believe
.
13th printing (Boston: American Uni-
tarian Association, 194-6), especially 43 -47 .
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APPENDIX
OUTLINE1 OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
2
INTRODUCTION
A ) Problems
1 .
What is The Philosophy of Religion? In this question
two others are included which must first be answered: 1)
What is philosophy? 2 ) What is religion?
2 .
Both of the latter questions may have a double mean-
ing, or may be resolved into two others: 1) What are
philosophy and religion as such? 2) What are they in re-
lation to us, i.e.
,
as man’s philosophy and religion?3
The relationship between these questions, the order of
their being answered.
4
3.
But even the second of these may be taken in a dual
sense: 1) What have philosophy and religion up to the
present been in relation to us? 2) What must they always
remain in relation to us, as distinct from what they are
1. This outline is found in SB, II, 215-236.
2. The literal wording of the title is: ’’The Phi-
losophy of Religious Doctrine.” It is, however, equiv-
alent to "Philosophy of Religion.”
3. Sometimes BostrOm begins the sentence following
a colon with a capital, and sometimes not. I am trying
to do it consistently.
A. BostrOm does not always use complete sentences
in this Outline.
,. 1
.
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considered absolutely? It is only in the second sense
that the question is here considered.
B) Philosophy Considered Absolutely
4 .
From a formal point of view philosophy, considered
absolutely, is: a) a science, consequently oJ a knowledge,
a definite form of self-consciousness or perceiving to-
gether with a definite degree of certainty or conviction,
f3) a systematic knowing , a system of thoughts; the highest
science both *) qualitatively and ^3) quantitatively , when
it is compared with the other sciences, for which it is
the foundation.
5
5 .
From a material point of view philosophy, considered
absolutely, is: a) The science of the self-existing, of
the absolutely true being or essence
,
consequently not of
the phenomenon without regard to the former; b) the science
of the concepts or ideas
,
of the absolute reason and its
substance, ^ which is exactly the absolutely true being.
6 .
From this come the most general ( formal ) attributes
in philosophy, when the word is taken in its absolute
meaning. It is, namely, a life or self-consciousness with
5. Literally: "For which it fphilosophyj lies as
foundation .
"
6. The word used— "innehall"
—
primarily means "content."
.J
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the attributes a) infinite , consequently oj absoluteness
and (i ) organic pan-unity ;? b) immateriality , consequently
ok) spirituality and fl) eternity .
C) Human Philosophy®
7.
Philosophy for us
,
or human philosophy, is possible
on condition of the postulate that man is: 1) rational ,
that is, a sharer in the absolute reason, a sharer in
philosophy as such; 2) finite ly-rational , that is, not
completely but only more or less sharing in it. From this
come the most general attributes in human philosophy in
so far as it is considered in contrast with philosophy
taken absolutely. Compare 6.
8 .
The philosophy which is possible for man therefore
as a consequence always remains only relatively identical
with the absolute philosophy; indeed it is possible only
in as far as, and in the measure that the absolute being,
\
reason with its ideas, can appear and be grasped in the
human self-consciousness and its world, in the relatively
existing (the phenomenon), of which it is the substance
and into which it enters as (a more or less potential or
actual) element . Consequence of this for the character of
7. EostrOm’s expression is "all-enhet ," for which I
believe "pan-unity” is adequate.
8. The literal translation would be "Man's Philosophy,"
but I think "Human Philosophy" is a better rendering.
'I
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human philosophy and for the method , by which the same
can be achieved.
D) Religion in the Absolute and Relative Sense
9 .
Religion in itself
,
or in the absolute sense, can be
nothing else than the absolute being or reason, which,
nevertheless, not merely as such is called religion, ex-
cept in so far as it is regarded as binding and in a cer-
tain way determining or regulating the spiritual being’s
free activity ; in other words, as this activity's pur-
pose and law. From this come the most general attributes
of religion. Compare 6.
10 .
Again, as far as religion for us, or human religion,
is concerned, it is possible under the same postulates and
in the same degree as human philosophy, and its most gen-
eral attributes are also analogous to those which belong
to this one. Human religion
,
furthermore, is not only a
knowing, but it is likewise and essentially a willing and
doing; wherefore the philosophy of religion is at the
same time a practical discipline.
E) Introduction to Philosophy
11 .
Human philosophy is A) theoretical in so far as it
conceives of the absolute being as the final ground for
man and his world, and explains the latter through the
..
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former; B) practical in so far as it conceives the same
being as the highest end of man and his world, and deter-
mines his free activity in the way according to which
this end can and should be attained.
12 .
Theoretical philosophy has three divisions: a) The -
ology
,
b) Anthropology
,
and c ) Ethnology . The object or
substance of these is being, namely, man and the world in
general for the first; the individual man for the second;
and for the third man naturally united, the tribe, the
nation.
13.
Practical philosophy also has three divisions: a)
Philosophy of Religion
,
b) Ethics
,
and c) Political Science .
The object or content of the first is for the purpose of
man in general, of the second for the individual man, and
of the third for man collectively, the state. In addition
to this it is taught in each division how the free human
enterprise should be determined by the purpose that is in-
dicated . 9
14 .
Remark: Anthropology and Ethnology taken together
may be called Cosmology or Anthropology in a wide sense .
In like manner Moral Philosophy (Ethics) and Political
9. The last two sentences are one in Bostrflm. The
division in the translation seemed wise in the interest
of clarity.
.,
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Science (Statescraft ) together may be called Jurisprudence
in a wide sense ,
15 .
The Philosophy of Religion must primarily determine •
the concept of religion or of the religious life with
respect to form and content, as well as indicate the
relative limitations which religion must meet in the
finite man. This is the object of the true Philosophy of
Religion .
16 .
The same science must, furthermore, in general present
the specific forms of religion in their relation to one
another and to the concept of religion, as well as
determine the laws of their historical development
,
which
belongs to the History of the Philosophy of Religion .
17 .
General remarks : Concerning the interest of the phi-
losophy of religion in science and life; concerning its
relation to the positive science of religion ; concerning
its assumptions in the investigator; concerning the rela-
tive necessity of permitting its presentation to be here
preceded by that of theoretical philosophy* etc.
..
.
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THEOLOGY
Introductory Remarks
18.
Is there a God? 10 And what is God? The relation of
these questions to each other. What is God taken absolute
w And what is He for us? [The problem asj to what ex-
tent these questions can be distinguished. Compare 8.
19.
Remarks concerning the so called proofs of the ex-
istence of God . What has been intended by them. What
should not have been intended by them.. The meaning of
a proof . The result of it for the question which is con-
sidered here, and the progress of the present investiga -
tion .
A) The Existing
20 .
What is the existing, in itself? 11 What must one
imagine by this expression? The existing is the per-
ceived; for to be is = to be perceived . Possible ob-
jections to this; their occasions and solution. The
meaning of an essence or a being in a wide sense and of
an essence in a limited or specific sense.
21 .
The perceived
,
the existing as such, cannot be any-
10. Literally, Is God?
11. Literally, "What is the existing per se?"
.«J/1
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thing else than self-consciousness and its attributes,
i.e., perceptions . The substantial in everything is life
or self-consciousness; everything is a definite modus
or form of this,, and beyond or independent of it there is
absolutely nothing.
22 .
Proofs of this proposition
,
taken 1} from the simplic -
ity of self-consciousness and its relationship to everything
that exists or is perceived; 2) from the very idea of per-
ception . The reason why we human beings place the per-
cept ion (the subjective) and its objects (the objective)
against each other; 3) from the axiom that nothing can
exist and be anything for another without existing first
( as an idea ) and existing as something by itself .
23 .
Further evidence
,
taken 1) from the relativity and
the subjectivity of the sensuous reality . Remark: Con-
cerning the absurdities of materialism and in specie of
atomism ; 2) especially from the significance of space
and its relation to us, i.e., to our spirit, and the im-
possibility that anything could exist beyond (extra) self-
consciousness; 3) from the impossibility to express in
words anything else than our own perceptions or to speak
about anything else than these.
24 .
Further evidence
,
taken 1) from the impossibility
to gain any knowledge of the existing, in case it really
. .
-
:
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were something else than perceptions, or were not such;
2) from the course of human culture in general and from
the course of philosophical culture in particular; 3) from
the fact that at least the incompletely perceived as such
cannot be anything else than perceptions
,
and that these,
nevertheless, are more identical with self-existing in
the measure that they are less incomplete.
25.
Consequently, the result of this
,
namely, that the
most general attribute, the first and the substantial in
everything, is life and self-consciousness, that everything
is a definite modus or form of this, and that without or
independently of this nothing can be found. Absolute
idealism is the only absolutely true view of the world.
B) The Necessity of the Absolute Reason,
or the Existence of God
26 .
Every form of life or self-consciousness is self-
existing^ or self-conscious in a definite way, i.e., per-
ceives, or is a rationality in a wide sense (mens , per-
cipiens ) . But this does not prevent it from also being a
perception ( perceptio & perceptum ) , namely, in another
perceiving being, provided this one refers it to itself as
12. BostrOm’s expression is "sjelf lefvande”— ’’self-
living” but it seems that ”self-9xisting” is a better form
in English, and that it adequately represents the original.
.,
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its determination. 1 ^ Further concerning the relationship
between the perceiving being and its perceptions.
27.
Every form of self-consciousness, every perceiving
or rational being , has all the others as its attributes,
i.e., as its perceptions , so that in reality all is in
all, it<*vTt v^v-rov . Remarks concerning the monadology
of Leibniz, and what is satisfactory in it or the con-
trary.
28 .
Taken together, the rational beings also comprise an
organic whole or a system in which each one has a definite
degree of perfection in relation to the whole and stands
in definite relationships to each one of the others; from
which it follows that there is only one single world
,
when it is viewed in its truth and perfection .
29.
But not every being grasps all the others with the
same completeness or just as really. In this respect
there can and must be an infinity of gradations. For this
reason each one, in addition, has actu its own and alto -
gether distinct world
,
irrespective of the extent to which
it may be identical with that of the others and with the
13. The Swedish word is "bestfimning. M An unabridged
Swedi sh-English Lexicon gives the words "attribute ,
"
"quality," "property" as the English equivalents. But from
a study of the various forms of the word it seems that
there are cases where "determination" is a better rendering.
..
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only absolutely true, of which it is a relatively perfect
concept ion. 14-
30 .
Since, therefore, relative and imperfect conceptions
exist, and since these are not possible without the as-
sumption of perfect ones
,
which again are impossible with-
out some one who perceives perfectly, the reality and
necessity of an absolutely perceiving being is thereby
presented, i.e., presented by reason 9 which,
in conformity with its idea, cannot be more than .just one ;
this is God .
31.
Observations concerning the chief of the so called
proofs of the existence of God
,
concerning the ontological
,
the cosmological t the teleological . and the ethico-theo -
logical . The critiques by Kant and others of these proofs.
In what measure they are valid or not, and why.
C) General Logical Determinations or
Attributes of the Absolute Reason
32.
The importance of the words attributes or qualities .
The importance and the difficulty of the doctrine concern-
ing God’s attributes. How and why a plurality of them may
11. This entire paragraph is one sentence in the orig-
inal, divided in only one place by a semicolon. It seemed
wise, in the interest of easier English, to break it up
into several sentences.
t'*
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The division of the divine attributes into: A)
logical
.
which are a) formal
,
b) real
.
which again are
in part «*) ontological . in part ft) noological ; B) meta-
physical
,
which are a) aetiological
,
b) teleological .
Observations concerning the relationship to each other
of these kinds of attributes.
34.
The first class of the logical attributes comprise
the formal, or the attributes of infiniteness of the
divinity, which are a) absoluteness, i.e., <*) independ -
ence, 1^ absolute self-existence
, ft) perfection , positive
infiniteness; b) organic pan-unity, 17 i.e., <*) unity in
the many , j) the many^n unity , consequently infinite har-
mony.
33.
The second class of the logical attributes consists
of the ontological
.
or the attributes concerning the reality
T5. Bo strOm uses the word "such" where the word ’•them"
is here used.
16. The word used here is identical with the German
word "UnabhSngigkeit . " The two words used by Bostrtfm mean
about the same thing, although the second may be a bit
stronger, and thus the rendering, "absolute self-existence."
17. Here again the word ”all-enhet”--"all-oneness"
—
is used. In Swedish combinations are very common, and it
is often difficult to give them in idiomatic English.
18. The Swedish word is "allhet"— "all-ness" which is
another coined word. The context would indicate that the
rendering "many" correctly reflects what the author has
in mind.
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of God, which are a) absolute immateriality , or the
quality of transcending sense, ^9 i.e., <*) spirituality ,
/3) eternity ; b) substantiality, having the quality of
an organism
,
20 i.e., <*) quality of universal being , 21
omnipresence
, ft)
omnipotence .
36.
The third class of logical attributes consists of
the noological
,
or God’s attributes of ideality
,
which are
a) absolute knowing , i.e., <*) self-consciousness
, ft) om
-
niscience ; b) absolute rationality , i.e., <* ) personality
and
ft) complete personality .
22
37.
These three classes are embraced respectively by the
attributes; A) beauty in a wide sense (majesty), a) sub-
limity
.
b) beauty in a narrow sense; B) truth
,
a) sub -
stance
, b) the quality of universal being , 2 ^ systematic
quality of universal being; C) goodness
,
a) life
,
b)
blessedness . All of them must here be regarded in the
absolute sense.
38.
Further observations concerning the negative and
19. "Supersensuality,” or the supersensuous
,
would
be the word.
20. The word is "organiskhet , ” something like ”or-
ganicism-hood .
”
21. The word— ’’allvSsenhet"—would be ”all-beinghood . ’’
22. The combination— ”allpersonlighet”—would mean a
personality that fills the universe— ’’all-inclusive per-
sonality.”
23. See note 21.
24. A phrase is here made into a complete sentence.
. . .
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positive expressions of these attributes; concerning
their consequences; concerning the critical evaluation
of them by Strauss and others, and to what extent this
may be regarded valid, etc.
D) The Comprehension or Ideas of the Absolute Being
39 .
The inner determination or comprehension of the
absolute reason consists of its perceptions, its ideas
or conceptions
,
which here are regarded only as thought
in and by their absolute subject.
40 .
Every idea, thus thought,, is the absolute reason
itself, regarded in a certain determination, in a certain
form of its infinite life or self-consciousness. This
self, however, must not be regarded as being only the
combination of its ideas, so that it would be completely
identical with its contents.
41 .
Every idea, as such, has the same general determina-
tion, the same attributes, as the absolute reason; but
it also has another and special determination
,
through
which it is distinguished from it, as well as from every
other idea.
42 .
Every idea requires all the others together with
their subject in order to be what it is. It is the whole
..
.
.
.
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considered from a certain point of view, and it is a
certain unity for us of all the others , which comprise
its content and refer themselves to it either as its
positive or negative determinations .
43.
By itself , i.e.
,
as thought in and by God, every
idea is absolutely perfect ) ; but this does not pre-
vent the possibility of comparing the ideas with each
other with regard to their special determination alone
,
and that then the one is more complete than the other in
the sense that the one has more positive and fewer nega-
tive determinations than the other.
44.
Therefore also God, 2 ^ when compared with the other
beings, has only positive attributes
,
and not a single
negative one. If we properly ascribe to Him negative
attributes
,
these would only be negations of negative
and consequently actually positive. The meaning of the
scholastic expressions, ens perfect issimum
,
realissimum
,
the highest being
,
etc.
45.
An idea can be thought
,
not only as existing within
oneself, as far as its own positive content is concerned,
but also as existing in others
,
who are higher or more
25. The word here used is "divinity." But the con-
text clearly indicates that BostriJm means God.
. . -
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perfect
,
and into whom it must enter as a positive deter-
mination. Regarded in this latter way, it itself also re-
ceives a greater determination, and this applies in the
same measure even more, the higher the idea is within
which it is thought.
46 .
From this it follows that all ideas have their com-
plete determination and significance in the measure in
which they are thought of in and by the absolute reason. 2^
It also follows that their original tendency as well as
their highest end and good must be to live and compose
oneself in and through this, provided they themselves are
living and perceiving beings. All other tendencies and
ends properly stand in relation to this end as inferior
moments and means.
E) The Relative Substantiality
l+B •
If the ideas are attributed to God
,
i.e., are thought
of by Him, they are His ideas or perceptions, and it is
only He who then is self-conscious with regard to them,
only He that comprises their eternal essence and sub-
stance. They also concern Him alone, without any other
beings than He being determined by them.
49 .
But if they also can and must be attributed to them-
26 . "I och af."
..
*
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selves , and are subjected to self-scrutiny, each one of
them is, however, also for himself living and self-con-
scious in a determinate way, in other words, a perceiving
or rational being , a personality ; for under no other con-
dition either would or could they be perceptions of the
absolute reason,
50 .
If one should ask what they
,
as perceiving beings
apprehend or perceive
,
it would be true with regard to
them also that they cannot perceive anything else than
themselves and their perceptions in their individual
determination; and since in their essence they are or-
ganic moments in the system of divine ideas, consequently
each one of them this system itself, regarded from a
certain special point of view, they also have this as the
original and eternal content of their self-consciousness,
provided they are considered in their truth and per-
fection.
51 .
But since they not only are perceiving, but also
finite, beings, therefore they cannot grasp their es-
sential substance with the same completeness as the
infinite reason, indeed the one among them cannot grasp
it with the same perfection as the other; consequently
the same substance, the world of the beings or ideas
.
must reveal itself to each of them as something different
..
.
.
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or the opposite of what it is for itself (for God) and
for all the others, i.e., they must find and possess
another reality as theirs than the one which exists im-
mediately for God.
52 .
Consequently, then, there exists for them
,
in addi-
tion to the absolute reality or world, a relative reality
,
which also consists of as many relatively distinct worlds
as there are finitely perceiving beings, because these
worlds are nothing but the finite beings as they are self-
conscious in their complete relative determination, con-
sequently always altogether dissimilar and individual, no
matter to what extent they may be partially identical.
53 .
The relative reality or, since only that of man is
known to us, our relative world is thus a phenomenon, an
incomplete perception of the absolute
,
which, as essence,
is its foundation, and also in that respect is. or is per-
ceived
,
although not completely as it is in its verity,
but more or less differently, according to the manner in
which it is grasped, whether less or more completely.
54 .
The relative world may indeed as a whole have deter-
minations or attributes which are the 1 very opposite of
those which belong to the absolute ( 34-37 )
;
but since
this antithesis is merely relative
,
it does not prevent
. .
.
'
.
.
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the former from being partially more or less identical
with the latter. Further development of this relation-
ship, and thereby explanation of the most general attri-
butes of the phenomenon .
55 .
The relative world is everywhere a unity of contra -
dictions
,
namely, of the being, through all its attri-
butes ( 34-— 37 ) and of its negation in the same manner as
the former reveals itself in the phenomenon as its
potential infinity
,
even though this is in all of its
moments as actually finite . From this comes the unlimited
development of the phenomenon
,
which constitutes one of
its essential characteristics.
56 .
Since the unity of contradictions within the phe-
nomenal world permeates the whole
,
therefore all of its
parts must stand in what has been called a state of polar-
ity to each other, so that when two distinct phenomena are
compared with each other, the essence will appear relative
ly more and the opposite or negation of the essence will
appear less in the one than in the other. A reminder in
this connection of Schelling's way of determining the
absolute in his system of identity.
57 .
Comparison of the view of the universe presented
here with others, in particular those of more recent date.
Evidence that the former cannot properly be called pan-
.-
.
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theistic ,, or lead to the consequences which must be re-
garded as valid reasons for discarding pantheism.
THE METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
53.
The relative world does not lie within the absolute
world in. the sense that it comprises a constituent part of
it; but neither does it lie outside of it in the sense
that it is independent of it. A relationship thus exists
between them, when they are considered from the point of
view of the former [view]
;
and a consideration of God
under this circumstance belongs to metaphysics
.
the general
foundation of which is given in what precedes ( 43-56)
.
59.
According to what already has been evidenced, the
relative world is a secondary existence
,
2? which for its
possible existence 2 ^ and reality postulates another as
its ground; and since beside the relative existence there
is no other than the absolute, i.e.
,
God, therefore he
must comprise the ground of the relative world in all the
considerations' and from all the viewpoints from which it
can be regarded.
60 .
But as finitely-infinite the relative world is
27. The word here rendered " secondary” could also
mean "subordinate.”
28. Literally, "possibility."
..
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one continually evolving reality, and therefore it can be
considered with respect to A) its reality and from this
point of view in regard to a) its material and formal ex-
istence as such and b) its existence or continuat ion in
its existence; B) its deve lopment and from this point of
view with respect to a) its form of development and b) the
goal of its development and direction.
61 .
If, therefore, God is considered in relation to the
reality of the relative world
,
and, furthermore, only from
the ontological point of view (j$£) » he is this world’s
primordial being29 and as such a) its cause30 (original
cause) and b) its original substance , 31 even though, as
absolute,, he is this only indirectly and mediately. It
is to be observed that here we are not concerned with any
empirical causality or substantiality, but only with a
rational.
62 .
And when he is further considered in the same rela-
tionship, but, in addition, from a noological point of
view, a consideration that includes and enlarges upon
the previous one, then he is the original intelligence ^ 2
29. "Urvfisende . ” This is the same as the German
’’Urwesen. ”
30. "Orsak." In parenthesis BostrOm has "ursak,"
which would be the same as the German ’’Ursache."
31. The Swedish word is ’’ursubstans . ”
32. Swedish, ”ur-intelligens . " ”Ur" means "original.”
',
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of the relative world, and as such a) its creator and
b) sustainer in which case the same remark holds true as
above ( 61 ) . The impossibility of a creation in time .
The possible meaning of a creation out of nothing . The
question of the purpose of creation, etc.
63 .
If again God is considered in relation to the develop
ment of the relative world, and, further, only from an
ontological point of view
,
he. is, nevertheless, by implica
tion and mediately, the source of religion^ of the same
world and as such its a) highest law and b) highest end,
which thus is realized infinitely, even though in each
of its moments it is only in a finite way.
64.
And if he is regarded in the same relationship from
the noological point of view , he is in the same manner the
absolute regent of the relative world, and as such a) its
highest providence and b) its most complete savior, 3A- in
which regard our world can be considered as one of his
realms, in connection with which the preceding remark (63)
should not be overlooked.
63 .
Thought of in the latter relationship (6^, 64) God
33. Swedish, "ur-religion.
"
34 * The literal expression is "highest savior," but
it seems that "most complete savior" is a more adequate
translation.
.'
.
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has the attributes of holiness and righteousne ss , and
further of omniscience and goodness, 35 for us# These at-
tributes possess only metaphys ical significance and ex-
press his logical being in special relationship to man,
who as self-conscious, free, and rational, stands in a
more immediately intimate relationship to him than every-
thing else that exists in his world. 36
ANTHROPOLOGY
A) Concerning Man in General
66 .
Man, inwardly regarded , 37 i s a relatively rational,
a sensuously rational being
,
and as such distinguished
not only from God Himself, but also from that idea in him
which is the most immediate ground of man's being. Fur-
ther analysis of what is implied by this.
67.
This formal explanation concerns not only the in-
dividual human being, but also humanity in all its states.
The human organism , furthermore, should not be regarded
as alone constituting the sensuous human being. The
entire sensuous world , as-seen from man's point of view,
3 5 . The word Bostrtfm uses here is "allgodhet." Swedish
has great facility for such combinations, which usually
are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to convey into
English in the richness of the original.
36. This paragraph is one sentence in the original.
37. Literally, "considered within himself."
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should be regarded as belonging to his phenomenal exist-
ence and comprising his determinateness,
68 .
The attributes which belong to man as a consequence
of his general concept38 ( 66 ) are already stated in what
precedes and are to be found by combining with 34- 37 .
The relationship in man
,
furthermore
,
between the being
and the phenomenon , between the reason and the sensuous-
ness, is determined according to the analogy of God’s
relationship to the relative in general, concerning which
see 61-6/j.. Further particulars about this relationship
when the being is considered within the phenomenon and
vice versa.
69 .
It is especially observed that man is temporal, or,
more correctly, eternally-temporal , ^ consequently be-
coming, inconstant, a life in continuous development
,
a determination which must be explained through the
relative finiteness of his ideas in connection with the
organic nature of his determinations (those of the other
ideas )
.
70.
As a consequence of this determination man is to be
regarded as a living activity or an active life ;40 and,
38. Here the meaning appears to be the concept of man.
39. The hyphenated expression is "evigt-timlig ,
"
’’eternal-temporal . ”
40 . This emphasis on activity is interesting, since
it is the definition that Bowne gives of the real.
-.
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furthermore, since man everywhere is a unity of contra -
dictions ( 55 « 56 )
,
therefore also his activity must reveal
itself as such, i.e., in part as more active and in part
as more passive
,
as the being expresses itself more or
less
.
71.
But all activity has a purpose for which it strug-
gles, and this can be nothing else than the concept of
the active being (66); consequently man as active can-
not tend to anything else than that he, though sensuous
,
may become rational ; that he may live and comprehend
himself as a unity of the rational and the sensuous
through the change of the latter, which would imply his
own change; for the rational is inherently unchangeable.
72.
What, furthermore, man thus strives for he can at -
tain actually to a greater or less degree
,
in part in-
voluntarily, as a consequence of his original ability^1
and his finiteness, and in part voluntarily, as a con-
sequence of his morality or his immorality. But this
does not prevent the tendency, considered as a matter of
principle
.
from being always the same ; it is only its
direction and use
,
only its closer determination in 'every
moment of life, that determines to what degree and in
41 . The word here is "Matt "- -’’measure . " But the con-
text makes it clear that the author means "measure of
ability.
"
<
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what manner the goal is reached.
73 .
Even the general trend of man’s development depends
on the fact that its content is in part relatively more
general, and in part relatively more particular, and that
the former must be regarded by him as relatively more
central
,
inner
.
present t and the latter as relatively
more peripheral , exterior , absent, not only to the extent
that it coexists in space, but also to the extent that it
follows in time.
74 .
This, added to the fact of man’s finiteness, ex-
plains why man, considered in a definite period of his
life, is originally more external and unconscious, and
that he from this point in due time changes so that he
becomes more introspective42 and self-conscious until he
reaches his culmination
,
as well as the fact that there-
after he gradually reverts to a more external and uncon-
scious condition, etc.; all of this takes place provided
that the development is normal and is not interrupted by
contingent circumstances.
75 .
Finally, it is observed that man's general work in
time is a continued reflecting with which, as a conse-
42. The word "inre”— "inner”— is translated as "in-
trospective," because it seems to convey the full mean-
ing better.
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quence of his finiteness
,
there is united a likewise
continued abstracting, in the negative significance of
this word. The word has another meaning when it des-
ignates the opposite to the determination , in which case
it expresses the progress of reflection from the more con-
crete to the more abstract.
B) Concerning Man’s Functions and Capacities
76 .
What man is when he is considered in a certain un-
divided moment of his activity or of his active life is
called one of his functions or manifestations
.
which is
consequently not to be regarded merely as one activity
,
but also as one effect
,
one product
,
of his being. Re-
marks concerning the ground and fitness of the determina-
tion.
77 .
Such a function or manifestation is also always to
be regarded as a unity in multiplicity
,
both with regard
to its content and the period of time it occupies; it
can, therefore, be regarded, according to preference,
both as one single function and as a plurality of such,
concerning each one of which the same would then apply,
etc.
78 .
Both the possibility and the reality of all the
functions of man depend primarily on his eternal being,
..
.
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which, regarded in this relation to them, i.e. , as their
ground and unity and subject, is called capacity or ability
in general, but in the same relationship to a certain kind
among them, a (certain) capacity or an ability of thi
s
kind of functions, which relate themselves to him in gen-
eral as the higher to the lower. Compare 68 .
79 .
From this it is thus apparent that all power or ability
is that of the being or of the spirit; but in specie such
a power is, nevertheless, called a faculty of the mind,
provided that man expresses himself in it as soul
, i.e.,
as actu or perceptibly self-conscious and independent.
Remarks: Concerning the difficulties which we have been
wont to find in the assumption of individual faculties of
the mind, and how they can be settled; further, concern-
ing the ground of the classification of the human capaci-
ties and their significance, etc.
80 .
With regard to I) the form of his functions and his
activity man is A) an elemental being
,
i.e., imperceptibly
self-conscious or perceiving and as such either abstract
or qualified or organized matter; B) spiritual being
,
i.e., perceptibly self-conscious or perceiving; and it
is to be observed in this connection that the lower form
is always in connection with the higher, when it is de-
veloped. The difference, however, is relative, depending
. .
•
.
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on a more or a less. Consideration of the consequences
of this.
81 .
As a spiritual being, man is a) perceiving and spon-
taneous
.
noticeable to others, but not to himself; b) con-
scious and arbitrary
.
noticeable to himself, but not as
spirit; c) self-conscious and free, noticeable also to
himself as spirit. The same comment as above is valid
here. The content itself is richer or more concrete in
the same degree (potentially) as the form is lower or
less spiritual, which is a consequence of man’s finitude.
82 .
With regard to II) the content of his functions and
his activity man is a) sensuous or, considered as ability,
sensuousness ; b) rational, or, considered as ability,
reason . The opposition between the two capabilities is
the same as between the being and the phenomenon. Neither
can exist in the actual man witho ut or exterior to the
other
. At the beginning, however, the former appears as
predominating . ^3
83 .
With regard to III) the purpose or direction of his
functions man is a) theoretical ability
,
provided that he
predominantly intends .higher self-consciousness through
development^ of the soul; b) practical ability
,
provided
43. One sentence in the original has here been divided
into two.
44. The word used means ’’change," but the context in-
dicates the kind of change that implies development.
'.
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that he predominantly intends higher freedom through
development of the exterior; c) esthetic ability
,
pro-
vided that he predominantly intends merely pleasure or
diversion through activity as such.
84 «
Remarks concerning the relation of these divisions
to each other, especially concerning the theoretical ,
practical
,
and esthetic capacities, their appelations in
Swedish
,
their relationship to each other and to the gen -
eral purpose , their bases and results, as well as what is
gained by it, etc.
C) Concerning Man’s Theoretical Ability
85.
The sensuous theoretical ability is a) sens uous
power to feel , or sense in a lower signification (as that
of the animal)
,
which expresses itself as <*) vital-sense^
for measures^ of pleasure or displeasure; /*> the sense
of the organs
,
the higher, with its familiar modifications
the five exterior senses . The very expressions of this
ability are called feelings in a wider sense and objective
feelings or organ-sensations
,
which together comprise the
qualities of the reality existing in space .
45* BostriJm: ’’vital-sinne . ” His use of ’’vital” is
apparently Latin, and is best left thus.
46 . The author uses only the word "modi.” It is
seemingly the plural of the Latin word ’’modus.”
,.
'
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86 .
The same ability, furthermore, develops into b)
ability to foreshadow , which is «*) sense in a higher
degree (as human) provided it has the same content as
the ability to feel, but considers it as an object op-
posite to itself; (&) power of imagination , provided it
has another content than merely the ability to feel, an
inner, clearer, more idealistic and more arbitrary world,
which partially corresponds to the external, more vital
and necessary objective [world}
,
and is not only in the
presently represented space
,
but also in time . The
functions of sense are called awarenesses ,^ intuitions ;
[the functions] of the power of imagination in the es-
sential sense [are called} representations .
87.
As power of imagination the spirit can more or less
arbitrarily use its represented content and 1) reproduce
it in accordance with associations
, 2) transform it ac-
cording to the law of fashion^-8 and schematize it accord-
ing to the lav/s of generalization
,
after which the power
of imagination also receives distinct appelations . Re -
marks : Concerning the meaning, conditions, and limita-
tions of these activities. Further, concerning memory
,
and concerning the meaning of .space and time and the or-
47. *This is perhaps not a good word, but it is ex-
pressive of what the author says here.
48. The word here is ”fictionens , " apparently from
"fingo," "to form," "to fashion."
..
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ganic body.
88 .
The sensuous theoretical power further develops
into c) the power of thought or reason in a wide sense
,
which is <*) concrete power of thought , provided at the
same time that its content is that of the power of pre-
sentation, though clearer, evident, inner, spiritual,
fundamental, necessary, and immutable, though at the
same time not completed; /3) abstract or pure power of
thought
,
provided its content is purely spiritual, and
only needs the language to be realized. The functions
of the former are properly called abstract apprehensions
,
relatively distinguished from schemata; those of the
latter, essential concepts .
..
.
ABSTRACT
The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critical
introduction to the Philosophy of Religion of the Swedish
philosopher, Christopher Jacob Bostrflm, with a translation
and a critical commentary.
Chapter I answers the question, "Who is Christopher
Jacob BostrOm?" After graduation from the university,
BostrOm was professor in the department of philosophy at
Uppsala from 1828 to 1863, except for four years as tutor
at the Swedish court. One of the most popular lecturers,
he brought the study of philosophy at Uppsala to the
highest level that it has ever enjoyed.
In chapter II there is a presentation of BostrOm's
historical relations, his unique contribution, and the
validity of his ideas. The philosophers by whom he was
chiefly influenced are Plato, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant,
Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. BostrOm claims, however,
to have gone beyond them all in bringing rational idealism
to what he considers to be its ultimate position, in
which it is freed from all empiricism and realism.
Chapter XU contains a summary of BostrOm's philo-
sophical system. His is a psychological and epistemo-
logical approach to the problem of reality, and his
system may be called a "logical thought-structure."
Originally there is only the Infinite Reason and its con-
**
.
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tepts, i.e., only God and His eternal ideas, which are
rational beings. The sensuous world in space and time is
only a phenomenon for man of the non-sensuous
,
or real.
Man is a finite-rational being, whose purpose is to at-
tain his eternal idea in God. Although BostrOm holds that
his philosophy of religion corresponds essentially with
Christianity, he rejects such doctrines as the Trinity,
revelation, and vicarious atonement.
Chapter IV, dealing with BostrfJm’s influence, indi-
cates that for half a century his influence controlled
philosophical thinking in Sweden., but that it has not
reached far beyond his own nation. It began to wane
toward the end of the nineteenth century; but the forma-
tion, in 190S, of a BostriJm society to perpetuate and
promote his thought and memory is evidence of the fact
that there is still interest in his philosophy.
Chapter V is a selected translation of BostrOm’s
general Introduction to his Philosophy of Religion
which, in its entirety, includes Theology, Anthropology,
and Philosophy of Religion. For Bostrflm philosophy in
itself is the highest science, dealing with the prin-
ciples of the other sciences. It is divided into theo-
retical and practical, theoretical philosophy dealing
with the true, and practical philosophy with the good.
Theoretical philosophy includes Theology, Anthropology,
and Ethnology. Practical philosophy is the doctrine of
./
.
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reason as purpose and law, whose unity is religion, and
is divided into the Science of Religion in a Restricted
Sense, Ethics, and Political Science.
Chapter VI contains Bostrflm’s brief introduction to
his Philosophy of Religion , which, being essentially prac-
tical, is the doctrine of religion as it exists in and for
man. God leads man to rationality, and gives him reason’s
form, content, and life.
Chapter VII deals with the Human Religion and Reli-
gious Activity as the Worship of God. Religion for man
is man himself as present in all his functions, and com-
prises them in their harmonious development for his
highest end. Devotion is man’s entire being completely
filled by God. Piety is the state of mind in which one
freely subordinates one’s activity to the religious
demands on it.
The subject of Chapter VUI is The Religious Man in
His States. It is divided into four sections. Section
one deals with the religious man's relation to Deity.
Man is relatively identical with, and relatively opposed
to, God,, but approaches relative unity with God's idea
of man, which is perfection.
Section two discusses the religious man's relation
to himself. Since he discovers that all of his powers
are in or from God, he strives to make them moments in
the service of religion. -In the moral activity, which
t:
.
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is a free self-development for the attainment of life in
God, religion appears as faith in the possibility of the
good, and gives man power to labor for it. Religion may
interpret itself in philosophy, and philosophy gives
greater clarity to religion, without destroying faith.
The third section deals chiefly with the problem of
evil. Evil is of two kinds: physical and moral. Phys-
ical evil does not have its ground in man’s free will,
whereas moral evil reaches to man’s inner being. Since
God does not immediately produce the sensuous world,
but this is done through man by his imperfect perceptions,
to demand a perfect world would require man to be perfect.
God is not responsible for evil, since He did not create
man. With the higher development of man, evil will dis-
appear, because it is not essential to man. Evil is a .
self-conscious and free activity. Man is not evil by
nature, but becomes morally evil through himself by the
misuse of freedom of choice. The ground of good and evil
is found in man’s will in relation to reason and sensuous-
ness. To be good is to be rational. Inherited sin is
the influence on man of what has preceded him in the im-
moral behavior of others. Evil does not possess an
eternal substance, since the thought of the eternal exist-
ence of evil does not harmonize with the thought of God
as the absolute end of all life.
Section four deals with man’s relations to other forms
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of life and to their totality. The consciousness of im-
mortality in man is grounded in his consciousness of his
personality. Since man's struggle is intent upon a goal
that has not yet been attained, the necessity arises of
a continuation of life in order to reach it. Several
forms of development are necessary, because man does not
feel completely satisfied in any moment of his existence.
Therefore it follows that a higher life than the present
belongs to his existence, and man must conclude from this
necessity that other forms of life are included in God’s
idea of him. Blessedness is an inevitable consequence
of morality. Endless punishment is at variance with the
very idea of absolute good. Death is only phenomenal,
an expression of man's finiteness, and a consequence of
man’s temporariness. In relation to a succeeding life,
it is a transition.
Chapter DL deals with Religion as It Appears in Time,
and is divided into two sections. Section one deals with
false and incomplete forms of religion. Imperfect forms
of religion arise through an imperfect relationship between
reason and sensuousness. Atheism is theoretical or practi-
cal empiricism in religion. Indifferentism is found in a
life which is not influenced by God. Formalism is placing
essential importance on a certain dogma, or on an external
mode of action. The pietist has religion in his heart,
but this piety is apt to satisfy his vanity in the thought
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of being God's pet. Mysticism is in danger of stopping
at the beginning of religious life—at the standpoint of
feeling and immediate intuition. The danger in quietism
is that the duties of life are neglected. Superstition
arises when the religious activity in man is tainted with
the sensuous, or in thinking of God anthropomorphically.
This superstition is found in the popular concept of prayer,
faith in miracles, in special revelation, in predestination
as an arbitrary act of God, and in man's being led to a
fall by an evil spirit. The imagination about guardian
angels is a sensualizing of man's own higher nature.
The second section discusses the effect of religion
on man, and the means for it. The activity of religion
consists in realizing one's self in the sensuous. The
only real sacrifice man makes is to bring sensuousness
into harmony with reason. All arbitrariness on the part
of God must be separated from grace, because salvation is
not conceivable without man's free co-operation. Man has
the power to convert himself, either in this present life,
or in some other form of life, but not without the help
of God, because it is God who is present in man and causes
conversion. All knowledge is revelation, and there is no
special revelation, because the higher consciousness of
what is true and right is revelation from God, and no
revelation needs anything else to be recognized as divine
than that it is true.
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The conclusion of this work may be summarized as
follows;
1* Bostrdm has established himself as an independent
thinker in bringing his rational idealistic philosophy to
its logical position, namely, that ultimately nothing
exists except God and His eternal ideas,
2, Bostrdm vindicates his claim to being a rational
idealist; his system is a logical thought-structure in
which space, time, action, and change are excluded from
the true and original existence,
3, Bostr8m is a personalist; the principle of his
philosophy is found in the idea of self-consciousness,
which seeks the true and fundamental reality in the eternal
and personal. With him self-consciousness is life, and
life is self-consciousness.
4, In this study it has been discovered that Bostrfira
is especially critical of Hegel, but that he, nevertheless,
resembles Hegel in many respects, a^ for example, in the
doctrine that to 1® is the same as to be for someone, or
to be perceived, and in his emphasis on reason as the
highest approach to God, He differs from Hegel in the
fact that his system leaves no room for development,
5, Bostrdm’s rational theology is in several respects
unacceptable to biblical orthodoxy, since he rejects such
doctrines as the Trinity, vicarious atonement, and revela-
tion, His use of the Bible is in harmony with liberal
•.
.
.
.
,
X '•
. I’
350
theology. The chief criticism of Bostrdm is that he
\
makes his rationality the criterion of truth,
6, Bostrdm’s philosophical system is of interest as
a chapter in the history of philosophic thought; but there
are also elements in it, such as his idealistic personalism,
that will be of abiding interest to those who try to see
beyond appearance to the reality that is its essence.
-'*
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